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Summary
This thesis is concerned with exploring the nature of the Japanese transnational 
corporation and analysing the real effects of their transnational activities within 
Japan’s machinery industries. The machinery industries are the most important of 
Japan’s manufacturing sectors. The sector is also the most open of all Japanese 
manufacturing industry to the forces of globalisation and has seen the global 
emergence of Japan’s so-called “national champions”, such as Toyota, Hitachi 
and Sony.
Japan’s transnationals have been pursuing global strategies to compete with their 
international rivals. In particular, they have been strategically developing their 
own transnational production networks, consisting of their core keiretsu partners 
and suppliers, to facilitate the use of global outsourcing. These transnational 
activities are changing the nature of Japan’s domestic industrial structure. In this 
respect, there have been concerns that the global expansion of Corporate Japan 
has had real consequences for domestic Japanese manufacturing. In particular, 
there have been concerns that the growth in Japanese transnational production will 
lead to a “hollowing out” of Japanese manufacturing industry (Fujita and Hill 
1989; Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000).
These important issues form the subject matter of this thesis. We begin by tracing 
the emergence of Japan’s transnational corporations - within the machinery sector 
- and the growth in Japanese transnational production. Using a Case Study of the 
Japanese automobile industry, we then highlight the growth in Japanese 
transnational production networks, known as the new keiretsu. This new keiretsu 
provides Japan’s transnational corporations with an inside option to “divide and 
rule” both their suppliers and their global labour force. We uncover direct 
evidence of this strategy from interviews and a questionnaire with Managing 
Directors and Senior Managers of Japanese auto-suppliers, based in the UK. We 
argue that such activities create interdependent linkages between the Japanese 
transnationals’ affiliates around the globe. Consequently, the transnationals’ 
strategic decisions, which determine the level of production, investment and 
employment at their domestic and foreign affiliates will then have a real effect 
upon the performance of domestic Japanese manufacturing. We provide both 
econometric and survey evidence to show that this is indeed the case. Finally, in 
the light of our conclusions we suggest possible ways forward for Japanese 
industrial policy.
xv
Chapter 1
Japan’s Transnationals and Globalisation: An Overview
1.1 Introduction
Over the last 25 years, Japan’s transnational corporations have emerged on the 
global scale. Companies such as Toyota and Sony have become household names 
around the world through both their export success and, increasingly, their global 
production activities. These corporations are typical examples of Japan’s 
“national champions”: Japanese corporations that have emerged to successfully 
compete in the global market place with their international rivals. Increasingly, 
however, there have been concerns that the global expansion of Corporate Japan 
has had real consequences for domestic Japanese manufacturing.
This thesis is concerned with exploring the nature of the Japanese transnational 
corporation and analysing the real effects of their transnational activities within 
Japan’s machinery industries. The central hypothesis is that the emergence o f 
Japan’s transnational corporations and their global activities has had real 
effects upon the structure and performance o f Japan's domestic machinery 
sector. In particular, the growth in Japanese transnational production networks 
has led to a new (global) structure of production for Japan’s larger corporations. 
For instance, access to global production sites has allowed Japan’s large 
corporations to attain greater bargaining power (and control) vis-à-vis their 
traditional keiretsu partners. This is because overseas sites offer Japan’s 
transnationals with a credible, alternative option for industrial production, if
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contract negotiations with their domestic keiretsu suppliers become 
unfavourable. Increasingly, Japanese transnationals have been diverting their 
investment and outsourcing their production at the expense of Japan’s domestic 
industry. This has left the majority of Japan’s small keirestu firms - who are 
reliant upon subcontracting orders from the larger Japanese corporations - 
isolated and has raised the spectre of a “hollowing out” (or kiidoka) of Japanese 
manufacturing (Fujita and Hill, 1989; Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000).
These are real concerns and reflect the prominent role that transnational 
corporations now play in the Japanese economy. According to Cowling and 
Sugden (1994), data provided by UNCTAD (1993) - based upon equity 
arrangements -  suggests that Japan’s transnationals own 37.3% of the economy’s 
manufacturing capacity and account for 32.1% of sales'. Although this is 
significant, these calculations are likely to underestimate the true position, since 
they do not account for the assets and sales of Japan’s keiretsu networks which 
fall under the control of the economy’s large firms. From this perspective, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that Japanese transnationals have considerable 
influence over the growth of production, investment and employment within 
Japan and that, in particular, decisions taken to expand their offshore activities 
may then have a real effect upon the behaviour of these variables and hitherto, 
the performance of the Japanese economy.
In this introductory Chapter, we provide a brief overview of the main issues that 
are explored in this thesis. We begin by highlighting the extent to which
1 This compares with the 2.4% of Japan's industrial capacity, which is owned by foreign 
transnationals, which account for 2.8% of sales (Cowling and Sugden, 1994).
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Corporate Japan has expanded its global activities (Section (1.2)). In Section
(1.3), we note the increasing concerns of the real effects of these activities upon 
domestic Japanese manufacturing. Section (1.4) provides an overview of the 
main arguments and ideas that are pursued in Chapters (2) to (7). Finally, Section 
(1.5) provides a description of the main research methodologies employed.
1.2 Corporate Japan’s Global FIJI Position
Figure (1.1) shows the growth in real Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
flows since 1970. There has been a significant growth in outward Japanese FDI 
since the late 1970’s. Indeed, between 1981 and 1998, Corporate Japan has 
recorded the highest average growth rate in FDI of any G7 industrial country. In 
monetary terms, total Japanese FDI flows were in excess of $500 billion, which 
has contributed to a four-fold increase in the real value of Corporate Japan’s 
overseas capital stock (Ministry of Finance, 2000). Consequently, Corporate 
Japan’s cumulative share of global FDI flows has risen from a marginal 3%, in 
1980, to over 12% in 1998. In absolute terms, only US transnationals have 
undertaken greater FDI (UNCTAD, 2000). Perhaps, significantly, given that the 
majority of global FDI flows represent mergers and acquisitions, it is noticeable 
that it is Japanese transnationals that now have the highest rate of overseas 
physical investment in the world (Lawrence, 1993; Yamawaki, 1994).
These trends have occurred in a more liberalised era for Japanese transnational 
corporations. Until 1971, all Japanese FDI had to be validated by Japan’s 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and few FDI proposals were 
actually authorised (see Chapter (2), for further details). However, the ending of
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the restrictions has allowed Corporate Japan to pursue strategies towards a 
greater transnationalisation of its production, allowing them to compete with 
their US and European rivals on the global stage (see Chapter (3)). In this 
respect, the most significant increase in Japanese FDI occurred after the Plaza 
Accord in 1985, which resulted in an appreciation of the Yen thus raising 
production costs in Japan relative to other countries (see Figure (1.1)). Although 
transnational corporations base their investment decisions upon fundamental 
factors -  as opposed to short-term exchange rate fluctuations -  it is likely that the 
Yen’s appreciation may have encouraged Japan’s transnationals to bring forward 
their planned overseas investments to take advantage of lower foreign asset 
prices. During the early 1990’s, Japanese FDI fell, as Corporate Japan 
experienced liquidity constraints in the midst of domestic economic stagnation. 
The mid-1990’s saw a recovery in Japanese FDI flows, although these have 
fallen back slightly after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (see Figure (1.1)).
Table (1.1) provides information on the cumulative dispersion of Japanese FDI 
as at 31/12/1997. The USA has been the largest recipient of Japanese FDI 
followed by the UK. The most important global economic regions for Japanese 
FDI are North and Central America, Asia and Europe, which collectively account 
for 84.8% of all Japanese FDI flows. These economies offer Japanese 
transnationals both “market-seeking” opportunities (Dunning, 1993) and access 
to lower labour costs (Tomlinson, 2002; Chapter (6)). We will return to these 
factors in later Chapters. More fundamentally, within and between these 
economies, Japan’s transnationals have been successful in establishing their own 
transnational production networks. These are networks of the transnationals’ own
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affiliates and suppliers and they provide Corporate Japan with an integrated 
global production chain. The nature o f these networks is discussed in further 
detail in Chapters (4) and (5), where we analyse the globalisation of the Japanese 
automobile industry.
1.3 Fears for Japan’s Domestic Economy and Industrial “Hollowing out”
The extraordinary growth in Japanese FDI has enabled Japan’s large corporations 
or so called “national champions”, such as Toyota and Sony, to emerge on the 
global scale and pursue their own corporate interests. However, while Corporate 
Japan has expanded globally, concerns have arisen about the real effects of this 
increased transnational activity upon the performance of Japan’s domestic 
economy. In particular, there are concerns that Japanese manufacturing - the 
foundation of Japan’s post-war economic growth - has become increasingly 
peripheral, as Japan’s large transnationals have sought to substitute foreign for 
domestic production. As this trend continues, there is a serious risk that Japanese 
manufacturing will experience a relative economic decline and a “hollowing out” 
(kudoka) of its industrial base (Fujita and Hill, 1989; Cowling and Tomlinson, 
2000). These concerns have gained particular credence during the 1990’s, which 
was a period of unprecedented economic stagnation for the Japanese economy.
The “hollowing out” of Japan’s industrial base is a serious possibility, given 
Japan’s low inward stock of FDI. According to the OECD (1999), Japan’s 
outward to inward stock of FDI is 12:1. This means that while outward FDI 
diverts investment expenditures away from Japan’s industrial regions, inward 
flows of FDI have been insufficient to replenish Japan’s domestic capital stock.
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Furthermore, the majority of these inward flows relate to foreign mergers and 
acquisitions of Japanese companies, rather than new physical capital investment. 
In many of these cases, such as Renault’s acquisition of Nissan, inward FDI 
flows have actually led to a further rationalisation of domestic Japanese industry 
(see Chapter (7)).
A further consideration is the growth in Japanese transnational production 
networks, which have facilitated a new (global) structure of industrial production 
for the Japanese corporations. In particular, access to an integrated global 
production chain has allowed Japan’s large transnationals to increase their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis their global network of suppliers and workers. 
Overseas sites provide the transnational with - in the parlance of game theory - 
an “inside option” to switch or threaten to switch their production, if contract 
negotiations with their suppliers or labour unions, at a particular site, become 
unfavourable. This is effectively a “divide and rule” strategy, which raises the 
transnationals’ share of the production surplus at the expense of either their 
suppliers or workers, or both (Cowling and Sugden, 1994). In Chapter (5), we 
provide direct evidence of Japanese automotive transnationals using their 
transnational networks to pursue such “divide and rule” strategies in order to 
generate a form of intra-firm competition.
The transnationals’ use of “divide and rule” strategies has particularly placed 
Japan’s domestic small firm sector in a vulnerable position and it has become 
increasingly apparent that Japan’s large corporations have been using these 
networks to out-source production at the expense of domestic industry. In this
6
respect, it is important to note that Japan’s small firms have traditionally 
operated in so-called keiretsu networks, providing intermediate goods and 
services to their main contractors. These clusters of small-firm subcontractors 
were once regarded as important contributors to productivity growth in Japanese 
manufacturing (JSBRI, 1996; see also Chapter (2)). However, the transnationals’ 
greater access to global supply chains and the use of “divide and rule” strategies 
has resulted in a significant reduction in demand for the keiretsu firms’ products. 
In addition to their falling order books, Japan’s keiretsu firms have also had to 
accept lower prices for their output; a consequence of their weaker bargaining 
position (JSBRI, 1996). In effect, the keiretsu firms have been left “isolated”, as 
their main contractors have become global players.
As the keiretsu firms’ revenues have fallen, Japan’s small firm sector has 
struggled to repay its long-term loan commitments, thus contributing to the 
substantial rise in small firm business failures and the high bankruptcy rates seen 
in Japan during the 1990’s (Nikkei Weekly, 19/10/98). These trends were 
occurring when other industrialised nations -  particularly the USA and the UK -  
were experiencing a noted resurgence in small firm vibrancy (Whittaker, 1997). 
Moreover, the “isolation” of Japan’s small firm sector has adversely affected 
Japan’s industrial regions, many of which now face the prospect of long-term 
industrial decline (see Chapter (6)). For Japanese manufacturing as a whole, the 
wider consequences of these trends have been clearly visible during the past 
decade. Japanese industrial productivity has barely risen since 1990, while the 
manufacturing sector lost over a million jobs between 1992 and 1996 and was 
forecast to lose a further 1.25 million jobs by 2001 (Katz, 1998).
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1.4 Outline of Chapters (2) to (7)
In order to understand why these trends have occurred and how Japan may 
nullify the adverse consequences of the globalisation of its industries, it is 
important to focus our attention upon the nature of the Japanese transnational 
corporation and to consider the real effects of their activities upon Japanese 
industry. This is the subject matter of this thesis. We will first consider the 
evolution of Japanese transnationals, their emergence on the global scale, their 
global activities and the real effects of these activities upon Japanese 
manufacturing. These issues are investigated using a mixed methodological 
approach as outlined in Section (1.5), below.
In conducting this study, we concentrate exclusively upon Japan’s machinery 
sector. The machinery industries are the most important of all Japan’s 
manufacturing sectors and - before 1990 - they were the foundation of Japan’s 
extraordinarily high post Second World War economic growth (Johnson, 1982). 
In this respect, the machinery sector has particularly benefited from MITI’s 
interventionist industrial policy and the adoption of “lean” production processes 
(see Chapter (2)). The sector is also the most open of all Japanese industries to 
the forces of globalisation, and has seen the global emergence of Japan’s 
“national champions”, such as Toyota, Hitachi and Sony. However, during the 
1990’s the sector has been severely affected by problems of “hollowing out”. 
The sector therefore represents an ideal Case Study to consider the nature of 
Japanese transnationals and the real effects of their global activities.
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Our study begins in Chapter (2), with an overview of the role and characteristics 
of the traditional keiretsu networks in Japan’s machinery sector, particularly 
those in the automobile industry. The origins of Japanese transnationals and the 
nature of their global operations evolve from Japan’s domestic structure of 
production. As we mentioned earlier, Japan’s industrial structure is based upon a 
multitude of subcontracting relationships in so-called keiretsu networks. These 
keiretsu relations are often purported to embody “close ties”, “co-operation” and 
“mutual trust” between the various parties involved (Smitka, 1991). Such 
characteristics have led Aoki (1990) to view Japanese firms as being “non- 
hierarchical entities” that embrace a wide set of interests, which includes 
suppliers, financial interests, management and workers. In summary, Aoki 
(1990) regards the Japanese firm as a nexus o f treaties.
Chapter (2) reviews Aoki’s (1990) position in some detail, but takes an opposing 
view of the Japanese firm, based upon a strategic decision-making approach as 
outlined in Zeitlin (1974) and developed further in the work of Cowling and 
Sugden (1994, 1998). Drawing upon alternative evidence and observations - 
primarily from Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) -  it is apparent that a few large 
corporate firms dominate Japan’s keiretsu networks, through the exploitation of 
various control mechanisms. In effect, these control mechanisms facilitate a 
hierarchical structure of production, with keiretsu firms often subordinate to the 
demands of their main contractors. This leads us to view Japanese corporations 
as being controlled from a centre of strategic decision-making. Interestingly, a 
re-appraisal of Japanese industrial policy would also appear to suggest that this 
structure was actively encouraged by MITI, in an attempt to cultivate Japan’s
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“national champions”. These are important insights, which aid our understanding 
of the nature of industrial relationships and the degree of control and 
oligopolistic behaviour in Corporate Japan.
Chapter (3) utilises this framework to analyse the reasons for the emergence of 
Japan’s transnationals. The main argument is that transnationality is, itself, 
endogenous and is a result of both demand constraints and supply side factors in 
Japan’s domestic economy. It is conceivable that Japan’s oligopolistic 
environment may have led to a climate of deficient domestic demand, which may 
have encouraged larger Japanese corporations to undertake FDI in order to 
secure and expand new overseas markets. Following Pitelis (1996, 2000), a 
simple econometrics test is undertaken, which provides some statistical evidence 
that domestic demand deficiencies are related to outward Japanese FDI. 
However, while demand-side factors are important, it is, fundamentally, supply 
side factors, which affect a firm’s strategic decision to become a transnational 
corporation - as opposed to servicing foreign markets through exporting and/or 
licensing/subcontracting. In this respect, the analysis returns to Hymer (1976) 
and the argument that transnationality reflects a determination, on the part of 
oligopolistic (Japanese) corporations, to protect a specific (competitive) 
advantage and to remove conflict in international markets. For Japanese firms, 
these specific (competitive) advantages may relate to their technological 
competence and the organisational efficiencies of their keiretsu networks. In the 
international market, transnationality allows Japanese corporations to directly 
control and protect these specific advantages, while the development of
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transnational production networks raises the corporation’s bargaining leverage 
with both international labour and world governments (see Chapter (3)).
These supply side issues are explored further in Chapters (4) and (5), where the 
analysis focuses upon the Japanese automobile industry. The automobile industry 
is Japan’s leading manufacturing industry and is the most global of Japanese 
industries. Chapter (4) provides new evidence on the scale and pattern of 
globalisation within the industry, using data carefully collated from the Dodwell 
Marketing Consultants’ Directory (1997). In Chapter (4), we reveal the extent of 
the various Japanese automobile assemblers’ (or Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs)) global operations, including details of the globalisation 
of their supply chain, the new keiretsu. The new keiretsu pre-dominantly consists 
of the Japanese OEMs’ core suppliers, which is a strategic attempt, by the 
industry’s corporate hierarchy, to replicate domestic keiretsu relations at the 
global level. In effect, the industry’s hierarchy have been deliberately creating a 
transnational production network to protect and maintain their specific 
(competitive) advantages - which are related to the nature to domestic keiretsu 
relations - and also to control their international operations.
Although the nucleus of the new keiretsu involves Japanese suppliers, the new 
keiretsu also includes a mix of Japanese and indigenous actors, such as 
managerial staff and personnel, and other suppliers of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs. These involve the establishment of new relations, between 
parties of different cultures. In Chapter (5), we investigate the nature of these 
new keiretsu relationships, using a Case Study of Japanese auto-suppliers based
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in the UK. We are careful not to generalise our results, given that they are based 
upon specific evidence from the UK. Nevertheless, given that the UK is the 
major European centre for Japanese automotive production, the results in 
Chapter (5) maybe considered a good representation of new keiretsu relations 
elsewhere.
As mentioned in Section (1.3), the new keiretsu alters the nature of traditional 
keiretsu relations, in that it provides Japan’s automotive transnationals with an 
“inside option” to switch production to an alternative global site. This facilitates 
the use of a “divide and rule” strategy, with both labour and world governments. 
In the former case, Chapter (5) uncovers direct evidence that Japanese UK 
affiliates are involved in this form of intra-firm competition. However, while 
such a strategy appears to allow Japan’s OEMs to resolve conflict with their own 
global labour force, such strategies may raise conflicts at the executive level 
when the Japanese affiliate is involved in a joint venture with an indigenous firm 
and disputes arise over the level of affiliate profitability. This issue is 
investigated in further detail in Chapter (5).
In Chapter (6), we provide empirical evidence of the real effects of transnational 
activity upon Japan’s domestic machinery sector. We first concentrate upon the 
real effects of transnational activity upon the behaviour of investment and labour 
demand in these industries. Through the new keiretsu, Japanese transnationals 
have created interdependent linkages between their transplants around the globe 
in order to control their (international) costs, via a “divide and rule” strategy. The
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result is that both investment and employment, at domestic Japanese transplants, 
are now increasingly sensitive to the behaviour of changes in global wage costs.
Following Hollingsworth (1997), the real effects of this transnational activity can 
be captured empirically, by augmenting foreign wage variables into the domestic 
production function. A partial equilibrium model is formulated and the estimated 
equations suggest that both investment and employment, in Japan’s machinery 
sector, are sensitive to international wage effects. These results, along with 
further qualitative evidence, are then discussed in the context of concerns about 
the “hollowing out” of the Japanese economy. Finally, given these concerns 
about the future of Japanese manufacturing. Chapter (7) considers the 
possibilities for the direction of future industrial policy.
1.5 Research Methodology
In investigating the above issues, this thesis has employed a mixed 
methodological approach. This has involved a comprehensive literature review, 
data collation from various primary and secondary sources and the use of a 
variety of statistical techniques, including cross-tabulation, correlation and 
econometrics.
The secondary data has been collated from established sources such as the 
Japanese Statistical Yearbook, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD) and the International Labour Office (ILO). 
This data is presented in relevant tables and graphs through Chapters (1) to (7).
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Secondary data is also used to conduct econometric testing of hypotheses in 
Chapters (3) and (6) and, in these cases, the appropriate data sources are quoted 
at the end of each Chapter.
In addition, data and information on specific Japanese machinery industries were 
obtained from the various industry bodies. However, for the Case Study, on the 
Japanese automobile industry (Chapters (4) and (5)), data was collated from three 
sources: the Dodwell Report (1997), interviews and a questionnaire. The 
interviews were conducted with 7 Managing Directors and the questionnaire was 
completed by 27 Managing Directors/Senior Managers of UK based Japanese 
auto-suppliers (a response rate of 71.1%). The interviews and questionnaire were 
based upon guidelines set out in Moser and Kalton (1971). Further details of the 
Dodwell data and the approaches taken with regards to the interviews and the 
questionnaire are provided in Appendices (A) and (B). In analysing the Case 
Study data, cross-tabulations and correlations were primarily employed and 
further details of these statistical techniques are provided in Appendix (C).
The mixed methodologies employed reflect the holistic approach that is taken in 
collating appropriate evidence for this thesis. It was felt that such an approach 
was warranted since it provides for a wider and deeper understanding of the key 
issues as opposed to relying solely upon the standard economist’s toolkit, where 
the emphasis is upon formal modelling and econometric testing. We would argue 
that to understand the emergence of Japan’s transnationals and to gauge the real 
effects of their activities upon Japan’s domestic machinery sector, a sense of 
historical perspective is required, along with an appreciation of the Japanese 
polity, culture and industrial organisation. These are important considerations.
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which cannot easily be encompassed within a standard neoclassical framework. 
Rather it is important that they are addressed through a wider, perhaps more 
scientific approach, which then allows for the formulation of a valid argument. 
This thesis has tried to adhere to this latter doctrine, with the literature reviews 
providing the basis of our argument and the automotive Case Study providing 
direct and deeper insights into the nature of Japanese (transnational) industrial 
organisation. These insights have then allowed us to formulate and estimate 
appropriate econometric models to provide further empirical support for the 
hypotheses under consideration.
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Figure (1.1)
Japanese Real Outward FDI Flows 1970-1998
16
Table (1.1)
Main Country Location of Japanese FDI by Cumulative Outward FDI Stock 
as at 31/12/1997 (in Millions of Yen)
Country Yen Component Ratio %
USA 13295500 37.6
Canada 613800 1.7
Subtotal 13909300 39.3
France 388700 1.1
Germany 578900 1.6
Italy 72000 0.2
Netherlands 1383200 3.9
Spain 120600 0.3
UK 2862100 8.1
Subtotal 5405500 15.2
China 2760600 7.8
Hong Kong 1077800 3.1
Indonesia 1027300 2.9
Korea 1147300 3.3
Malaysia 611800 1.7
Philippines 273700 0.8
Singapore 1429100 4.0
Thailand 743500 2.1
Subtotal 9071100 25.7
North & Central America 14041400 39.7
Europe 5894300 16.7
Asia 10037300 28.4
Rest of World 5361000 15.2
World 35334000 100
Source: O E C D  (1999), Iateiuatioaal Dirac« Investment Statistics Yearbook (Faria: O E C D )
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Chapter 2
The Japanese Firm and Japan’s Domestic Machinery Industries1
2.1 Introduction
Our analysis of the Japanese transnational corporation and the machinery sector 
begins with an (historical) overview of Japan’s domestic industrial structure. 
This is important since, in Chapter (3), it will be argued that the roots of 
transnationality and the industry’s globalisation stem from Japan’s domestic 
business environment. Furthermore, as will be seen in Chapters (4) and (5), the 
nature of this globalisation reflects an attempt by Japan’s large transnationals to 
replicate important characteristics of their domestic activities in various 
locations, around the globe. This is clearly evident in the automobile industry 
(see Chapter (4)). The overview in this Chapter, therefore, provides key insights 
into the nature of Japanese keiretsu relationships within the machinery sector and 
also how activities are organised. An understanding of these keiretsu 
relationships is also important, for considering the wider real effects of 
globalisation within the sector in Chapter (6).
Through an analysis of Japan’s machinery sector and industrial structure, this 
Chapter also reappraises the literature on the Japanese firm. This is important 
since one of the central tenets in this thesis, is that the Japanese transnational 
corporation is a hierarchical organisation, controlled by a corporate elite, which 
is in control of its global operations. Furthermore, this thesis maintains that 1
1 Some of the arguments in this Chapter - which relate to the nature of the Japanese Firm - are 
considered further in Cowling and Tomlinson (2001).
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Japan’s transnationals are a replication of their domestic entities. However, an 
influential literature, initiated by Aoki (1984, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994), argues 
that Japanese firms are “non-hierarchical entities”, which embody a wide range 
of interests within the organisation (e.g. workers, financial and managerial). 
Aoki’s argument is anathema to the view(s) espoused in this thesis. In 
confronting Aoki’s position, we focus upon the concentration of strategic 
decision-making within the typical Japanese firm and draw upon particular 
examples of the various control mechanisms used by Japan’s large automotive 
firms. The automobile industry examples are particularly relevant, since Aoki 
(1990) and others (see, for instance, Smitka, 1991) have referred to the industry 
as a clear example of Japanese industrial co-operation, and the “close ties” and 
“mutual trust” that exist between firms. From our perspective, the discussion also 
provides a useful precursor to the analysis in Chapters (4) and (5).
The remainder of this Chapter is as follows. In Section (2.2), we present data on 
the main characteristics of the machinery sector and identify the major 
agglomerations of industrial activity within Japan. We also consider the 
important role of industrial policy in the machinery sector’s economic 
development. Section (2.3) outlines the key aspects of the machinery sector’s 
industrial structure, drawing upon particular examples from the automobile 
industry. In Section (2.4), we reappraise Aoki’s (1990) view of the Japanese firm 
and offer an alternative interpretation through a strategic decision-making 
approach (Zeitlin, 1974; Cowling and Sugden, 1994, 1998). Finally, Section (2.5) 
concludes.
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Japan’s machinery sector consists of five broad industries: Fabricated Metal 
Products (ISIC 381), Agricultural and Industrial Machinery (ISIC 382), 
Electrical Machinery and Electric Goods (ISIC 383), Transport Equipment (ISIC 
384) and Precision Tools (ISIC 385). These industries have traditionally played a 
significant role within the Japanese economy and have long been regarded as the 
engine of the country’s economic growth and international competitiveness (see 
Johnson, 1982). The machinery sector collectively accounts for 43.7% of all 
manufacturing employment and, on average, contributes 42.8% to Japan’s total 
output (see Table (2.1)). It also provides 75% of the economy’s exports (see 
Whittaker, 1997).
The statistics in Table (2.1) provide further information on the characteristics of 
Japan’s machinery sector for the period 1968 to 1994. It appears that the sector’s 
largest industries are Agricultural and Industrial Machinery (ISIC 382), Electrical 
Machinery and Electric goods (ISIC 383) and Transport Equipment (ISIC 384). 
The output of these industries has been quite similar and collectively accounts for 
approximately 83% of production in the machinery sector. In terms of capital 
employed, Transport Equipment accounts for almost a third of the sector’s real 
capital stock, while the Electrical Machinery and Electric Goods industry is the 
largest employer. Furthermore, these relative positions have remained stable over 
the 1968 -1994 period as indicated by the small variance in the sample means of 
the reported data (see Table (2.1)).
2.2 Japan’s Machinery Industries
2.2.1 Industry Characteristics
20
The final column in Table (2.1) is the average labour/capital ratio (L/K), which is 
calculated as the proportion of total hours worked to the real capital stock in each 
industry. For all industries in Japan, this ratio has fallen since 1968, as firms have 
moved towards more automated production processes (see Baba, 1997). From 
Table (2.1), it appears that the L/K ratio is higher in the machinery sector than in 
other manufacturing industries. This indicates that the machinery sector is more 
labour intensive, which implies that labour costs will be relatively more 
important in the firm’s cost function. A particular case is the Electrical 
Machinery and Electric Goods industry, which is dominated by the production of 
semi-conductors, electronics, computer hardware and other consumer appliances. 
These are industries that rely upon a large workforce to assemble items such as 
circuit boards, microprocessors and other electronic devices. In contrast, the L/K 
ratio is much lower in Transport Equipment where over two-thirds of the output 
is in automobiles, an industry that is said to rely upon highly automated “lean” 
production processes (see Womack et.al, 1990; Fujimoto and Takeishi, 1997).
2.2.2 Japan’s Industrial Districts
The data in Table (2.2) and the map in Figure (2.1) provide some information on 
the geographical location of domestic Japanese manufacturing and, in particular, 
the machinery sector. As Table (2.2) shows, over 73% of output and 68% of 
employment in the machinery industries are concentrated within 15 of Japan’s 47 
prefectures. In addition, these 15 prefectures also account for 63% of total 
manufacturing output and employment. Since the Meiji Restoration of 1968, 
these regions have emerged to become the hub of Japanese manufacturing, 
benefiting from being close to major ports and a large labour force. The most
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important of these prefectures are the large industrial belts of Aichi, Kanagawa, 
Sizuoka and Tokyo (see Table (2.2)), where the major industries are Transport 
Equipment, Electrical Machinery and Electronics.
It is within these prefectures that we find Japan’s main industrial districts. 
Marshall (1919) defines an industrial district as an area where there is a cluster of 
industrial activity, which enables firms to benefit from external scale economies 
that are a result of their direct interdependence. These agglomeration economies 
include not only “technological factors”, such as labour market pooling and the 
sharing of local infrastructure, but also the diffusion of information such as new 
technology, advances in knowledge and changes in organisation. By generating 
these agglomeration effects, local industries reduce their costs and achieve 
increasing returns to scale. The cluster’s economic vibrancy, in turn, attracts new 
firms and industrial activity - the so-called centripetal forces of agglomeration - 
which generates even further externalities and enhances the network’s 
competitive advantages (Krugman, 1995).
These clusters are often characterised by a propagation of small firm activity, 
with firms establishing horizontal linkages between themselves, such as those 
evident in Emilia-Romagna - the ‘Third Italy” - and Baden WUrttemburg, in 
Germany. There are also a large number of small firms in Japan’s industrial 
districts. Indeed, small and medium sized businesses play an important role in 
Japanese manufacturing and regularly account for over 99% of private business 
establishments, employ over 78% of the labour force and produce approximately 
70% of domestic output (JSBC, 1998). However, unlike in Europe, Japan’s small
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firms primarily operate in so-called vertical keiretsu networks, acting as 
subcontractors to larger firms within a Corporate Group (the kigyo shudan). 
Nevertheless, a number of Japan’s smaller firms have developed other income 
sources and do not rely solely upon sub-contracting.
In this respect, Whittaker (1997) has identified three types of industrial district 
that exist within Japan. The first type of district is known as the sanchi, which 
comprise of agglomerations of small independent firms, operating in small 
workshops. In the machinery sector, these firms primarily specialise in the low 
volume production of high-tech goods. They can be found in the metropolitan 
centres of Tokyo and Osaka. Whittaker (1997) identifies the small-scale nature of 
production within the sanchi, as being Japan’s closest example of a Marshallian 
industrial district. The largest industrial districts are the so-called “company 
castle towns” (kigyo joka machi), where there are a large number of small firms, 
but the dominant players are Japan’s large corporations. Examples of these 
“company castle towns” include Toyota City, in Aichi prefecture, where Toyota 
and their core suppliers (for instance, Denso and Aisin Seiki) have established 
their major domestic operations. Nissan have developed similar clusters within 
Kanagawa, Tokyo and Tochigi, while Honda’s operations are primarily within 
the prefectures of Shizuoka, Saitama and Mie. In addition, the large electronics 
firms, such as Hitachi, Sony, Toshiba and NEC have also created their own 
keiretsu networks within these prefectures. Finally, there are also districts where 
the main firms are medium-sized firms, who manufacture under their own label, 
but who combine local contracting out with in-house production (see Whittaker,
1997).
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According to Johnson (1982), the growth of Japan’s machinery sector, its relative 
importance in Japanese manufacturing and its post-war international 
competitiveness are the result of MITI’s active industrial policy and Japan’s 
institutional style of capitalism2. In this respect, the immediate post-war period 
saw the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) designate 
the machinery industries as being “strategic”. This meant that MITI identified the 
sector as being one that would play a pivotal role in Japan’s future economic and 
industrial development. As a result, over the last fifty years, the sector has, at 
various times, benefited from measures such as direct subsidies, discriminatory 
tariffs, preferential commodity taxes, import restrictions and favourable industry 
regulation. Initially, during the 1950’s and early 1960’s, the machinery sector’s 
“strategic industries” consisted of the heavy industries, iron and steel, 
shipbuilding and electrical equipment. By the 1970’s and 1980’s the emphasis 
had shifted to industries producing consumer durables, namely automobiles and 
semi-conductors, while in the 1990’s, MITI has tried to encourage higher 
technology industries such as advanced electronics and computer equipment 
(JSMA, 1993).
For Johnson (1982), the most important tenet of Japan’s industrial policy was the 
regulation of foreign trade. In the early post-war period, MITI shielded Japan’s 
infant machinery industries from foreign competition, by imposing extensive 
import quotas on cheaper foreign imports. The quotas were implemented under
2.2.3 Industrial Policy and Industrial Development
2 The economic rationale for the State to encourage industrial development through an 
institutional style of capitalism and an active industrial policy is associated with the literature on 
“development traps” (see Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Gershenkron, 1962; Murphy et.al, 1989).
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the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, which authorised 
MITI to allocate Japan’s limited foreign exchange reserves to importers. 
However, by the mid-1960’s, the quota system was under pressure from new 
GATT guidelines, while Japan’s rising trade surpluses effectively restricted 
MITI’s ability to ration foreign exchange (Katz, 1998). M m  responded by 
raising tariff levels, particularly in its designated “strategic industries”. For 
instance, in 1963, the highest Effective Tariff Protection Rate (ETPR) was 
applied in Transport Equipment (61%), Electrical Machinery (31%) and 
Precision instruments (35%). As the machinery sector developed and became 
internationally competitive, the tariffs were gradually reduced and by 1978, the 
ETPR in these industries were 3%, 7% and 6% respectively (Itoh and Kiyono, 
1988).
While protecting domestic infant industries, M m ’s trade policies were 
supplemented with positive support to Japan’s exporters. This included specific 
tax breaks; such as tax deductions on export earnings (1953-1963) and 
accelerated depreciation allowances for exports (1964-1971). These subsidies 
sometimes amounted to as much as 25% of profits (Itoh and Kiyono, 1988; Katz,
1998). An important institutional development was the establishment of the 
Japanese External Trade Organisation (JETRO), which was given the directive to 
promote Japanese trading interests abroad. The overseas JETRO offices 
expanded upon the role played by Japan’s general trading companies (the sogo 
shosha), by conducting extensive market research and aiding Japanese exporters 
to secure contracts in new and existing markets (see Johnson, 1982).
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In addition to trade protection, MITI imposed strict controls upon Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). The controls over FDI were operational under the 1949 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and the 1950 Foreign 
Investment Law. These laws were strict and all FDI proposals were subject to 
approval by a MITI appointed, governmental liaison committee. The 
overwhelming majority of these proposals were rejected and few official reasons 
were given3. Bailey et.al (1994a) argue that by allowing MITI to sanction all 
inward and outward FDI proposals, the laws allowed Japan to insulate infant 
industries from the pressures of global competition4. However, while FDI was 
subjected to restrictions, MITI did positively encourage machinery firms to enter 
into suitable licensing and joint venture agreements with foreign competitors. 
These arrangements usually required MITI’s approval, but they enabled Japanese 
industry to gain access to the latest international technologies. Ozawa (1973) has 
argued that a critical factor in Japan’s post-war international success was the 
remarkable ability of Japanese manufacturers to successfully adopt and improve 
upon these foreign technologies.
Finally, in addition to MITI, the post-war Japanese State also established 
institutions that have provided long-term finance for manufacturers at 
preferential rates of interest. The Bank of Japan encouraged the development of 
the banking keiretsu, whereby groups of enterprises could collectively borrow
3 FDI proposals that were permitted were those MITI regarded as being conducive to the long 
term interests of the Japanese economy (see Chapter (3)).
4 The concerns over Foreign Direct Investment were two-fold. MITI was concerned that inward 
flows of FDI would lead to foreign competitors (mainly from the USA) entering and 
monopolising Japanese markets, at the expense of indigenous industry. There were also fears that 
outward FDI would lead to “reverse exports", which would also harm less efficient domestic 
infant industries (see Bailey et.al, 1994a).
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funds, in excess of their net worth from city banks. The city banks, in turn, 
borrowed funds from the central bank, which guaranteed the system. The 
Ministry of Finance also set up the Japanese Development Bank, enabling funds 
to be directed from the postal savings system to MITI’s designated “strategic 
industries” in the machinery sector (Johnson, 1982).
2.3 Japanese Industrial Organisation
2.3.1 Japan’s Keiretsu Networks: The Case o f Japan’s Automobile Industry 
In Japan, approximately 56% of small firms are involved in some form of 
subcontracting. However, in the machinery sector, over 70% of small firms are 
subcontractors and this figure is higher than 80% in Electrical Machinery and 
Transport Equipment (Whittaker, 1997). These are the keiretsu firms that operate 
in the “company castle towns”, where they predominantly supply intermediate 
goods and services to the larger Corporate Group firms. The Corporate Group(s) 
or “kigyo shudan" consist of Japan’s larger firms and they represent a horizontal 
conglomerate of financial and industrial interests (Scher, 1997).
As we have already noted, the typical Japanese firm is a vertically de-integrated 
entity. Industrial activity is generally organised through keiretsu networks, where 
intermediate goods and services are supplied through an extensive set of 
(vertical) sub-contracting arrangements. This may be described as a pyramidal 
structure of production, but the literature emphasises the long-standing close 
relationships, co-operation and the mutual trust that exist between keiretsu firms 
and their main contractors. Indeed, firms are often encouraged to co-operate and 
innovate through the sharing of technology and personnel exchanges (see
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Gerlach, 1992, Scher, 1997). These close relations also include the practice of 
large corporations guaranteeing the keiretsu firms’ income streams, particularly 
in periods of fluctuating demand. Furthermore, larger corporations may also offer 
a “free consultancy service”, providing their sub-contractors with advice and 
information about manufacturing operations, financial matters and foreign 
markets. In return, some sub-contractors may be given responsibility for the 
design and manufacture of complete sub-assemblies.
The most prominent examples of these keiretsu relations are those observed in 
Japan’s automobile industry (see Smitka, 1991). The industry has the largest and 
widest number of keiretsu linkages within Japanese manufacturing. These 
linkages involve Japan’s 11 main assemblers (hereafter referred to as Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)) and approximately 1,400 auto-components 
suppliers (Dodwell, 1997). In addition, the automobile industry also has linkages 
with more than 10,000 materials producers and subcontractors, which span the 
whole of the machinery sector. The scale of these linkages are reflected in the 
fact that Japanese OEMs outsource 70% of their components in terms of value 
and 90% of actual components (Fujimoto and Takeishi, 1994, Dodwell, 1997).
The automobile industry is a web of “high dependency relationships”, with a 
high degree of interdependence between the activities of keiretsu firms. A 
supplier’s profitability ultimately depends upon the competitiveness of the OEM 
and the success of the final product(s). The OEM’s competitiveness, in turn, 
reflects the performance and technology of its supply chain. A key facet of the 
industry’s corporate success is the close, long-term, bilateral relationships that
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have evolved between the OEMs and their suppliers (Smitka, 1991). The “close 
ties” and “mutual trust” are reflected in the fact that OEMs often designate 
responsibility for the design and production of complete component systems to 
their First Tier suppliers. Over time, these suppliers have accumulated relation- 
specific skills and this would appear to place them in a favourable bargaining 
position vis-à-vis their OEMs. However, by owning a significant proportion of 
equity in their key suppliers, Japan’s large OEMs are able to reduce the potential 
for any conflict over contracts. In this respect, contract prices are usually set 
through a process of “open book accounting”, where the price and cost structure 
of each component is analysed by the OEM in detail, before a “target price” is 
agreed upon. There is a general expectation that the “target price” will fall over 
time, with the OEM providing the supplier with assistance to reduce costs (Aoki, 
1988). Furthermore, to reduce potential agency problems, particularly at the 
lower end of the supply chain, the OEM also maintains internal rankings of all its 
suppliers. Those suppliers that do not meet the required standards - on price, 
quality and delivery - often lose their position within a transactional hierarchy 
and they also lose future business opportunities (Aoki, 1988, 1990). This 
prospect is more likely where the components are small, standard units and the 
OEM can easily find an alternative supplier (Asanuma, 1989).
A particular feature of Japan’s automotive keiretsu relationships are the supplier 
associations or "kyoryoku-kai", which exist at 10 of the 11 Japanese OEMs5. The 
supplier associations facilitate a wider communication of the OEM’s production 
plans, and encourage mutual learning amongst participants. They also provide a
5 The exception is Honda Motor Corporation.
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forum for members to solicit new suggestions for common problems, such as 
parts standardisation. According to Sako (1996, p.669), the associations 
encourage a “network o f innovators", providing important net benefits to both 
OEMs and suppliers while also assisting the diffusion of knowledge throughout
the sector.
2.3.2 Japanese Production Processes
In addition to MITI’s industrial policy and the co-operative nature of the keiretsu 
networks, the international competitiveness of Japan’s machinery sector has also 
been attributed to the efficiency of Japanese production processes (see, for 
instance, Kenny and Florida, 1988, 1993). These processes revolve around a so- 
called Just-In-Time (JIT) production system, based upon time economy, and an 
emphasis upon kaizen quality control at each stage of production. The successful 
implementation of these processes requires long-term co-operation by all keiretsu 
firms. The processes were first introduced in the Japanese automobile industry, 
during the 1950’s and 1960’s, by, ironically, Western engineers, such as the 
American, William Deming, whose ideas had largely been ignored in the West 
(Dicken, 1998). The principles of these processes have subsequently been 
adopted throughout Japan’s machinery sector (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). Since 
the mid-1980’s, they have also been increasingly adopted by Western 
corporations (Sabel, 1988).
After conducting a major study into Toyota’s production processes, Womack 
et.al (1990, p.13), describe the Japanese production processes as “lean” since “it 
uses less of everything compared with (traditional) mass production - half the
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human effort in the factory, half the manufacturing space, half the investment in 
tools, half the engineering hours to develop a new product in half the time. Also 
it requires keeping far less than half o f the needed inventory on site, results in 
many fewer defects, and produces a greater and ever growing variety of 
products". Womack et.al (1990) argue that the description of “lean” is merited 
because Japanese production processes are highly flexible, in terms of both the 
use of the labour force and machinery. Production is said to be organised so that 
there is frequent job-rotation, which facilitates learning by doing and job 
flexibility, while the use of information technologies allows flexibility in the use 
of machinery so that it can easily, and quickly, be switched to different 
processes.
The use of kaizen or total quality control is believed to develop a particular 
emphasis upon quality throughout the system, which reduces waste and, 
therefore, increases efficiency. In addition, Womack et.al (1990) also argue that, 
through their close keiretsu relationships, Toyota and other Japanese automotive 
OEMs have perfected the Just-In-Time (JIT) production system, which allows 
production to “flow”, with components being delivered and assembled, exactly 
when required - through the use of quick machinery changeover - to meet 
projected individual demand(s). It is then argued that JIT and “flow” leads to a 
significant reduction in inventory holdings, throughout the system, while 
production runs are flexible, and can be tailored to manufacture a diverse range 
of output. This is said to compare favourably with the traditional batch system, 
where there are long production runs, producing a narrow range of outputs - a 
system, which also requires large stock holdings to avoid a disruption in supply.
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2.3.3 Labour Relations
In the workplace, Aoki (1990) has observed that the Japanese firm encourages a 
wide degree of job rotation, which allows workers variety in their daily tasks and 
promotes flexibility in the production process. Workers are said to be regarded as 
an integral part of the firm and develop firm-specific skills. They are rewarded 
through incentive devices based upon a rank hierarchy that primarily provides 
financial rewards (e.g. salary and bonuses) for length of service and good 
performance. The nature of the Japanese incentive system is said to allow for a 
greater delegation of decision-making, which encourages wider on-site 
information and problem solving and horizontal co-ordination across 
departments. Aoki (1988, 1990) argues that this facilitates positive learning 
externalities throughout the Japanese firm. In addition, by relating incentives to 
long service, Japanese firms are able to retain employees with Firm specific 
skills. This helps to explain the long-standing tenure of Japanese employment 
(Aoki 1988, 1990).
Japanese firms have also established close relationships with labour unions. 
These unions are company sponsored, are not associated with any national 
federation and include only company workers. In Japan, nearly one in every six 
executives has held a position in the labour union. This has led Abbeglen and 
Stalk (1985, p.205) to conclude that "the (Japanese) labour union does not exist 
as an entity separate from, or with an adversarial relationship to, the company ”.
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The Japanese firm’s prime financial relationship is with its main bank, which 
provides cheap access to long-term funds, advice on investment projects and 
assistance in financial and foreign markets. The main bank usually has an equity 
stake in the Japanese firm, although it is unlikely to intervene in the business 
affairs of the company, unless the firm is in financial distress. In effect, Japanese 
firms are given a corporate ranking, which is related to their profitability (Aoki, 
1990). Smaller keiretsu firms can also gain access to low-cost funds through the 
banking keiretsu, with their main contractor often acting as guarantor.
An additional feature of Japan’s capital markets is the prevalence of cross­
shareholdings between companies, the reciprocity of which encourage a 
remarkable stability in equity holdings (Sheard, 1994). The financial system thus 
shields the Japanese firm from the (short-term) threat of take-over, which is a 
particular feature of Anglo-American capital markets. It is argued that these 
arrangements extend the “close ties” between Japanese firms, allowing Japanese 
industry to make long-term investment decisions, particularly with respect to 
Research and Development.
2.4. Strategic Decision-Making within Japan’s Machinery Sector
2.4.1 Aoki’s Non-Hierarchical Hypothesis
Japan’s industrial structure described in Section (2.3) is unique and consequently, 
it has attracted a considerable economic and business literature. The major 
emphasis of this literature has been upon the embodiment of long-term co­
operation, mutual trust and flexibility - between the various actors - that appears
2.3.4 Financial Relationships
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to exist within Japanese manufacturing. This co-operation allows for the 
implementation of Japanese production processes that are said to compare 
favourably with Western modes of industrial organisation and provide a 
competitive advantage for Japanese firms (see, for instance, Kenny and Florida, 
1988, 1993).
One of the main proponents of this view is Aoki (1984, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994), 
who argues that there are clear differences between the Japanese firm, which he 
labels the J-mode, and the hierarchical Anglo-American firm, which he refers to 
as the H-mode. In the H-mode, there is a hierarchical separation between 
planning and manufacturing operations, where “planning, such as production 
scheduling, manufacturing process control, and commodity development is 
entrusted to an office at the top level o f each function, which is supposed to have 
prior knowledge on markets, engineering know how etc" (Aoki, 1990, p.8). This 
contrasts with the J-mode’s emphasis upon horizontal co-ordination between 
workers and firms to achieve flexibility and time economy in production (see 
Section (2.3)).
The H-mode also has a hierarchical labour market, with an incentive structure 
based upon job classification and status, whereas the J-mode relies upon 
rewarding good performance through salary and bonuses (see Section 2.3.3). 
Aoki (1990) argues that, consequently. Western firms have created an 
employment structure with layers of specific tasks. This lessens the opportunities 
for workers to gain wide-ranging work experience and also reduces the flow of 
information throughout the firm. Furthermore, Western managers are thought to
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be less likely to delegate decision-making, since it may undermine their own 
autonomy. Finally, in the H-mode, Western corporations are subjected to the 
hierarchal control of the capital markets, which are purported to use the takeover 
threat to generate increases in (short-term) profitability. In contrast, such threats 
are rarely encountered in J-mode firms, where cross-shareholdings exist and the 
emphasis is upon long-term objectives, with dividends being paid at an agreed 
set rate and are not related to profitability (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985).
For Aoki (1990), the Japanese firm is a nexus o f  treaties with keiretsu 
relationships, employee relations and the financial structure all inter-related. The 
economic rationale behind their sustainability can be explained in terms of each 
party recognising their joint responsibilities and the mutual benefit of co­
operation. Aoki (1990) believes that because of these mutual interdependencies, 
the Japanese firm represents a wider set of interests than the typical profit- 
maximising Western corporation. Other writers have gone further and have 
suggested that the arrangements within the Japanese firm favour employees, who 
are rewarded with lifetime employment assurances and generous salary schemes. 
In this respect, J-mode employees can be considered as the firm’s most important 
stakeholders (see Abegglen and Stalk, 1985, Miwa, 1996).
2.4.2 The Strategic Decision-Making Approach
At this point, we should note that Aoki’s (1990) non-hierarchical hypothesis 
would appear to conflict with one of the central tenets in this thesis - that the 
Japanese (transnational) corporation is a hierarchical organisation, tightly 
controlled by a corporate elite. In this and later Chapters, it will be argued that
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this control extends beyond the Japanese firm’s legal boundaries, to also include 
its (global) network of sub-contractors. It is through the use of their various 
control mechanisms that Japan’s transnationals can determine their international 
production strategies. This in turn, will affect the behaviour of their various 
(global) keiretsu partners and will have real effects upon Japan’s domestic 
manufacturing industry. It is, therefore, important to confront Aoki’s (1990) non- 
hierarchical position.
The position taken in this thesis follows a strategic decision-making approach as 
outlined in Zeitlin (1974) and developed further by Cowling and Sugden (1994, 
1998). According to Cowling and Sugden (1998, p.64) a strategic decision is 
“one that determines the broad direction of a firm, such as its geographical 
orientation, its relationship with rivals (and sub-contractors), with governments, 
and its labour force Those who have the power to make strategic decisions, 
thus effectively control the firm (Zeitlin, 1974). Furthermore, a concentration of 
strategic decisions may have wide implications for all those involved along the 
value chain. This would infer that the boundaries of the firm could extend 
beyond their legal frontier, to include not only in-house activities, but also all 
subcontracting arrangements. In this context, a firm can be regarded as “the 
means o f  coordinating production from one centre o f strategic decision-making ” 
(Cowling and Sugden, 1998, p67).
The strategic decision-making approach implies that all Japanese keiretsu 
relationships fall under the ambit of the core firm within the Corporate Group. 
Similarly, the boundaries of a Western corporation also include activities
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conducted both in-house and through the market. If activities in each type of 
organisation are co-ordinated and controlled from the centre, then there are clear 
parallels between the command structures in both Western and Japanese firms. 
This insight will be a consistent theme within this thesis - that the Japanese 
(transnational) corporation is a hierarchical entity and that strategic decisions are 
concentrated within the controlling groups of Corporate Japan. It also implies 
that the hierarchical differences highlighted by Aoki (1990) are somewhat 
superficial.
2.4.3 Control within Japanese manufacturing
Before we can reject Aoki’s (1990) non-hierarchical approach, some further 
exploration of the command structures and control mechanisms that exist within 
Japanese industrial organisation is required. These are now discussed, in the 
context of the evolution of Japan’s industrial command structures and drawing 
upon particular examples of corporate control in production, finance and the 
workplace from the Japanese automobile industry.
The first observation is that the development of Japan’s industrial structure has 
been based upon the cultivation of large-scale firms and, in particular, the core 
firms within the Corporate Group(s). In this respect, it is interesting to review 
Japanese industrial policy, which shows a particular policy bias towards Japan’s 
larger corporations. This bias began during the 1930’s under the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI) - the predecessor to MITI. The MCI’s officials 
had studied the (Taylorist) scientific management and mass production systems 
of the United States and the German model, which promoted big business cartels,
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technological innovation and efficiency. These models were very influential 
upon Japanese industrial policy-making and their major characteristics - in 
particular the adoption of large-scale production technologies - were 
incorporated under the MCI’s “industrial rationalisation plan” (see Johnson, 
1982, Piore and Sabel, 1984)6.
During the post-war period, the MCI’s prejudice in favour of promoting the 
interests of the larger corporations continued under MITI’s industrial strategy. 
Failing firms were encouraged to merge under a cartelisation programme, raising 
the level of industrial concentration. With some modifications, Japan’s 
production system was also one of mass production, and the activities of smaller 
keiretsu firms were specifically geared towards the requirements of the large 
corporations. The large corporations were effectively regarded as Japan’s 
“national champions”, whom MITI later encouraged to compete on the 
international stage with their Western rivals (see Piore and Sabel, 1984).
The combination of MITI’s policy bias and the evolving nature of Japan’s 
industrial structure has provided Japan’s large firms with effective control in 
production decisions. In many cases, this has enabled the Corporate Group firms 
to dictate contract conditions and impose technologies and processes upon their
6 The apparent attraction of Western industrial organisation and the multi-divisional firm was that 
large-scale production, of a standardised product, could achieve greater (internal) economies of 
scale, higher productivity and lower prices than traditional small-scale craft production. This 
possibility encouraged a number of countries, including Japan, to adopt a mass production system 
for industrial development (see Piore and Sabel, 1984). Chandler (1962, 1990) regarded " th e  
business enterprise , th rough  th e  developm ent o f  o rg a n iza tio n a l capabilities, a s  p la y in g  th e  
cen tra l ro le  in industria l developm ent in the U SA , B rita in  a n d  G erm a n y"  (see Teece (1993, 
p.211). For a critique of the Western corporation and the system of mass production, see Piore 
and Sabel (1984).
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keiretsu partners. Consequently, the majority of the smaller keiretsu firms are 
often allocated specialised tasks and they rely heavily upon the Corporate Group 
firms for new orders (Scher, 1997). In effect, the keiretsu firms are “locked in” to 
a vertical relationship with their main contractor; indeed, such is the nature of 
these relationships that MITI (1999b, p.71) report that 81.6% of keiretsu firms 
have never changed their main contractor. In their study of international control 
mechanisms, Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995, p.53) have described Japan’s 
vertical keiretsu relationships as creating a “one-way dependency o f suppliers on 
the end producers”.
2.4.4 Control in Production: The Japanese Automobile Industry Reconsidered 
The automobile industry probably best illustrates the various control mechanisms 
that are exercised by Japan’s Corporate Groups. As we have already noted, the 
industry has the largest number of keiretsu linkages, with “close ties” and mutual 
trust being regarded as important components within these relationships. 
However, while such attributes may be a common feature of keiretsu relations, in 
terms of corporate governance, neither mutuality nor trust should be equated with 
equal power in decision-making processes (Sachetti and Sugden, 2000). Indeed, 
the industry’s pyramidal structure and the nature of interdependency amongst 
firms, suggests that, in order to further their own objectives, the larger, more 
dominant players - within the production network - will exploit their position to 
exert control over their trading partners. In the automobile industry it is the large 
OEMs that dominate the keiretsu relationships through a “formal command 
structure”, where they often exert direct control over their suppliers (see also 
Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995).
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In this respect, equity participation is one mechanism through which Japan’s 
OEMs can exert direct control over their supply base. The large OEMs typically 
own substantial shareholdings in their core. First Tier suppliers. For instance, 
Toyota holds the largest shareholdings in their large suppliers, Denso (23.3%) 
and Koyo Seiko (21.9%), while Nissan has also, traditionally, held similar 
shareholdings in their large Group suppliers (e.g. in Calsonic (33.4%) and Unisea 
Jecs (29.6%)). These core suppliers, themselves, also hold controlling equity 
stakes in lower tiered suppliers. Reciprocal shareholding arrangements do exist, 
with some Group suppliers even holding small stakes in their main OEM. 
However, those firms and sub-contractors lower down the industry’s pyramidal 
structure have smaller equity stakes in their trading partners (Dodwell, 1997, 
Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1995)7.
These ownership details are significant since, by holding significant 
shareholdings within their supply base, Japan’s OEMs and their core suppliers, 
have been able to exert direct control over the industry. For instance, it has 
become common practice for the large Japanese OEMs to appoint their former 
executives into key positions within their supply chains. This has the effect of 
establishing direct lines of communication and allows for the dissemination of 
corporate strategy from the OEMs’ hierarchies to core suppliers. Personnel 
exchanges, supplier associations, and technology sharing are also spheres of 
influence. In this respect, Piore and Sabel (1984) give the example of how
7 This pattern is also observed in Japan's other machinery industries, where although numerous 
interlocking share-holding arrangements exist, with reciprocal cross-shareholdings, and equity 
ownership is relatively dispersed, the major shareholdings are typically concentrated amongst a 
few large corporate shareholders (Sheard, 1994).
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Nissan, in the early post-war period, were able to use such channels to control the 
rationalisation and re-organisation of automobile production.
Control and influence are also exerted through long-term contractual ties, 
particularly where suppliers are “locked in” to vertical relationships. In these 
cases, an OEM’s insistence upon a JIT delivery system may increase a supplier’s 
dependence, and raise the OEM’s degree of control. It is argued that, in effect, a 
JIT delivery system forces the supplier to subordinate their production schedules 
entirely to suit the OEM’s requirements. It also shifts the burden of inventories 
from the OEM to the supplier (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). A further 
consideration is that, for efficiency, the JIT  delivery system favours a close 
proximity between the OEM and the supplier, which effectively limits the latter’s 
choice of prime location (Dicken, 1998; see also Chapter (4))8. An insistence 
upon kaizen quality control and the use of internal rankings also enhances the 
OEM’s position, since if the supplier does not comply then there is a potential 
loss of custom. A related issue is the practice of open-book accounting where, as 
we have already noted, the OEM scrutinises the supplier’s costs and imposes a 
“target price” for components. This “target price” allows the supplier a profit 
margin, but there is an expectation that the price will fall over time, which forces 
the supplier to continually reduce costs. The OEM will then accrue most of these 
productivity gains, while maintaining supplier profit margins above a minimal 
level - to enable the supplier to re-invest in new capital as directed by the OEM 
(Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995, p83) have 
described open-book accounting as a process where negotiations are such that
'  For instance, in Japan, many of Toyota’s suppliers are located within a 70-mile radius of Toyota
City.
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"the supplier is required to bargain with the assembler, literally with all its 
cards open on the table”.
It may be argued that institutions, such as the state funded Public Testing and 
Research Centres (PTRs), or "kosetu shiken kenkyu kikan ", could offer smaller 
suppliers the opportunity to diversify, innovate and become more independent 
from their main OEM. However, even these institutions - which are exclusively 
designed to encourage independence and innovation amongst Japan’s small firms 
- are manipulated to suit the OEMs’ strategic interests. Toyota’s involvement, at 
the Aichi PTR centre, is a particular example. Rather than being used as a centre 
for Toyota’s smaller suppliers to advance their own research programs, the Aichi 
PTR centre has, in the words of Ruigrok and Tate (1996, p.397), become "a tool 
to help subcontractors meet Toyota’s stiff demands". The authors’ find that 
activities at the centre are heavily weighted towards test inspections, with 
suppliers’ processes and components being subject to close scrutiny. Ruigrok and 
Tate (1996), argue that Toyota have been able to direct the PTR centre’s 
activities to the extent, that certification by the PTR centre is now an integral part 
of the company’s domestic production system. They conclude that the Aichi PTR 
centre has played a major role in sustaining Toyota’s ability to exert control over 
its domestic supply chain.
The degree of control over suppliers does vary between the different Japanese 
automobile manufacturers. According to Ruigrok and Tate (1996, p.398), the 
concentration of Toyota’s domestic production in the Aichi prefecture, has 
allowed the company to establish unrivalled control over its large supply base.
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Similarly, the authors point out that Nissan also rely upon a large supply chain, 
and have also secured a high degree of control over their suppliers. Indeed, 
according to Adio Kodani, a former Nissan executive who was appointed, in 
1990, as the President of Nissan’s core First Tier supplier Ikeda Bussan, the 
“keiretsu has served to create a comfortable vertical supply structure for Nissan, 
rather than as a structure to make affiliates stronger" (Nikkei Weekly, 
21/8/2000). In contrast, to both Toyota and Nissan, Ruigrok and Tate (1996, 
p.395-396) note that Honda have only “limited control" over their domestic 
suppliers. This partially reflects the fact that Honda was a late entrant to 
automobile production and has consequently found it difficult to establish a 
large, exclusive domestic supply network.
It is important to appreciate that control is an important factor and a significant 
competitive advantage for Japan’s OEMs. Through their various control 
mechanisms, Japan’s OEMs have been able to direct operations and reduce costs 
to an internationally competitive level. This is obviously important, since the 
OEMs produce the final product and are primarily responsible for the industry’s 
profitability. It should be noted that the Japanese situation contrasts sharply with 
that of the OEM-supplier relations that existed - in the 1970’s and 1980’s - 
between the then (loss-making) State owned, UK manufacturer, British Leyland 
(BL), and its core UK suppliers. According to Cowling (1981), BL was in a 
vulnerable position, in relation to its UK transnational suppliers, such as Lucas 
and GKN. The latter dominated the UK components industry and were able to
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exploit their market position, to the detriment of the heavily subsidised BL (and 
the tax-payer)9.
Finally, in addition to exercising control over their suppliers, it is also argued that 
Japan’s large (automotive) firms exert control over their workforce. For instance, 
Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) point out that the Japanese corporation’s 
involvement in labour unions, as exemplified by Toyota, reduces the union’s 
independence and effectively nullifies its bargaining power. In addition, 
corporate management may also use the individual incentive system as a strategy 
to discourage worker collectivisation (Dicken, 1998). Naruse (1991) has also 
argued that the Japanese production process, with its emphasis upon continuous 
improvement and allegiance, is also designed to place great pressure and co­
operation from the workforce. Furthermore, the Japanese notion of “lifetime 
employment” and long-term contracts only appear to apply to core workers in the 
major companies; the remaining workforce, who are employed by sub­
contractors, are often regarded as peripheral and have no job security (Naruse, 
1991, Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995).
Drawing upon these perspectives, the suggestion that the Japanese firm is "run in 
the interests o f the workforce” and that employees participate in corporate 
decision-making appears to be misplaced. In terms of decision-making, it is 
probable that the Japanese firm may accommodate a greater delegation of 
decision-making. However, it is likely that these refer to operational decisions;
9 Cowling (1981, p. 10) argues that in effect, these highly profitable suppliers “w ere being  
su p p lied  with a s s e m b ly  se rv ice s  a t o r  b e lo w  co m p e titive  ra tes b y  an  in d ep en d en t dow nstream  
supp lier (B L )" .
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decisions that concern the daily operations of the firm. These are not strategic 
decisions, which affect the firm’s broad direction. Furthermore, the nature of the 
incentive schemes discussed by Aoki (1990, p. 11-13), would also suggest that 
employees are subordinated to comply with management authority. The 
management themselves are also monitored through the main bank system, and 
poor corporate performance can lead to their removal (Aoki, 1990, p.15-16).
2.5 Concluding Comments
Japanese industry is generally organised through keiretsu networks, where 
vertical layers of subcontractors provide intermediate goods and services to 
Japan’s larger corporations. This Chapter has provided an overview of the 
evolution and organisation of keiretsu networks within Japan’s machinery sector, 
where sub-contracting is the norm - particularly in the “company castle towns” 
within Japan’s main industrial districts. These keiretsu relationships are said to 
embody long-term co-operation and “mutual trust”, and are epitomised within 
the Japanese automobile industry (Smitka, 1991).
While such attributes are features of keiretsu relations, this Chapter has argued 
that production activities are centred upon Japan’s large corporate firms. The 
result is that Japan’s machinery industries are oligopolistic and dominated by a 
few large firms, such as Toyota, Nissan, Sony and Fujitsu. It is argued that these 
large corporations are controlled by an elite hierarchy, whose strategic-decisions 
determine the broad direction of the firm and ultimately the industry. In order to 
enforce these strategic-decisions, Japan’s Corporate Groups have developed 
various control mechanisms to exert direct control over both their suppliers and
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labour force. The automobile industry appears to provide the clearest examples 
of such hierarchical actions. The analysis in this Chapter, of course, contrasts 
sharply with that expressed by an influential body of literature, initiated by Aoki 
(1984, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994), which regards the Japanese firm to be a “non- 
hierarchical” organisation or a nexus of treaties. Indeed, we argue, that the 
strategic-decision-making approach might suggest that Aoki’s (1990) “non- 
hierarchical” view is somewhat superficial.
The reappraisal of the Japanese firm is important since it is the firm’s strategic 
decisions that play a key role in globalisation. Furthermore, the hierarchical 
nature of the Japanese (transnational) corporation will become apparent in the 
following Chapters. Finally, an understanding of the nature of the machinery 
sector is also important, for three reasons. First, as we will argue in Chapter (3), 
transnationality is an endogenous outcome that reflects the domestic environment 
in which (Japanese) firms operate. Second, the nature of keiretsu relations is a 
specific, competitive advantage to Japanese (machinery) firms and they provide a 
reason for the attempted replication of such activities overseas. Third, it is only 
through an understanding of Japanese industrial organisation that we are able to 
consider the wider effects of globalisation within Japan’s machinery sector.
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Table (2.1)
Japan’s Machinery Sector: Descriptive Statistics 1968-1994
Industry (3 digit)
Mean •/• 
Share of 
Capital 
Employed
(K)
Meun% 
Share of 
Labour 
Employed
(L)
Mean •/• 
Share of 
Output
(V)
Mean
Labour/
Capital
Ratio
(L/K)
Fabricated Metal Products (381) 5.29 7.8 5.8 6.1
(S tru c tu ra l m e ta l  p ro d u cts , h a n d  to o ls ,  cu tlery , 
fo u n d ry  p ro d u c ts ,  o ffic e  fu rn itu re )
(0.7) (03) (0.5) (4.4)
Agricultural & Industrial Machinery (382) 7.71 11.5 10.7 5.6
(M a c h in e  to o l s  fo r  in d u stry /a g ric u ltu re , 
m a n u fa c tu re  o f  e n g in e s /tu rb in e s , sp e c ia lis t 
o f f ic e /in d u s tr ia l  (n o n -e le c tr ic a l)  m ac h in e ry )
(0.3) (0.7) (1.5) (3.2)
Electric Machinery & Electric Goods (383) 6.9 14 12.4 7.4
(E le c tric  m o to r s  &  e q u ip m en t, sem i-c o n d u c to rs , 
e le c tro n ic s , c o n s u m e r  a p p lia n c es)
(1.5) (2.1) (2.2) (3.9)
Transport Equipment (384) 10.2 8.4 12.5 3.2
(M a n u fa c tu re  o f  a u to m o b ile s , m o to rc y c le s  and  
b icy c les, a ir c ra f t ,  sh ip  b u ild in g  a n d  ra ilro a d  
e q u ip m e n t)
(0.7) (03) (1.4) (19)
Precision Tools (385) 1.4 2.0 1.3 6.2
(P ro fe s s io n a l a n d  sc ie n tif ic  in s tru m e n ts , m ed ical 
eq u ip m e n t, o p t ic a l  goo d s, w a tc h e s  a n d  c locks)
(0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (4.5)
Sub -Total Machinery Sector (ISIC 38) 31.5 43.7 42.8 5.2
(A g g re g a te  o f  c a p ita l, e m p lo y m e n t a n d  ou tpu t fro m  
in d u str ie s  w i th  IS IC  c o d es 381 to  3 8 3  inclusive)
(3.5) (2.8) (5.1) (3.1)
Other Manufacturing Industry 68.5 56.3 57.2 3.0
(ISIC 31-39; excluding 38)
(A g g re g a te  o f  c a p ita l, e m p lo y m en t a n d  o u tp u t fro m  
a ll o th e r  m a n u fa c tu r in g  se c to rs  in  J a p an ).
(3.5) (2.8) (5-1) (1.8)
Total Manufacturing Industry (ISIC 3)
(A g g re g a te  o f  c a p ita l, e m p lo y m en t a n d  ou tpu t fro m  
a ll  m a n u fa c tu r in g  se c to rs  in  J a p an )
100 100 100 3.7
0-1)
S o a res: OECD (1997), UNIDO (199a).
Notes: The  firs t three i oh— —  provide the average share of capital, la hoar and oat pat over the period 1968 to 1994. Flgares hi 
brackets are the standard deviatioa o f the respective uample w a a , w hich indicate the stahihty o f these stathtics. Th e  U K  ratio Is the 
proportion o f total hoars worked to the real capital stock hi each Industry.
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Chapter 3
The Global Emergence of Corporate Japan: The Globalisation of Japan’s 
Machinery Sector
3.1 Introduction
This Chapter considers the factors behind the globalisation of Japanese 
manufacturing industry and the emergence of Corporate Japan, in the global 
economy. The position taken in this Chapter is that, fundamentally, 
transnationalism is an endogenous outcome, which reflects the degree of 
monopolistic and oligopolistic behaviour in the home country. In the case of 
Japan, we have argued - in Chapter (2) - that Japan’s industrial economy is 
highly concentrated and dominated by a few large corporations. We also noted 
that the development of this industrial structure appears to have occurred through 
a consensus of MITI’s industrial policy-making, with its focus upon developing 
“national champions”, and the interests of Corporate Japan.
Highly concentrated economies may encourage domestic firms to undertake 
transnational production for two reasons. First, in the aggregate, oligopolistic and 
collusive behaviour by firms, may lead to a reduction in domestic aggregate 
demand and profitability, providing a general incentive for firms to seek new 
markets overseas (demand-side factors). Second, it is conceivable that, under 
oligopoly, firms will have acquired a degree of market power in labour and 
product markets, which, as Hymer (1976) first noted, they can exploit 
internationally (supply-side factors). These demand and supply side factors have
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each contributed to a wide and rich literature on the theories of international
production (see Cantwell (2000), for a recent survey). However, both should be 
regarded as being complementary, rather than competing theories in explaining 
the conditions that pre-empt globalisation (Pitelis, 1996, 2000).
In this Chapter, we review some of the main theories of international production 
and discuss them in the light of the Japanese experience, drawing upon - where 
possible - particular examples from the machinery sector. The literature review is 
not meant to be exhaustive, but it does allow us to gain an understanding of the 
factors behind the globalisation of Japan’s machinery sector and the nature of the 
Japanese transnational corporation. The remainder of this Chapter is as follows. 
In Section (3.2), we highlight the global emergence of Corporate Japan and the 
growth in their transnational activities. Section (3.3) considers how demand side 
explanations of transnationalism apply to the Japanese economy. Following 
Pitelis (1996, 2000), a simple econometrics test is conducted, with the result that 
there is some evidence to suggest that domestic demand deficiencies are related 
to the growth in Japanese FDI. In Section (3.4), we draw primarily upon Hymer’s 
(1976) insights and consider the application of supply side theories to Japan’s 
transnationals. There are no direct tests of these supply-side hypotheses in this 
section. However, some of the main issues raised are subject to direct and 
empirical investigation in later Chapters. For instance, the Knickerbocker (1973) 
hypothesis is examined in Chapter (4), while “divide and rule” strategies are 
observed in Chapter (5). Finally, Section (3.5) concludes.
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3.2 The Global Emergence of Corporate Japan
3.2.1 The Relaxation o f MIT Vs FD1 Restrictions
The first point to recall is that, during the immediate post-war period, Japanese 
FDI was strictly regulated by MITI (see Chapter (2)). These regulations appeared 
to be conducive to the successful nurturing of Japan’s infant industries. Indeed, 
the pace of Japan’s post-war industrial development was such that, by the early 
1960’s, Japan’s larger corporations had attained a strong technological position, 
from which they were able to compete in the global market, with their rivals 
from the USA and Europe.
However, despite Japanese corporations appearing internationally competitive, 
the combination of domestic demand constraints, supply factors (see Sections
(3.3) and (3.4)) and the restrictive FDI regulations appeared to inhibit their future 
development. Corporate Japan’s foreign rivals, for instance, were major 
transnational corporations, who could use their global facilities to access both 
new and mature markets, and also to take advantage of lower production costs. 
Consequently, Japan’s large corporate firms felt required to compete on equal 
terms and so they began to pressurise MITI into relaxing the FDI restrictions 
(Mason, 1994). In this respect, MITI became increasingly enthusiastic about 
developing Japan’s own “national champions” in the global economy (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984). Eventually, in 1971, MITI revised the FDI laws and all outward 
FDI proposals were automatically validated without financial limit. The abolition 
of exchange controls in 1980, which liberalised international capital flows,
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completed the de-regulation programme1.
3.2.2 Japan’s Global Actors
The relaxation of the FDI restrictions has allowed Japan’s large corporations to 
pursue their own strategic interests at the global level. We have already noted, in 
Chapter (1), the significant increase in Japanese FDI, particularly since the late 
1970’s: a trend which has have enabled Japan’s large transnationals to emerge as 
dominant players in the global economy. In this respect, Japan is now the home 
of 17 of the world’s top 100 transnational corporations who, collectively, own 
approximately 16% of the global economy’s foreign assets. Only the corporate 
sector of the USA owns a greater proportion of foreign assets (see UNCTAD, 
2000). Table (3.1) provides some recent details about these 17 transnational 
corporations, ranking them in terms of their ownership of foreign assets.
The machinery sector accounts for over 60% of all Japanese FDI flows (OECD,
1999). As result, over two-thirds of the transnationals listed in Table (3.1) 
operate in the machinery sector; the others are Japan’s large trading companies 
(see Table (3.1)). The largest Japanese transnational is Toyota, which is ranked 
as the sixth largest transnational in the world, and the third largest in the 
automobile sector. However, the degree of transnationality is greater in 
companies such as Honda, Sony and Bridgestone, which own a greater 
proportion of their assets outside Japan (see Table (3.1)). 1
1 In this respect, it is interesting to note the degree of influence that Corporate Japan could exert 
upon MITI’s economic policy-making. Since the Second World War, Japanese corporations and 
MITI had developed a close working relationship. These relations extended to the common 
practice of retired MITI officials being offered prominent positions within large Japanese 
corporations. It is conceivable that such channels allowed Corporate Japan to influence economic 
policy (Johnson, 1982). Certainly, these lines of communication were very effective in Corporate 
Japan's campaign to convince MITI to liberalise the policy on FDI (Mason, 1994).
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In terms of global market shares, Japan’s transnationals have made significant 
advances since the late 1960’s. For instance, in 1966, Toyota was the only 
Japanese automobile manufacturer amongst the world’s top ten producers, with a 
marginal 2.4% share of the global car market. By the mid-1990’s, the company 
had almost quadrupled its global market share to 9.4% and was joined in the top 
ten, by Nissan (5.4%), Honda (4.0%) and Mitsubishi (3.3%). In the case of 
Honda, its global market share has increased 20 fold since 1966 and it is now 
also the world’s leading manufacturer of motorcycles. Furthermore, in the 
production of rubber tyres, Bridgestone is second only to Michelin. In 
electronics, Sony is now the world’s largest company in audio and video 
equipment, while Fujitsu is in the top three of the world’s mainframe computer 
manufacturers (Toyo Keizai, 2001).
3.2.3 Global Sourcing
The increase in Japanese FDI has contributed to the significant rise in the 
proportion of Japan’s total corporate output produced offshore and in overseas 
employment. This is reflected in Japan’s overseas production ratios, which have 
been rising at both the sector and aggregate manufacturing level (see Table
(3.2))2. Since 1985, there has been a four-fold increase in Japan’s aggregate 
overseas production ratio and, between 1985 and 1995, the growth rate in Japan’s 
overseas production was twice that of its main competitors: the USA or Germany 
(see Table (3.2)). Furthermore, in 1997, outsourcing also accounted for 31.1% of 
the total corporate output of Japan’s transnational corporations - a 350% increase
2 It is wise to treat these statistics with caution, given that the data is collated from annual surveys 
of Japanese transnationals. These surveys are vulnerable to variance in both coverage and 
response rates (Ramstetter, 1996). This qualification aside and, in the absence of any alternative 
data, Table (3.2) still provides us with some useful indicators.
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on the 1985 level. In addition, between 1992 and 1996, the number of 
employees, employed by Japanese transnationals doubled to 2.2 million - over 
17% of Japan’s domestic labour force (see Table (3.2)).
Over the same period, at the industry level, Japanese overseas production also 
more than doubled in Chemicals, Industrial Machinery, Iron and Steel and 
Precision Tools. However, the highest overseas production ratios are recorded in 
the machinery sector: Electrical Machinery and Electrical Goods (19.7%), and 
Transport Equipment (24.9%). Within these industry sub-sectors, the level of 
overseas production is even higher. In the Japanese electronics industry, for 
instance, the Electronic Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ, 1997, p. 6) 
claims, “offshore production, by Japanese affiliates, has now surpassed the 
domestic totals for almost every consumer electronics product". The EIAJ have 
attributed this trend as being the prime reason for the decline of Japan’s domestic 
consumer electronics industry. In this respect, the EIAJ note that although 
Corporate Japanese output - total production at home and abroad - in the sector is 
currently at an historical high, domestic production runs are now at less than half 
the levels they were during their peak in the mid-1980’s (EIAJ, 1997)3.
The data in Table (3.2) illustrates the growing extent to which Japan’s large firms 
have become involved in their own transnational production networks. These 
networks primarily involve production linkages both within and between the
3 The case of the Japanese television industry provides an illustrative example. In 1978, Japan's 
overseas affiliates produced 3.2 million television sets, almost a third of Japan’s total corporate 
production. By 1988, the ratio was 30:30. In 1996, Japanese overseas affiliates produced a record 
40.3 million colour television sets, over 6 times the domestic figure. In 1996, Japan's of domestic 
output of television sets was a mere 40% of its 1983 level. Japanese production of video tape 
recorders (VTRs) follow a similar pattern (EIAJ, 1997).
55
economies of Asia, North America and Europe. The linkages are created through 
the co-ordinated operations of Japanese subsidiaries, keiretsu group companies 
and other non-affiliated suppliers. According to MITI (2001), 48.7% of all 
Japanese transnational’s trade-flows are now intra-firm; a statistic, which, to 
some extent, reflects the importance of these networks in Corporate Japan’s 
international operations. The Japanese automobile industry provides the most 
prominent example of these transnational networks and, as such, they are 
considered in further detail, in Chapters (4) and (5).
In summary, since the early 1970’s, Japan’s large corporations have emerged to 
compete on the global scale. They have enhanced their global market shares, 
through producing reputable branded goods and have become increasing 
involved in transnational production networks. We will now consider the 
fundamental factors that lie behind the growth of these transnational activities.
3.3 Demand-Side Theories of Internationalisation
3.3.1 Deficient Domestic Demand
Demand-side theories of FDI highlight a country’s rising industrial concentration 
as the source of domestic demand deficiency, which, in turn, precipitates outward 
FDI (Pitelis, 1996, 2000). The analysis is rooted in the early works of Steindl 
(1952) and Baran and Sweezy (1966) and Cowling (1982). These authors argued 
that economies dominated by large corporations were likely to be characterised 
by oligopoly and collusive behaviour, as firms sought to secure the joint 
maximisation of industry profits and avoid the competitive outcome. The result is 
that prices are greater than marginal cost, leading to a distribution effect in
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consumption, since firms are extracting a surplus (income) from consumers. 
There is also a corresponding distributional effect in the labour market, since 
firms pay the nominal wage and then -in the aggregate - determine its real value 
by colluding over the level of their prices and consequently their own price-cost 
margins (see Kalecki, 1971). In the aggregate, the collusive pricing strategy leads 
to a reduction in domestic consumption, creating a deficiency in domestic 
demand. A further source of demand side deficiencies is the emergence of the 
joint stock companies, which are now a feature of modem industrial economies. 
In this respect, Pitelis (1987) has argued that these firms typically obtain finance 
for internal growth by encouraging the socialisation o f ownership, through the 
use of equity issues and occupational pension funds. This leads to “excess 
liquidity” in the corporate sector, with higher corporate retentions and pension 
fund surpluses but less disposable income for consumers, which reduces 
effective demand. Finally, the adoption of mass production technologies, by 
large-scale firms, can also lead to domestic market saturation and problems of 
under-consumption (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
Eventually, these demand deficiencies induce firms to turn to overseas markets to 
sell their output. Initially, surplus production can be sold through the export 
market, but a combination of retaliatory trade barriers and an appreciating 
currency may limit this possibility. It then becomes optimal for firms to consider 
overseas production to relieve the pressures upon their profitability (Pitelis, 1996,
2000). At this point, we should note that the demand deficiency hypothesis has 
similarities with Vernon’s (1966) product life cycle model where, in the first 
phase, production takes place at home, allowing firms to directly control both
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product design and development. In the second stage, the product becomes 
standardised and the firm benefits from scale economies. The product is 
exported, primarily to countries with similar income levels and tastes. 
Eventually, FDI becomes inevitable, as scale economies are exhausted at home 
and rising tariff barriers ensure that servicing foreign markets becomes very 
difficult. At the micro level, Vernon’s (1966) theory has been subjected to the 
criticism that it is an inadequate account of post-war transnational activities4. 
Nevertheless, Pitelis (1996, 2000) maintains that, at the aggregate level, deficient 
domestic demand considerations are important since they apply to all firms, at all 
stages of product life cycles. In summary, Pitelis (1996, 2000) argues that a 
nation’s tendency towards monopolisation leads to an environment where firms 
find that FDI becomes an attractive option.
There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that the demand deficiency 
hypothesis may be relevant to Japan’s experience. As was pointed out in Chapter 
(2), Japan’s industrial economy, particularly in the machinery sector, is highly 
concentrated and dominated by a few large corporations. It is quite probable that, 
in the aggregate, the activities of Corporate Japan and the adoption of mass 
production technologies, may have led to domestic demand deficiencies within 
the Japanese economy. In this respect, it is interesting to note that since 1955, 
Japanese consumption relative to GDP has barely risen above 60%, and has been 
significantly lower than other major industrial nations (Katz, 1998). Between
4 The main criticisms are from Buckley and Casson (1976), who point out that the theory is 
unable to explain non-export substitution investments, the appearance of non-standardised 
products produced offshore and cases of differentiated products to suit local markets. A further 
criticism is that firms can avoid the decline in the rate of growth in demand during the maturity 
phase, through product diversification at different stages in their cycle (see Pitelis, 1996, 2000).
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1955 and 1970, this ratio actually declined from 62% to 54%, while the labour 
share of national income also fell by 18%. Conversely, over the same period, 
corporate profits tripled their share of national income from only 5 to 16%. The 
relative decline in consumption and disposable income, combined with the 
“excess liquidity” held by the corporate sector would thus appear to fit the 
demand deficiency hypothesis outlined above. It could be that Japan’s general 
climate of deficient domestic demand, may have precipitated the large outflow of 
Japanese FDI - primarily from the machinery sector - that has occurred since the 
late 1970’s.
Furthermore, rising external demand constraints, during the mid to late 1980’s, 
may have exacerbated the effects of Japan’s domestic demand deficiencies. 
These external constraints included higher effective tariff barriers, due to the 
emergence of official regional trading blocs, such as the North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). In addition, the imposition 
of Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), particularly in automobiles, also 
restricted Japanese export growth, while 1985 Plaza Accord and the subsequent 
appreciation of the Yen, combined with higher transport and insurance costs 
ensured that Japanese exports were less attractive on world markets. To 
overcome these trade barriers, Japanese transnationals began to invest 
significantly in the larger, more sophisticated, consumer markets of Europe and 
North America (see Mackinnon, 1990). Dunning (1993) has described such 
investments as “market seeking” since Japanese transnationals undertake them to 
protect and expand both their regional and global market shares. Barrell and Pain 
(1999), provide econometric evidence for these types of investment. Their panel
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data study shows that, during the 1980’s, the direction of outward Japanese FDI 
was positively correlated with the number of trade restraints, in both Europe and 
the USA.
A potential criticism of applying the demand deficiency hypothesis to Japan is 
that the majority of Japanese FDI is primarily located in developed countries, 
where industrial structures are similar (see Chapter (1), Table (1.1)). If the 
demand deficiency hypothesis is correct, then these countries may have 
experienced, or could also potentially suffer similar problems of under­
consumption. In this case it would appear irrational for Japanese firms to invest 
in such economies. This maybe a valid criticism, but can be answered in a 
number of ways. First, developed countries have similar tastes, which provides 
an obvious outlet for Japanese goods. Over 60% of Japanese FDI is in the 
machinery sector, where Japanese firms have a comparative advantage. Through 
product differentiation and their reputation for quality, Japan’s machinery firms 
may be able to nullify the effects of any downward spiral in the host country. 
Second, as we have already noted, locating in a developed country may provide 
the Japanese firm with access to a regional trading bloc and the avoidance of 
trade barriers. Third, the timing and/or severity of demand-side problems may 
differ among developed countries. In this latter respect, the significant increase 
of Japanese FDI into both Europe and the USA has coincided with periods of 
strong economic growth in these economies (for instance, 1985-89 and 1995- 
1997). Finally, supply side factors are likely to play an important role in the 
location of Japanese FDI. These will be discussed further in Section (3.4).
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3.3.2 An Econometric Test of the Demand Deficiency Hypothesis
Pitelis (1996, 2000) has proposed a simple direct test of the demand deficiency 
hypothesis. This involves regressing FDI upon Aggregate Demand and the 
domestic profit rate. If the demand deficient hypothesis is valid then there should 
be a negative relationship between Aggregate Demand (AD) and outward FDI. In 
addition, a lower domestic profit rate should also instigate outward FDI, since 
firms will seek to locate in overseas markets where the profit rate is higher. 
Using aggregated annual UK data, for 1963 to 1992, Pitelis (1996, 2000) finds 
strong statistical evidence that these negative relationships hold. He concludes 
that aggregate demand deficiencies provide a stimulus to outward FDI.
Following Pitelis (1996, 2000) we now conduct a similar test of the demand 
deficiency hypothesis for the Japanese economy, using annual data for the period 
1973-1998. Although the prime focus of this thesis is Japan’s machinery sector, 
the results reported in this section are those using aggregated data for the whole 
of Japanese manufacturing. This is because the earlier data on Japanese FDI 
flows, by sector, is incomplete and it, therefore, provides an inadequate number 
of degrees of freedom, for estimation. Nevertheless, the aggregated equation 
should capture the general business climate that affects the decision-making of 
Japan’s machinery firms, who contribute to over 60% of Japanese FDI.
The general specification of the equation is:
2 2 2 
FDI, = uo + 2 )a iAD,.) + Relative Profit,.] + TlcuFDI,.j + U, (1)
j=0 j=0 j=0
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where FDI represents Foreign Direct Investment by all Japanese manufacturing 
firms and Aggregate Demand is defined as the sum of Aggregate Consumption 
(C), Investment Expenditure (I), the Export surplus (ES) and the Budget Deficit 
(BD)). The data is taken from the Japanese Statistical Yearbook (various issues). 
The specification differs from Pitelis (1996, 2000) in that we include a Relative 
Profit measure, as opposed to including just domestic (Japanese) profitability. It 
was felt that a measure of Japanese profitability relative to the rest of the world 
was the more appropriate variable to include, given that Japanese transnationals 
will compare their own domestic profitability rates with those that they can 
reasonably attain elsewhere. In this respect, Relative Profits are defined as 
aggregate manufacturing Japanese profit margins relative to a weighted average 
of aggregate manufacturing profit margins for the USA, UK and Germany5. This 
data is taken from the United Nations Industrial Statistics Yearbook (various 
issues). Finally, the lag structure captures the possibility that past values of both 
the independent and dependent variables have a role in explaining Japanese FDI.
All the variables were tested for unit roots, and all the variables were found to be 
1(1). It was, therefore, decided to estimate a first difference equation to avoid the 
common time series problem of spurious regression, which can occur with non- 
stationary data (Greene, 1993). Equation (1) is, therefore, re-written as:
2 2 2
A Relative Profit,.j + ^ .n iA  FDl,.j + U, (2)
j=0 j=0 j=0
5 In the construction of the profitability variable, data availability restricted us to using a measure 
of the Gross Profit Margin as opposed to a Return on Capital. In this respect, numerous methods 
have been used to construct profit margins (see Conyon and Machín, 1991). We use a standard 
measure, for which comparable data was available: Gross Profit Margin = (Value Added -  Total 
Wage BiliySales (Hart and Morgan, 1977). Finally, the average profitability margin for the USA, 
UK and Germany was weighted by output at purchasing power parity.
A FDI, = S o t.A A D ,, + <I2
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A general to specific methodology was applied, with Wald tests used to justify 
parameter restrictions imposed when simplifying the lag structure. The results 
are shown in Columns (1) and (2) in Table (3.3). The results were disappointing, 
with, in the “preferred” equation (Column (2)), only the Relative Profit variable 
being statistically significant. The estimated equation also appeared to suffer 
from problems of heteroscadisticity, while the R-Bar Squared was a 
disappointing, 0.35.
It was felt that the disappointing results in Columns (1) and (2) of Table (3.3) 
could have been due to endogeneity problems. These may have been caused by 
the inclusion of consumption in the composition of the AD variable. In the 
simple Keynesian model, consumption is regarded as the endogenous component 
in aggregate demand: an increase in C leads to a rise in AD, while a rise in AD 
induces a further rise in C. All other factors (I, BD, and ES) are regarded as 
exogenous. If consumption comprises a significant proportion of AD, then 
current AD is unlikely to be pre-determined and this may lead to endogeneity in 
estimation. Aggregate Demand was, therefore, re-defined (denoted as AD2), to 
include only the exogenous components (I, BD, and ES) and Equation (2) was 
re-estimated.
The results are shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table (3.3). These estimated 
equations do not appear to suffer any serious misspecification and all diagnostic 
tests are passed. In the “preferred” model (Column (4)), the R-Bar-Squared 
improves to 0.44, but its “low value” suggests that the model has only moderate 
explanatory power. Nevertheless, the AD variable is negative and is now
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statistically significant (see Column (4)), with an estimated coefficient of -0.31. 
This suggests that the relationship between Japanese FDI and AD is fairly 
inelastic: a 100 yen decrease in Japanese Aggregate Demand induces a 
corresponding 31 yen increase in the outflow of FDI. Both current and lagged 
relative profits are statistically significant and negative: a 1% fall in Japanese 
profit margins relative to the rest of the world increases Japanese FDI by 
approximately 72,727 yen, while a 1% fall in lagged relative profitability raises 
current FDI by 50,387 yen. Between 1970 and 1990, Corporate Japan’s profit 
margins fell by approximately 20% relative to the average of those in the USA, 
the UK and Germany. The econometric evidence would suggest that declining 
domestic profit margins might have precipitated the significant outflow of 
Japanese FDI during this period.
In summary then, there appears some evidence to suggest that the demand 
deficiency hypothesis may be applicable to Japan. It would appear that deficient 
domestic demand, within Japan’s general business climate, combined with 
declines in Japanese profitability, relative to other major industrialised 
economies, may have been a stimulus to outward FDI by Japanese firms - 
particularly those from the machinery sector. However, the low R-Bar-Squared 
in our results would suggest that other (supply-side) factors are also important. 
Furthermore, the relative profitability measure may also have been capturing 
supply side effects, such as lower wage costs elsewhere. These will now be 
considered in further detail.
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3.4 Supply-Side Theories of Internationalisation 
3.4.1 Hymer and the Market Power Hypothesis
While the demand deficiency hypothesis may explain the general incentive for 
(Japanese) firms to internationalise, it does not provide sufficient detail on why 
firms choose the transnational option, as opposed to serving foreign markets 
through exporting, licensing and/or subcontracting. To explore these micro level 
choices, it is necessary to consider the supply-side theories of international 
production.
In this respect, the discussion begins with Hymer (1976), whose 1960 doctoral 
dissertation provides the first detailed analysis of the theory of the transnational 
corporation. For Hymer (1976), the concept of control was the fundamental 
feature of FDI. In particular, Hymer (1976) argued that the decision to become a 
transnational corporation revolves around the possession of a firm-specific 
(oligopolistic) advantage and the removal of conflict between (international) 
firms. Both explanations for control are based upon the assumption that 
international markets are imperfect and oligopolistic.
The main point in Hymer’s (1976) argument is that transnationals require a 
specific (oligopolistic) advantage over indigenous firms, to enable them to 
successfully set up operations in overseas markets. This is to enable them to 
overcome the natural disadvantage associated with foreign production, such as 
language, cultural and other related factors. For Japan’s machinery firms, these 
specific advantages could be related to their technological flexibility and 
organisational efficiency vis-à-vis their Western rivals (Kenny and Florida, 1988,
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1993). However, the possession of such an advantage need not necessarily lead 
to FDI. It is possible that the firm could license the advantage to an indigenous 
firm and receive an appropriate rent through an arm’s-length transaction. 
Alternatively, the firm could control operations through subcontracting 
arrangements with indigenous firms.
Hymer (1976) suggested that both possibilities might be impractical when there 
is a degree of interdependence between firms in international markets. For 
instance, it may be difficult to arrange a licensing agreement when there are only 
a few potential buyers of such an advantage. This situation may create a “conflict 
of evaluation” as both parties bargain over the contract’s worth. Furthermore, 
such contractual arrangements may also fail to protect the property rights of the 
licensor. As Hymer (1976, p.51) points out, "a reluctance to license may arise 
from the inherent danger o f losing the advantage". Given these possibilities, FDI 
is used to remove the potential for such conflicts and provide the transnational 
with direct control over its international operations.
For Japan’s machinery firms, retaining control over international operations, 
through FDI, appears to be very important, particularly in both the European and 
North American markets. In this respect, Dunning’s (1986) survey of Japanese 
participation in British industry highlighted that Japanese businessmen were not 
enthusiastic about alternative entry modes such as licensing. Typically, 
respondents cited concerns about entrusting their technology and reputation with 
(major) foreign rivals and the diffusion of strategic information. Perhaps these 
concerns are well founded, given the post-war history of Japan’s machinery
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sector, which succeeded in overturning Western technological supremacy 
through the assistance of licensing agreements with US and German 
transnationals (Ozawa, 1973).
In equilibrium, Hymer (1976) saw the growth of transnationals as leading to a 
process of monopolisation abroad, which can potentially reduce the host 
country’s welfare. This process may occur, since transnational firms can use their 
specific advantages to raise entry barriers in their industry and restrict 
competition in the foreign market(s). Alternatively, given the global oligopolistic 
environment, it is argued that transnationals will recognise their interdependence 
and will seek out international collusive agreements - such as joint ventures - to 
obtain monopoly profits. Both possibilities involve the removal of conflict, but 
are potentially Pareto inefficient, as compared to the competitive outcome. It 
may be that the prevalence of joint ventures and the recent spate of international 
mergers, involving major Japanese automobile firms, are a reflection of rising 
collusion and the process of monopolisation within the global industry (see also 
Chapter (4)).
It is the focus upon monopolisation that has led Hymer’s (1976) analysis to 
become associated with the “market power” school of internationalisation. An 
extension of Hymer’s (1976) framework is the possibility that transnationals will 
imitate the behaviour of their major (domestic) rivals and follow each other 
overseas, so as to avoid “being left behind” (Knickerbocker, 1973). This strategic 
interaction, in international FDI, is also believed to increase the level of 
industrial concentration at the global level. Dunning (1994) has observed this
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type of “herd behaviour” in the entry patterns of Japanese machinery firms into 
Europe. In Chapter (4), we provide statistical evidence of this Knickerbocker 
(1973) effect, for Japan’s automobile industry at the global level.
3.4.2 The Internalisation School
In contrast to Hymer (1976) and the “market power” school, “internalisation” 
theorists offer a more sympathetic account of the transnational corporation. The 
main proponents of this approach are Buckley and Casson (1976), Rugman 
(1981) and Caves (1982). These authors draw upon the work of Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (1975), where the firm is seen as an institutional device to raise 
efficiency by replacing markets. Williamson (1975) argued that using the market 
mechanism could incur high transaction costs, which result from bounded 
rationality, opportunism and asset specificity. Examples include the cost of 
search, contract negotiation, monitoring costs and the danger of “lock in”, when 
there are a small number of firms bargaining over the use of specific assets. 
These costs may be internalised when firms conduct their activities in-house. 
Similarly, in an international setting, FDI is undertaken when the costs of 
overseas production are seen as lower than the use of market alternatives, such as 
licensing and sub-contracting.
In the latter respect, it is argued that conducting market transactions, across 
national boundaries, may involve greater uncertainty and high monitoring costs. 
Furthermore, as we have already noted, the use of the market may lead to 
appropriability problems and the loss of a firm’s competitive advantage(s). This 
is because of the “public goods” nature of the firm’s intangible assets, such as
68
technological knowledge and managerial skills. It is argued that, by internalising 
such transaction costs, the transnational corporation can minimise its production 
costs and will be more likely to undertake efficiency enhancing activities such as 
Research and Development. In short, the “internalisation” school, regard the 
transnational corporation as a more efficient institution than the market 
mechanism (Buckley and Casson, 1976).
3.4.3 Distributional Issues - Divide and Rule
The efficiency property of the “internalisation” position has attracted particular 
criticism, since there are possible distributional effects of transnational activity. 
Distributional effects can occur because of the global mobility of capital, which 
provides the transnational corporation with greater leverage in its bargaining 
relations with an international division of labour. The argument is that, by 
locating production in a number of different countries, the transnational 
corporation can pursue so-called “divide and rule” strategies (Cowling and 
Sugden, 1994). By credibly threatening to switch production to an alternative, 
overseas site, the transnational generates intra-firm competition, by playing off 
its workers around the globe. Since workers value their employment, the “divide 
and mie” strategy allows the transnational to reduce its real labour costs and 
nullify potential labour militancy at each location (see also Hollingsworth, 1997; 
Peoples and Sugden, 2000). The transnational’s bargaining position will be 
further strengthened, because of the inability of its global workforce to co­
ordinate a collective (international) response to such threats. The lack of an 
international, co-ordinated response, from the corporation’s labour force, reflects 
problems with organising international trade unions, along with deep-rooted
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cultural factors that exist between workers of different nations, such as language, 
xenophobia and religious denominations (Helfgott, 1983)6. In essence, the 
“divide and rule” hypothesis can be associated with the Hymer (1976) tradition, 
mainly because the strategy enables the transnational to exert tighter control over 
its workers and remove conflict in international labour relations. Also, since 
“divide and rule” strategies involve extracting distributional gains from the 
workforce there is, by definition, a Pareto in-efficiency7.
The “divide and rule” strategy is important for our understanding of the activities 
of Japanese transnationals. James (1989), for instance, has argued that Japanese 
transnationals have successfully been able to play the international wage game 
both within and across continents. He cites the example of Sanyo, which, in 
1988, switched the production of its television sets from Arkansas, in the USA, 
to Maquiladoras, in Mexico, after its US workers refused to accept pay-cuts. In 
Chapters (4) and (5), our fieldwork research will also reveal how Japan’s 
automobile manufacturers have been using their transnational production 
networks to pursue a “divide and rule” strategy and generate intra-firm 
competition within the Japanese automobile industry.
Finally, it should be noted that transnationals might also use “divide and rule” 
strategies to bargain with world governments. This may be particularly effective 
with those governments that place a political premium upon attracting inward
6 The “divide and rule" position has been developed further in a model of international wage 
bargaining by Hollingsworth ( 1997). This is examined further in Chapter (6).
7 Labour, for instance, may not consider the transnational corporation as a Pareto improving 
institution, if transnational production reduces their real wages. This result contrasts with the 
efficiency claims of the "internalisation" school.
70
investment. The transnational’s threat to re-locate production elsewhere may 
entice governments to offer more lucrative grants and subsidies, or a less 
regulated business environment. Furthermore, since transnationals may use their 
global transplants for intra-firm trade, it is likely that such transactions will 
involve transfer pricing. This occurs when intermediate goods are sold - between 
transplants - at a pseudo price, so as to minimise the corporation’s tax liabilities 
in different locations. The “divide and rule” game was demonstrated by Toyota, 
in 1997, when it successfully used the strategy to play-off both the UK and 
French governments in its bid to secure a favourable investment package for a 
second assembly transplant in Europe - the new site eventually being located in 
Lens, France (Business Week, 15/6/1997). Nissan have also used a similar 
strategy to acquire £40 million of state funds, to aid the finance of the future 
development of its Sunderland transplant. It was also claimed that Nissan 
received guarantees over UK government policy towards the EU (The Guardian, 
25/1/2001).
3.4.4 Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm
Dunning’s (1988a) Ownership Location and Internalisation (OLI) paradigm 
offers an eclectic synthesis of both the “market power” and “internalisation” 
approaches to internationalisation. The synthesis is not, in itself, a new theory 
but, as Cantwell (2000, p.20) notes, “is an overall analytical framework for 
empirical investigations, which would draw the attention o f the analyst to the 
most important theories (of international production)". For Dunning (1988a), 
transnational corporations have Ownership (O) advantages vis-à-vis their major 
rivals, which they can exploit by establishing production in countries that have
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favourable Lœational (L) attributes These ownership advantages can relate to 
intangible assets (such as firm-specific technology) or they may be 
complementary assets that are jointly owned (such as the firm’s organisational 
abilities, the capabilities and expertise of its personnel, its supply network). 
Transnationals retain direct control over the use of such assets because of the 
Internalisation (I) advantages in doing so (see above).
The locational attributes of the host country may be resource-based, such as the 
abundance of raw materials and/or the availability of a cheap labour force or 
there may be cultural advantages, such as the use of a common language. 
Alternatively, locational factors may reflect demand side considerations, such as 
greater market opportunities (Dunning, 1988a, 1993). We should note that 
locational attributes are a major consideration, particularly where the 
transnational’s home country has a lack of natural resources or is experiencing 
rising domestic labour costs. In the case of Japan, a country that is lacking in 
natural resources, these supply-side factors have been very important. Before the 
lifting of FDI restrictions, MITI validated certain overseas investments in mining 
and textiles because they appeared conducive to the long-term interests of the 
Japanese economy (Mason, 1994). The mining investments enabled Japanese 
firms to secure direct control over a key source of raw materials, while Japan’s 
textile firms could use their offshore affiliates as export platforms to specifically 
overcome the rising trade barriers, which were being imposed by the USA 
(Dicken, 1998). In recent years, these export platforms have become a major 
source of cheap labour for Japanese manufacturers (Wells, 1993)
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3.5 Concluding Comments
This Chapter has introduced Japan’s major transnational corporations and 
considered the fundamental factors behind their emergence on the global scale. It 
was argued that these factors relate to both the demand and supply-side, and that 
the reasons for the growth in transnational activity, fundamentally, reflect the 
nature of Japan’s highly concentrated industrial structure - in short, 
transnationalism is endogenous. The combination of domestic demand 
constraints and supply-side pressures, led Corporate Japan to successfully lobby 
MITI to relax the post-war restrictions on FDI. Since liberalisation, Japan’s 
transnationals have emerged to compete on the global scale, increasing their 
market shares and their overseas production ratios.
On the demand side, this Chapter has found some evidence to suggest that a 
climate of deficient domestic demand may have precipitated the increase in 
outward FDI, since the early 1970’s, by Japanese manufacturing firms. This 
result was consistent with Pitelis’s (1996, 2000) evidence for the UK. The main 
factor on the supply side appears to be the determination of Japanese 
corporations to retain direct control over their international operations. In this 
respect, Hymer’s (1976) approach appears most applicable here. By internalising 
activities, rather than relying upon licensing or sub-contracting arrangements 
with indigenous firms, FDI allows Japanese transnationals to control and protect 
their “specific advantages” in international production. Furthermore, through 
“divide and rule” strategies, Japanese transnationals are able to reduce their 
international labour costs and remove the potential for conflict in labour 
relations. Some of these supply-side issues will be re-considered, in further
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detail, in the Case Study the Japanese automobile industry in the following two 
Chapters.
3.6 Data Sources
Aggregate Demand (AD): Consumption (C), Investment (I), Export Surplus (ES) 
and the Budget Deficit. Source: Japanese Statistical Yearbook (Various Issues).
Japanese Aggregate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Source: Japanese 
Statistical Yearbook (Various Issues).
Relative Profitability: Profit Margins for Japan relative to a weighted average of 
Profit Margins for the USA, UK and Germany (weighted by output at purchasing 
power parity). Gross Profit Margin = (Value Added -  Total Wage Bill)/Sales. 
Source: United Nations Industrial Statistics Yearbook (Various Issues).
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Table (3.3)
Japanese Outward FDI and Effective Demand 1974-1998 (Annual Data) Ordinary 
Least Squares Estimates
Dependent
Variable
A FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A AD„ -0.092 -0.073
(-0.139) (-0.122)
A AD M 1.077 0.443
<»■»«)___ (0.710)
A AD 1^2 -0.597
(-0.855)
A AD 2, -0.367 -0.310«
(-'7 3 4 ) (1.972)
A ADa., 1.788 1.321
(0.489) (0.517)
A/iDjw -0 686
(-0.793)
A Relative Profit -62652.12** -68273.5*** -69048.61 • • -72727.28««*
(-2.158) (-3.185) (-2.409) (-3.506)
A Relative Preßt,., -25593.60 -23515.77 -35933.55 -50387.00««
(-0.752) (-0 772) (-1.045) (-2.052)
A Relative Profit,.] -6602.12 2607.298
(-0.194) (0.068)
A FD!h, 0.168 0.161 0.192
(0.526) (0.620) (0.586)
A FDI^i -0.184 -0.064
(-0.530) (-0.184)
R-Bar Squared 0.27 0.35 0.32 0.44
Durbin Watson 1.84 1 84 1.67 1.53
Jarque-Bera x*(2) 1.51 (0.47] 1 54 (0.46] 0.54 [0.76] 0 87 |0.65]
Ljung-Box Q(4) 0.71 [0.95] 3.41 [0.49] 1 94 [0.74] 2.46 |0.65]
Heteroscadastidty 3.08(0.19] 3.38 (0 03) 0.82 [0.66] 1.42 (0.35]
Wald 1.49 [0 68) 1.15 [0.77]
Notes:
1. AD| -  C +  I +  BD + ES (L e . includes consom ption) and ADa-  I + BD + ES (Le. excludes consomption).
2. The resnMs were estimated by Kviews (version 3.1/ Th e  associated t ratios are In parenthesis beneath the 
estimated coefficients and ••• indicates s ta tis tic a l significant at the 1 %  level, •• at 5 %  mnl • at 1 0 % . Th e  test for 
norm a*? la Um  Ja r ,u r  Hera x '(2 ) teat. Q(n) la Um  I.Ja a t B o i x’atatistic, fo r aerial correlation, w ith a dégreva of 
fre e d «. Th e  teat for heteroam daatkity la W h ite ', teat (1980), w hich asym ptotically foOow. a x‘ dtatrihudoa, w ith 
datrraa of freedom equivalent to  the a am her o f dopa coefficient» h i the teat re gre a tou. Finally, thcae dln fnoatic teat, 
have com puter-tenanted prohaMUUea (h i parentheaie) lad lent lu t the prohahUHy of acceptiat the a o l hypotheUe of 
no model mtaepecUlcatlou. T h e  W ahl teat la need aa a variable deletion teat, h a p a ^ g  a linear reetrictioa that 
coefficient valaca are lero.
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Chapter 4
The Globalisation of the Japanese Automobile Industry: Strategic Behaviour and 
Transnational Production Networks
4.1. Introduction
We now focus our attention upon the role of Japanese automotive transnationals and 
the globalisation of the Japanese automobile industry. As we have already noted, the 
automobile industry plays the leading role within Japan’s domestic machinery sector 
and accounts for the largest and widest number of keiretsu linkages within Japan (see 
Chapter (2)). The industry has also been the “strategic focus” for much of MITI’s 
post-war industrial policy and is also widely acknowledged as providing Japan with 
“national champions” such as the large assemblers (referred to as Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs)), Toyota Nissan and Honda (see also Table (3.1), Chapter (3)).
In the global economy, the automobile industry has consistently recorded the highest 
level of actual overseas output and also the highest overseas production ratio (24.9%) 
of all Japan’s manufacturing industries (see Table (3.2), Chapter (3)). The automobile 
industry can, therefore, be regarded as being the most “global” of Japanese industries. 
From this perspective, the industry provides an ideal basis for a Case Study, which 
will enable us to gain useful insights into the (general) nature of the Japanese 
transnational corporation, its evolution into a global entity, its strategic behaviour and 
its involvement in the development of a new (overseas) keiretsu, otherwise known as a 
transnational production network. Furthermore, the Case Study also enables us to
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explore, more specifically, some of the supply-side theories of transnationalism that 
were introduced in Chapter (3).
Although, much has been written about the Japanese automobile industry (see, for 
instance, Womack et.âi 1990; Smitka, 1991), this Case Study differs in that it 
considers the industry from a truly global perspective. The Case Study is presented in 
two Chapters. In this Chapter, we draw upon new, primary data sources to provide 
new evidence on the scale and pattern of globalisation within the industry. This data 
has been carefully collated from the Dodwell Directory (1997). Further details of this 
unique data set are provided in Appendix (A). In Chapter (5), we consider the 
experiences of various actors involved in Japanese automotive transnational 
production networks, using direct insights from interviews with and questionnaires 
from Managing Directors and Senior Managers of UK based Japanese suppliers. We 
pay particular attention to the nature of the various relationships that have evolved 
between Japanese OEMs and their suppliers within this new keiretsu. However, given 
that our results only relate to experiences in the UK, we are careful not to generalise 
our results.
This Chapter begins with a (brief) profile of each of Japan’s OEMs and also the 
distinction between “Group” and “Independent” suppliers. We also note some recent 
trends in the domestic industry. We then consider the globalisation of the industry 
(Section (4.3)), concentrating upon the role played by Japan’s large OEMs. In 
particular, we focus upon the strategic behaviour in entry patterns, where we observe 
the Knickerbocker (1973) effect. Section (4.4) examines the internationalisation of the 
Japanese auto-components industry. We provide new, original data to show the extent
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to which Japan’s OEMs have actively been involved in (strategically) recreating their 
domestic keiretsu networks, internationally, to form a new keiretsu; a transnational 
production network. Finally, Section (4.5) concludes.
4.2 Japan’s Domestic’Automobile Industry: Overview
4.2.1 Profiles of Japan’s OEMs
There are 11 “Japanese” OEMs that manufacture passenger cars, mini-cars and 
commercial vehicles (i.e. vans, trucks and buses). All of the Japanese OEMs are 
transnational corporations and a profile of each of them, as at the 30th June 2000, has 
been compiled and is presented in Table (4.1)1. The table lists the OEMs’ major 
domestic and overseas plants with entry date(s) and also includes details of both equity 
holding(s) in these subsidiaries and, where possible, joint venture partners. Limited 
information on capacity or production runs is also provided, where available. The 
global position of Japan’s OEMs will be discussed in further detail, in Section (4.3).
Originally the 11 OEMs were established as independent companies, but since the 
Second World War, there has been considerable co-operation between Japanese OEMs 
on both technological and product development. Such technology sharing has pre­
dominantly been between the larger OEMs and smaller producers who operate in 
niche segments of the market. For instance, Toyota has a long history of involvement 
with the small car producer, Diahatsu, and also the truck maker, Hino. Nissan has had 
similar arrangements with Fuji Heavy Industries and also its own subsidiary Nissan 
Diesel. In the early post-war years, these ties were often encouraged by MITI, as part
1 The main details were acquired from Dodwell (1997), which was updated using information from 
MIRA (1997), Bursa et.al (1998) and recent company reports.
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of an industrial strategy of cartelisation to strengthen the international competitiveness 
of the Japanese automobile industry (Johnson, 1982).
The technological arrangements were initially supplemented by small cross­
shareholdings between ihe companies involved. Such cross-shareholdings promoted 
trust and mutual cooperation and also re-enforced the commitment of each company to 
joint projects. However, in recent years, the larger Japanese OEMs - particularly 
Toyota - have substantially raised their equity participation in their smaller partners, to 
obtain a “controlling interest” (Dodwell, 1997; Bursa, et.al, 1998). This increased 
equity participation has occurred during a period in which there have also been 
significant changes in the ownership structures of Japanese OEMs - in particular, there 
has been substantial foreign equity participation within Japanese OEMs (see Table
(4.1)). These recent trends are now reflective of the increasing level of concentration 
within the global automobile industry. This is discussed in further detail, in Section
(4.3.3).
4.2.2 Group vis-à-vis Independent Suppliers
As we mentioned in Chapter (2), the 11 Japanese OEMs are each supported by 
keiretsu networks that, in the aggregate, consist of approximately 1,400 Japanese auto­
parts suppliers. Smitka (1991) provides an historical overview of the development and 
the evolving structure of the Japanese auto-supply industry. For our analysis it is 
important to note that Japan’s auto-suppliers can be classified as either a “Group” or 
“Independent” supplier. This distinction is defined in the Dodwell Report (1997):
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“A Group supplier is defined as a subsidiary or affiliate of an automaker and/or company which 
depends on a single automotive company for 50% of its annual sales with some exceptions e g. a 
company whose dependence is less than 50% may be regarded as a Group company, taking into 
consideration such factors as historical relationships, personnel ties and licensing agreements” (Dodwell 
Report, p.178, 1997).
It follows that an “Independent” supplier is one that supplies most OEMs, without any 
OEM affiliation in terms of major shareholdings and personnel exchange2. Typical 
Independent firms include Akebono Brake, NTN and Yazaki, who are involved in the 
production of brakes, bearings and wire harnesses; products that are standard auto­
parts, which, in production, can generate large internal economies of scale through the 
use of a particular technology.
One other difference between Group and Independent suppliers is that the former are 
often precluded from supplying consumers directly, with replacement parts. These 
restrictions do not hold for Independent suppliers (Dodwell, 1997). However, it should 
be noted that being a Group supplier no longer precludes the firm from supplying 
other OEMs. This has become more apparent as the Japanese OEMs have widened 
their global supply base, while suppliers have responded by beginning to trade with 
more than one OEM (Sako, 1996).
4.2.3 Recent Trends
On average, over two-thirds of Japan’s domestic automobile production consists of 
passenger cars (including mini-cars), while commercial vehicles account for the
2 It is true, o f course, that some Japanese OEMs have "minor” shareholdings in some Independent 
suppliers. For instance, in Akebono Brake, Toyota holds a 14.3% stake, Nissan 7.5%, Isuzu 4.9% and 
Hino 2.2% (Toyo Keizui Inc, 2000).
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remaining one third of output. The trend in domestic production is one of long-term 
decline. In 1996, total automobile production, in Japan, was just over ten million units, 
which was 75% of the 1990 level. During the same period, world output had grown by 
3.2%. Dodwell (1997), attribute the decline in Japan’s production to falling domestic 
demand and, more significantly, to the increasing transfer of manufacturing capacity 
overseas (see Figure (4.1)).
However, despite domestic decline, Japan’s large car producers continue to enjoy a 
significant proportion of the global market (see also Table (3.1), Chapter (3)). Dicken 
(1998, p.342) notes that they are increasingly “moving towards a greater 
transnationalisation o f  their production”. Toyota, Nissan and Honda have, in 
particular, all stated a medium term ambition to manufacture more cars overseas than 
in Japan. Consequently, Japanese car exports have been falling steadily since 1985 
and, for the first time, in 1995, they were exceeded, in both output and revenue, by 
production from Japanese foreign subsidiaries (Dicken, 1998).
4.2.4 The Structure o f Japan’s Domestic Automobile Industry Revisited 
We have already provided an outline of the domestic Japanese automobile industry, in 
Chapter (2). The main conclusion was that the industry has a pyramidal structure, with 
the OEMs at the apex. It is important to recall that the Japanese OEM is typically a 
vertically de-integrated entity, which is involved in long-standing business relations 
with suppliers in so-called keiretsu networks. These relationships involve “mutual 
trust” and co-operation between the actors (Smitka, 1991). However, while we 
recognised these industry characteristics, we argued that control and strategic
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decisions are concentrated amongst the corporate hierarchies of Japan’s large 
automotive firms.
This latter point is important, since it aids our understanding of the nature of the 
Japanese (automou *e) transnational corporation, and also its role in the global 
economy. It is the OEMs’ corporate hierarchies that shape both the operations and the 
long-term direction of the Japanese automobile industry. The strategic decision for the 
industry to globalise (with implications for the control of international operations) is 
one such example and has had profound implications for all firms throughout the 
sector. These issues will be explored in further detail in both this and the following 
Chapter. It is to the globalisation of the industry, to which we now turn.
4.3 Japan’s OEMs as Global Actors
4.3.1 The Global Position of Japanese OEMs as at 30.6.2000
The starting point for our analysis of the globalisation of the Japanese automobile 
industry is Table (4.1). The data in this table provides some information on the global 
position of Japanese OEMs as at 30th June 2000. As Table (4.1) clearly shows, 
Japan’s OEMs are now represented on a truly global scale, with the large assemblers 
having built or acquired equity stakes in production facilities throughout five 
continents. In addition, it should also be noted that the Japanese OEMs’ global 
operations are much wider than the production that occurs within these plants. 
Through licensing agreements and, more importantly, extensive sub-contracting 
arrangements, the large Japanese OEMs have increasingly been able to expand their 
global production network. A consequence of these trends is that while Japan’s vehicle 
exports are in long-term decline and have been falling steadily since 1985 (Dodwell,
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1997), the ratio of overseas to domestic production has been significantly rising for all 
of Japan’s large OEMs. In this respect, the latest overseas production ratios (see Table
(4.1)) are significantly higher for Toyota (34%), Nissan (38%), Mitsubishi Motors 
(35%) and Honda (51%), than for the whole of the transport equipment sector (24.9%) 
and Japanese industry (14.1%). Furthermore, we have already noted that all of the 
major Japanese OEMs have stated a medium term ambition to manufacture more 
vehicles overseas than in Japan (Dicken, 1998, p.342).
Moving to the geography of the Japanese OEM operations, we can see that it is 
predominantly concentrated within the economies of North America, Europe and East 
Asia (see Table (4.1)). This is not surprising, given that 92% of the world’s 
automobile production takes place within these markets From a first glance, it appears 
that Japanese OEMs are particularly well represented in Asia, although caution needs 
to be taken when trying to make inferences about the scale of these operations 
Unfortunately, Table (4.1) does not distinguish between plants that have fully 
integrated car-manufacturing facilities and those that are merely final assembly 
operations3. Limited information reported in Bursa et.al (1998) and MIRA (1997), 
implies that the Asian plants are much smaller, and constrained in terms of capacity 
and product range, compared to their counterparts in North America, Europe and 
Japan (see also Table (4.1), for (limited) data on output and capacity levels). Dicken 
(1998), goes further to note the existence of high tariffs on finished vehicles 
throughout the region has meant that it is not cost effective to operate full car 
production in East Asia. However, there is a long history of a vertical production chain
3 An example of a fully integrated car-manufacturing facility can be found at Nissan’s Sunderland plant 
in the UK. Described by Bursa et.al (1998, p. 142) as "one  o f  th e  m o s t in teg ra ted  c a r  m an u fa c tu rin g  
fa c ilitie s  in  E urope ", the plant contains panel pressing, body assembly, paint shop, plastics injection 
and blow moulding facilities, engine machining and assembly, plus final car assembly.
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chain between Japan and East Asia in the automobile industry (Dicken, 1998). These 
observations may then be consistent with the fact that the Japanese OEMs’ most 
prevalent form of entry within East Asia has been through forming a joint venture with 
an indigenous assembler. By pooling capital costs, sharing platforms and technology, 
the Japanese OEMs are able to assemble and market low-cost vehicles, and gain 
significant market shares within the region (Dicken, 1998).
In contrast to East Asia, the Japanese OEM operations in North America, and 
particularly those in the USA, have been fully integrated on a global scale. Honda was 
the first Japanese OEM to begin full car production in the USA, with its plant at 
Marysville, Ohio, which opened in 1979. Both Toyota and Nissan subsequently 
followed Honda in the early 1980’s, as higher domestic wages and the imposition of 
quotas and Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) began to hit exports from Japan. The 
plants in the USA are the largest Japanese OEM plants outside Japan, equipped with 
fully integrated car manufacturing facilities to serve the large North American 
markets. Typically, the North American Japanese transplants are green-field sites, in 
rural locations, where the influence of labour unions is minimal (Dicken, 1998). In the 
mid to late 1980’s, Nissan, Toyota and then Honda began to invest in similar platforms 
in Europe, with the UK being the preferred base4. By the late 1980’s, the transplants 
were not only serving national markets but were also used to export to other locations 
across the globe, including Japan.
4 There are many reasons for the UK being the prominent choice for Japanese OEMs in Europe. 
Typically these include the UK having lower production costs than the EU, weaker labour legislation, 
the availability of generous tax and subsidies and the fact that English is Japan's second language (for 
further details, see Dicken, 1988).
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It was through their US transplants, that the Japanese OEMs began to pioneer a 
strategy of creating “the world car”. This concept is based on the premise that a 
vehicle is designed using a set of basic components (such as floor pans and power- 
trains), with vehicle derivatives then tailored to suit various national markets (see 
Bursa et.al 1998). This enables the OEM to build a range of models using a shared 
platform enabling the OEM to attain scale economies, particularly in research and 
design, purchasing components and - through the more efficient use of platforms - 
during the actual manufacturing processes. According to Bursa et.al (1998), the early 
models -  such as Toyota’s Corolla -  were comparatively low priced, but the basic 
common design often lacked appeal across wider markets. However, in recent years, 
the introduction of flexible computer controlled manufacturing systems has enabled 
the OEMs to widen and extend regional variations to match consumer demand.
Japanese OEMs are also establishing themselves outside the main automobile markets. 
In South America, Toyota leads the Japanese presence, with access to facilities that are 
geographically dispersed across the continent. During the 1990’s, the company 
increased its activities in the region with investment in new sites in Columbia, 
Argentina and more recently Brazil. The other Japanese OEMs have smaller footholds 
in the continent, although this will change as the economies mature. As yet, the 
Japanese South American transplants are smaller scale operations compared to those 
in the North American or European economies, with facilities generally designed for 
assembly rather than full car production (Bursa, et.al 1998).
In Oceania, only Toyota and Mitsubishi now have production facilities with 
transplants in Australia. Until 1997, Toyota, Nissan, Honda and Mitsubishi all had
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assembly plants in New Zealand, but these were closed following the country’s 
abolition of vehicle import duties that made exporting to the market more feasible. 
Africa remains the one major continent that the Japanese OEMs have yet to fully 
penetrate. Most Japanese car production has been through sub-contracting and 
licensing agreements with local assemblers. However, in 1997, both Toyota and 
Nissan purchased substantial stakes in their South African partners and it is envisaged 
that more Japanese automobile investment will soon follow into the region (MIRA, 
1997).
4.3.2. Strategic Behaviour in Entry Patterns
The strategic behaviour of both Toyota and Nissan in acquiring stakes in their South 
African partners appears to fit Knickerbocker’s (1973) view of international 
oligopolistic rivalry. Knickerbocker (1973) noted that the timing of the entry of US 
firms into overseas markets was “bunched”, while Dunning (1994) has noted a similar 
pattern in the entry of predominantly Japanese machinery firms into Europe. 
Knickerbocker’s (1973) explanation for this type of phenomena is that, large national 
firms imitate the behaviour of their domestic, growth-seeking rivals, particularly those 
rivals who invest overseas to enhance their market shares. The game becomes one of 
“following the leader” , with firms engaged in an international “mutual exchange of 
threats", each aware that a failure to respond may leave them in a weaker global 
market position vis-à-vis their rivals. In this respect, global strategic interdependence 
between firms leads to cycles of both aggressive and defensive investments in 
international markets.
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A closer look at entry patterns in Table (4.1) reveals that the behaviour of Japan’s 
larger OEMs appears to fit Knickerbocker’s (1973) hypothesis, particularly entry into 
the North American, European and East Asian economies. For instance, consider East 
Asia, where it appears that Nissan was the early “leader”, with its Taiwan affiliate in 
1959. Within 'tiiree years, both Toyota and Honda had responded with similar 
investments in the region. The late 1960’s then saw both Toyota and Honda engaged 
in “tit for tat” investments in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand respectively. The net 
result of all this was that, by the early 1970’s, in terms of equity stakes in East Asian 
affiliates, both the followers -  Toyota and Honda -  had acquired a wider geographical 
manufacturing presence than the initial leader Nissan. Consequently, Nissan 
responded by investing in a Malaysian affiliate in 1976.
The next surge of Japanese automobile investment within the region was in the early 
1980’s, and again it was Nissan that “led” the way, with a joint venture in the 
Philippines (1983). The response of Toyota, Honda and now Mitsubishi was the same 
as before: within four years these rivals had made multiple investments - in 
geographical space - throughout the region. During the 1990’s, Nissan reacted by 
widening its manufacturing presence in Asia, which again has encouraged others to 
respond (see Table (4.1)). There is also evidence of strategic behaviour within the 
continent’s sub-markets. Toyota was the first Japanese OEM to invest in the 
potentially large consumer markets of India and Southern Asia, which induced a 
strategic response from Honda (see Table (4.1)). Similarly, during the 1990’s, Toyota 
has led the way into China (1991), followed this time by Nissan (1994) and more 
recently Mitsubishi (1998).
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A similar analysis can also be applied to Japanese OEM entry patterns in both North 
America and Europe. Honda’s investment in manufacturing facilities at Ohio, USA 
(1979), was followed by both Nissan’s transplants in Tennessee and Toyota’s in 
California and Kentucky during the early 1980’s. Once again, in the late 1980’s, both 
Honda and Toyota widened their geographical manufacturing presence with 
transplants in Ontario, Canada, while Nissan eventually responded by increasing its 
capacity at its Mexican transplant (Dicken, 1998). Mitsubishi and Mazda also entered 
the USA with joint venture operations in Illinois and Michigan respectively. In the late 
1990’s, both Toyota and Nissan have become engaged in more “tit for tat” investments 
within the region (see Table (4.1)).
In Europe, the early 1980’s saw Nissan “lead” the way with its transplants in 
Catalonia, Spain followed by its much larger operations in the North East of England. 
Toyota responded with a similar investment at Bumaston, Derbyshire, in the UK. 
Honda’s entry into Europe had actually been earlier than both their main rivals, but 
their European operations had initially taken the form of a joint venture with the 
indigenous UK manufacturer, British Leyland (the predecessor to Rover), and it was 
not until the late 1980’s that Honda’s vehicles were being manufactured on British 
platforms. Honda now has its own production facilities at Swindon, in the UK. 
Meanwhile, Mitsubishi Motors have also begun large-scale production in Europe, 
through a joint venture with Volvo (see Table (4.1)).
A simple attempt to capture the (global) strategic interaction, between Japan’s four 
major OEMs, is through the use of a correlation matrix for the dispersion of major 
(Japanese) OEM plants (as listed in Table (4.1)), by region, as at 31/12/1980 and again
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at 30/6/2000. In this respect, for each Japanese OEM, we correlate the number of 
transplants in operation (as listed in Table (4.1)) vis-à-vis its domestic rivals, in nine 
economic or strategic locations5. This approach is similar to that of Knickerbocker 
(1973, p.49), although his statistical analysis considered strategic behaviour in a 
number of industries. Our correlation coefficients are presented in Table (4.2), 
although the reported results are accompanied by a caveat. This is that the correlation 
coefficients can be open to wide interpretation and particularly so in this case, given 
that the nature and timing of affiliate formation varies considerably amongst the 
OEMs. The correlation coefficients in Table (4.2) are dependent upon both the date 
and region(s) chosen for calculation and so should be treated with caution. This aside, 
a simple comparison of the correlation coefficients in 1980 and 2000, from Table(s) 
(4.2a and 4.2b), point to a significantly positive relationship between the numbers of 
OEM plants located across regions. Furthermore, the strength of the association 
between Toyota and Nissan and Toyota and Honda also appears to increase over the 
period, which may indicate a rise in the intensity of strategic interaction between the 
OEMs. This result certainly appears consistent with the preceding analysis and the 
patterns of entry observed in Table (4.1).
So far, the analysis in this Section has only allowed for general conclusions to be 
drawn. This reflects the limited information available on the extent of activities in the
5 It was felt that it was better capture global strategic interaction on a regional basis, rather than a 
country basis, since OEMs typically regard regions as strategic locations for global production. Nine 
“regions” were used which were based upon geography and viable trading areas. The regions were 
North and Central America, South America, the EU, non-EU economies, the East Asian economies, 
China, West Asia, Africa, and Oceania. China was not included in the East Asian economies because 
the country has only recently begun to open its trading borders and is regarded, strategically, as a 
separate site. For a similar reason, OEM operations in the EU and non-EU countries were not 
amalgamated together. Given that the first overseas OEM affiliate was in 1959, and the data in Table 
(4.1) ends at 2000, it was felt 1980 might be reasonable benchmark date with which to compare 
strategic behaviour.
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OEMs’ overseas subsidiaries. The data in Table(s) (4.1) and (4.2), therefore, requires 
careful consideration and interpretation. In this respect, a glance at Table (4.1), 
confirms that Nissan’s operations are less geographically dispersed than their main 
rivals, which may imply that Nissan has reacted to globalisation, rather than being a 
leading play w*. However, Industry Reports regard the company as having been a 
“leader” in the globalisation of the Japanese automobile industry, particularly in 
Europe and Asia (MIRA, 1997). This is important because there may be real gains 
from becoming a “leader”. By being the first OEM to invest in manufacturing 
facilities, in a new market, the OEM widens its market presence and brand appeal. In 
addition, the OEM will have a preferential choice over potential sites. Consequently, 
the OEM will have more time - relative to its rivals - to be able to integrate both its 
domestic and overseas production operations, and also establish relationships with 
both indigenous and Japanese suppliers.
These “leadership” advantages appear to manifest themselves in relative market 
shares. According to AAMA (1998), Nissan’s aggregate market share in Europe, in 
1996, was 3.1%, followed by Toyota (2.8%) and Honda (1.5%). In North America, 
where Honda led the Japanese transplant entry, Honda has 9.2%, Toyota 7.7% and 
Nissan 4.3% of the total market. Furthermore, both the Toyota Camry and Honda 
Accord were the best selling vehicles in the USA during 1997 (AAMA, 1998). AAMA 
(1998) also report that the relative (Japanese) market positions in these economies 
have remained stable, since the Japanese OEMs built their transplants in the early 
1980’s. The East Asian markets, of course, are much smaller and more fragmented, 
but are dominated by the Japanese OEMs, who account for approximately 80% of new 
vehicle sales. Throughout the continent, the largest players in each national market
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tend to be those Japanese OEMs, which have a significant manufacturing presence 
(MIRA, 1997)). The East Asian markets are not yet mature, but it would appear that 
the Japanese OEMs are in a strong position to exploit the opportunities on offer.
These marku positions may, of course, reflect earlier successful export penetration by 
Japanese OEMs, which has enabled them to establish a brand image and acquire a 
favourable reputation. For instance, Honda has a long and successful history of serving 
the US market through exports (Bursa.et.al, 1998; Dicken, 1998). It may be that export 
success provides the OEM with a Hymer (1976) type “specific advantage”, allowing 
the OEM to assume “leadership”. FDI is then undertaken by the OEMs to protect and 
expand their respective market shares.
4.3.3 Recent Ownership Changes and Foreign Participation in Japanese OEMs 
It was briefly mentioned in Section (4.2.1), that there have been significant recent 
changes in the ownership structures of Japanese OEMs. The increasing globalisation 
of the industry appears to have coincided with a corresponding increase in merger 
activity, particularly between Japanese and foreign OEMs, which has been primarily 
instigated by the latter. This is particularly interesting since, traditionally, MITI have 
been opposed to any foreign participation in Japanese OEMs and industrial policy has 
attempted to prevent such involvement. For instance, Johnson (1982) reports of how 
MITI, following Japan’s capital liberalisation reforms, during the late 1960’s, was 
successful in persuading Toyota and Nissan not to become involved in either joint 
ventures or other equity holding arrangements with the large American manufacturers. 
MIT1 was, however, less successful in negotiations with Mitsubishi Motors, who
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formed a joint venture with Chrysler in 1971, a move that can be seen as initiating the 
liberalisation of Japanese automotive capital (Johnson, 1982).
The recent changes in OEM ownership and the associated rise in the global 
concentration of the industry have particularly gathered pace since 1996. Most 
observers argue that Western markets have become saturated, leaving many OEMs 
with stagnant order books and (global) excess capacity. Consequently, lower returns 
on capital and falling equity values have meant that some OEMs have become 
vulnerable to takeover, with merger being regarded as a means towards a large-scale 
rationalisation and restructuring of the industry (Bursa.et.al, 1998). Larger or more 
successful OEMs are purchasing their “weaker” international rivals to essentially 
secure a “brand image”, to obtain entry into niche markets. In this respect, the 
Chairman of Daimler-Chrysler, Bob Eaton, believes that the current number of major 
world car producers of 14 is untenable, and will fall to around 8 within the next few 
years (Bursa et.al, 1998).
With regards to the Japanese OEMs, only Honda has yet to be directly involved in 
these ownership changes. Toyota, as mentioned earlier, has strengthened its long-term 
relationships with both Diahatsu and Hino and has become the largest shareholder in 
each company. The acquisition of Diahatsu provides Toyota with a specialist small car 
producer, while the increased participation in Hino, increases Toyota’s options in the 
global commercial vehicle market. Toyota’s strategy is similar to that of one of its 
global rivals, the American giant, General Motors, who are, ironically, now the major 
shareholders of both Suzuki and Isuzu -  both the direct major (Japanese) domestic 
rivals to Daihatsu and Hino.
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The most significant changes in ownership relate to the acquisitions of three of Japan’s 
large OEMs -  Mitsubishi Motors, Mazda and particularly Nissan - by foreign 
companies. Mazda’s relationship with Ford was consolidated when the American 
company purchased a controlling stake (33.4%) in 1996 and installed an American 
President.' Tne acquisition of Mazda provided Ford with the opportunity to gain a 
foothold in the Japanese market. According to Bursa et.al (1998), both companies will 
further integrate their global operations, sharing common platforms, and basic engine 
design and transmission structures. The most recent proposed merger - announced in 
July 2000 - is between Mitsubishi Motors and Daimler-Chrysler, which will leave the 
German company as the largest shareholder (34% stake) and there is a strong 
possibility that a full takeover will occur by 2002. As yet, little is known what effect 
the merger will have upon Mitsubishi’s operations, but it is thought that Daimler- 
Chrysler are to appoint their own top executives to overhaul the current management 
structure and outgoing Mitsubishi Motors President, Katsuhiko Kawasoe, anticipates 
“sweeping organisational changes" (Nikkei Weekly, 3/9/2000).
The most controversial takeover, within Japan, has been French based Renault’s 
acquisition of Nissan, Japan’s second largest OEM, in 1998. During the late 1990’s 
Nissan had become vulnerable to a takeover given its high debt equity ratio and falling 
share price. Renault’s acquisition has had important consequences for Nissan and their 
predominantly Japanese supply base. Nissan’s new (Renault appointed) President, 
Carlos Ghosn, has embarked upon a Western style of organisational restructuring, with 
cutbacks in plant investment, planned factory closures in Japan and moves towards 
global sourcing and a dismantling of the company’s keiretsu Corporate Groups. The 
latter has included plans to sell Nissan’s large equity stakes in two of its largest
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components firms, Calsonic Kansei and Ikeda Bussan, to the US auto-suppliers Delphi 
and Johnson Controls respectively (Nikkei Weekly, 21/8/2000). Outlining the future 
for Nissan, Ghosn has consistently made it clear that "maintaining keiretsu ties, 
complete with cross-shareholdings and production, personnel and technology
exchanges, is not an objective..........the question is whether suppliers will commit to
20% cost reductions for Nissan in a credible way” (Nikkei Weekly, 25/10/99).
The Nissan case highlights some of the likely implications of increased foreign 
participation in Japanese OEMs. In particular, the industry’s supply base can no longer 
rely upon orders from their main OEM, but instead will have to compete with other 
global suppliers. Consequently, suppliers themselves are becoming involved in 
international mergers, in order to maintain a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
OEMs. Throughout the Japanese automobile industry, there are calls for Western style 
re-structuring, with changes in managerial and organisational practices. These changes 
may not conform to Japanese culture and could be difficult to implement (Nikkei 
Weekly, 25/10/99).
The increased merger activity should not be seen as being independent from 
globalisation. Rather, both rising merger activity and globalisation should be regarded 
as endogenous. From being small independent producers, the Japanese OEMs were 
promoted as “national champions” on the global stage (see Chapter (2)). Japanese 
automotive capital was liberalised and Japan’s OEMs became transnational 
corporations. As the world’s major automotive markets have become saturated, 
experiencing a slow growth in demand, a number of Japanese (and other) OEMs have 
seen falls in their Stock Market valuations and have subsequently become vulnerable
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to (international) takeovers. These ownership changes will have a number of important 
consequences for the industry, particularly for Japan’s smaller domestic suppliers in 
the keiretsu networks, who may no longer be able to rely upon their main OEM 
contractors for new orders (see Chapter (6)). Unlike in the immediate post-Second 
World War period, MITI has been powerless to prevent or nullify the effects of these 
changes.
4.4 The Internationalisation of the Japanese Components Industry
4.4.1 Corporate Globalisation, Specific Advantage and the New Keiretsu 
The analysis in the previous section considered the emergence of the large Japanese 
OEMs on a global scale. However, as we noted in Chapter (2) and Section (4.2.4), 
Japan’s domestic automobile industry also consists of a wide and extensive set of 
keiretsu networks of auto-suppliers. In this Section, we will show the degree to which 
Japan’s large OEMs have (strategically) tried to recreate these keiretsu networks in the 
global economy. The new data presented in this Section will, therefore, enable us to 
gauge the full extent of globalisation within the Japanese automobile industry, while 
also providing us with insights into the evolution and development of these Japanese 
transnational networks.
The data in Table (4.1) and Tables (4.3a to 4.3e) reveal a symmetrical pattern in the 
overseas entry of Japan’s OEMs and auto-suppliers, with the timing of overseas entry 
being “bunched” and concentrated within the North American, European and East 
Asian economies6. These patterns reflect an attempt by the Japanese automobile 
industry to reproduce the close domestic relationships between Japan’s OEMs and
6 Indeed, 96% of Japanese offshore supplier affiliates are located within these economies (see Table 
(4.3a to 4.3e)).
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their suppliers, throughout the globe. In essence, Japan’s OEMs have been 
strategically establishing a new (overseas) keiretsu, or a transnational production 
network. This has been achieved through OEMs actively “encouraging” their core 
domestic suppliers, to set up wholly owned subsidiaries or, in many cases, establish 
joint ventures with indigenous suppliers.
The rationale behind the new keiretsu lies in both maintaining the Japanese automobile 
industry’s specific (competitive) advantages and reducing the uncertainty associated 
with operating in a different environment. These “specific advantages” primarily relate 
to the domestic industry’s governance structure, the various control mechanisms 
available to the OEMs and the close relationships that have developed between OEMs 
and suppliers (see Chapter (2) for further details). When production is shifted 
overseas, Japan’s large OEMs could lose these advantages, particularly when they 
have to establish new supply chains with indigenous suppliers (Gittelman and 
Dunning (1992)). This may be because (Western) supplier-manufacturer contracts are 
based upon competitive bidding, rather than the cultivation of long-term trading 
arrangements. An additional problem is that indigenous suppliers are generally 
unfamiliar with the format of Japanese production processes, which involve an 
understanding of Just-in-Time (JIT) delivery systems, lean production, kaizen quality 
control and also the (Japanese) labour bargaining process (see Section (2.3.2 and 
2.3.3), Chapter (2)).
More fundamentally, these difficulties, combined with an absence of an (controlling) 
equity stake in indigenous suppliers, reduce the effectiveness and enforceability of the 
various control mechanisms available to Japanese OEMs (see Section (2.4) of Chapter
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(2)). In the light of these uncertainties, it was rational for Japan’s OEMs to minimise 
the risks associated with international production by continuing to work with their 
acknowledged suppliers and attempt to replicate Japanese industrial organisation at 
their overseas sites. A further advantage for the Japanese OEMs was that by using 
their core Japanese suppliers and employing similar technology as in Japan, the OEMs 
could directly compare production costs between international supply subsidiaries, 
along the value chain. This provides the OEMs with greater leverage in their 
bargaining position with subsidiaries and allows them to exert direct control over an 
international division of labour.
The importance for Japan’s OEMs to maintain control and protect their specific 
advantages, in international automobile production, is reflected by their direct 
involvement in the development of the new keiretsu. This involvement has often 
extended to identifying potential sites for supplier transplants and/or possible joint 
venture partners for suppliers. The interview responses from Managing Directors 
(MDs) of Japanese suppliers, in the UK, provide a direct insight into the influence of 
the large OEMs. Consider, for instance, the comments of an MD, from a Honda Group 
supplier, based in the South West of England:
‘The decision to build a new factory here was really Honda's. Honda own 49% of our parent company 
in Japan and consequently they have a large influence on decisions. Honda had chosen the Swindon site 
in preference to other European sites for new car production. It was decided that we, as one of Honda’s 
core suppliers in Japan, should support their operations here, in a joint venture with a (Honda) chosen 
UK supplier. That was the main reason for us to locate here. For us, other location factors were not 
really an issue. However, we have benefited from things such as the region’s infrastructure”.
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MDs also expressed similar sentiments at two of the three other UK based (Group) 
supplier affiliates, where interviews were also conducted. However, as noted in 
Chapter (2) (Section (2.4)), equity participation in the supplier is not the only control 
mechanism available to the OEMs. In this case, it is interesting to note that Japanese 
OEKao have also been in a position to exert their authority over non-Group suppliers. 
An MD from an Independent Japanese supplier that produces aerials, based in the 
West Midlands commented:
“In Japan, Toyota is our main customer. When Toyota began operations here, our parent company 
decided to follow them to maintain customer relations. Otherwise there was a real danger that we would 
lose their custom to a rival supplier “.
The threat of sourcing production from a (global) rival supplier is, therefore, a credible 
threat to “encourage” domestic Japanese suppliers to follow their main OEM into 
overseas markets.
Industry logistics also allow Japan’s OEMs to indirectly determine the actual 
(overseas) location of their suppliers. As mentioned in Chapter (2) (Section (2.4.4)), 
Japanese production processes generally favour a close geographical proximity 
between the OEMs and their supplier’s transplants and, as in Japan; the close 
proximity of operations is a notable feature of the new keiretsu. In the USA, for 
instance, large Japanese dominated automotive clusters have emerged to rival 
domestic producers (Dicken, 1998). The importance of geographical proximity is that 
it helps to facilitate good working relationships between the OEM and supplier 
transplants, and also assists in the smooth functioning of Just-In-Time (JIT) delivery
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systems. An MD, from a Toyota supplier, in the West Midlands, UK, acknowledged 
these points:
‘Toyota expect us to make 28 deliveries to their assembly plant at Burnaston, per day and we are 
working on increasing that load, without incurring additional capital expenditure. In addition, our 
employees regularly meet representatives from Toyota to discuss production operations. Being close to 
their plant at Burnaston was therefore an important logistical consideration”.
In addition, the MD’s comments appear to be supported by other UK based Japanese 
suppliers, since 76.2% of all questionnaire respondents regarded the issue of regional 
proximity, to their main Japanese OEMs operations, as being the most important 
reason for the precise location of their own transplant7. It appears then that, throughout 
the industry, corporate strategy is determined to suit the global activities of the large 
OEMs. In short, Japan’s OEMs are responsible for choosing the optimal location and 
time horizon for new automotive production. The OEMs can then either exploit their 
equity stake or their various control mechanisms to “persuade” their suppliers to 
follow them overseas.
4.4.2 The Fusion o f  Entry: Group vis-à-vis Independent suppliers 
As mentioned in Section (4.4.1), the general patterns of overseas supplier entry are 
shown in Table(s) (4.3a to 4.3e). In Table(s) (4.4a to 4.4c), details of supplier entry 
into East Asia, Europe and North America is decomposed into Group and Independent 
supplier entry. A Country-Group breakdown is also provided in Table (4.5). These 
tables allow a closer investigation of the evolution and composition of the new 
keiretsu. This is important, since although Independent suppliers will form part of the
7 See Appendices (A) and (B) for details of the Questionnaire.
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OEMs’ new keiretsu, their role is likely to be looser and less defined than those of 
Group suppliers (see Section (4.2.2)).
From the Tables (4.3 and 4.4), it is clear that the earliest and largest regional 
concentration of overseas Japanese supplier affiliates is in East Asia. These offshore 
bases have become a source of low cost labour for Japanese auto-suppliers and they 
support the Japanese OEM activities throughout the whole region. However, 
production is not only for the Asian markets. Indeed the bases are sometimes referred 
to as “export platforms”, since they also supply a significant proportion of components 
to both Western and Japanese markets as part of a vertical production chain (Wells, 
1993; Dicken, 1998; MITI, 1998). The transplants are widely dispersed throughout the 
region, although Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia are clearly the most favoured sites 
for production. During the 1990’s, however, China emerged as the most important 
Asian economy for new Japanese (automobile) subsidiary formation - possibly at the 
expense of its neighbour, Taiwan (see Table (4.3a) and also Table (4.1)). In terms of 
composition, 64.8% of East Asian transplants belong to Independent suppliers (see 
Table (4.4a)). Historically, the large Independent suppliers have served a wide (global) 
client base that also includes non-Japanese OEMs8. In order to serve the global market 
competitively, Independent suppliers were amongst the first Japanese component firms 
to extensively outsource their operations and, in this respect, they predominantly took 
advantage of the low cost East Asian “export platforms” and began to create an 
international division of labour. It was not until the early 1980’s that Group suppliers 
began to set up extensive East Asian regional operations, in order to support the
g
These Independent suppliers included the likes of Asahi Glass and NSK Ltd, who were engaged in 
large scale manufacturing of specific components such as car glass and bearings for all the Japanese 
OEMs and amongst others, General Motors and Ford (Dodwell, 1997).
102
increased overseas activities of their main OEMs and also to take advantage of lower 
labour costs (see Table (4.4a)).
In North and Central America and Europe, supplier entry patterns are similar to those 
oi Japan’s OEMs. Large-scale entry - by both Group and Independent suppliers - 
began in the early 1980’s, with affiliates being primarily established to support the 
large Japanese OEM operations in the region(s). Since the early 1980’s, the USA has 
attracted the largest number of new Japanese supplier transplants, than any other 
country in the world. By 1996, the USA accounted for 30.1% of all overseas Japanese 
supplier transplants: a statistic that reflects the strategic importance of the US 
economy for Japanese automobile production. For similar reasons, the UK 
accommodates the largest number of Japanese supplier transplants within the 
European Union (see Table(s) (4.3b), (4.3c), and (4.5)). The composition of supplier 
affiliates within both North and Central America and Europe, is more balanced than 
those in East Asia. In 1996, 50.2% of all North American based Japanese auto­
suppliers were affiliated to an OEM Corporate Group, while in Europe the 
comparative figure was 46.4%. As noted in Section (4.3.1), Japanese OEM operations, 
within these regions, are much larger than those in their offshore affiliates in East 
Asia. The higher proportion of Group suppliers reflects the strategic role that they play 
in the new keiretsu and is an indication of their importance in maintaining the Japanese 
automobile industry’s (global) specific advantages (see Section (4.4.1)).
In terms of Corporate Groups, both Toyota and Nissan have established the largest 
number and the widest dispersion of Group supplier affiliates. Honda relies upon 
relatively fewer offshore Group affiliates, while Mitsubishi’s Group suppliers have not
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yet significantly expanded overseas (see Tables (4.4) and (4.5)). Group supplier 
affiliates are, not surprisingly, predominantly located in countries where their main 
OEM has production facilities. With regards to Independent suppliers, the majority 
(55%) of their overseas transplants are dispersed throughout Asia, although they also 
have a significant presence in the USA and Europe to serve both Japanese and foreign 
OEMs. To some extent, the data in Tables (4.4) and (4.5) reflect both the scale and 
scope of the respective OEMs overseas operations (see Section (4.3.1) and Table
(4.1)). However, there is a caveat with this interpretation, in that it ignores the 
possibility that some OEMs, particularly those involved in joint ventures with foreign 
OEMs, are using indigenous suppliers. What is clear from the data is that through their 
extensive Group supplier affiliates, both Toyota and Nissan have established direct 
control over a wider geographical space and have created a Group international 
division of labour.
In Tables (4.6a and 4.6b), we provide estimates of the statistical relationship(s) - as 
measured by correlation coefficient(s) - between the dispersion of the various Japanese 
OEM transplants and their Group supplier affiliates. These correlation matrices are 
calculated on the basis of both country and regional dispersion, as at 31/12/1996. As 
with Table (4.2), the correlation coefficients should be treated with caution, and it 
would be unwise to use their numerical values for economic interpretation. This is 
because of both the small-sample properties of the data and also its qualitative nature, 
which does not allow us to capture the intensity of Japanese automotive activity in 
each country/region. However, as we would expect, in all cases there are strong, 
positive and statistically significant relationships between the dispersion of the various 
Japanese OEM transplants and their Group supplier affiliates. In addition, the
104
relationships between the OEM transplants and those of the Independent suppliers are 
also positive and statistically significant. These results support the idea of a new 
keiretsu, where there is a strategic clustering of overseas Japanese OEM and supplier 
transplants.
Finally, we note that the main period for all Japanese supplier subsidiary formation -  
across all regions -  was 1986-1990 (see Table(s) (4.3 and 4.4)). During this period, 
57.9% of all Japanese supplier affiliates in North America were established, while the 
comparable figures in Europe and East Asia were 39.1% and 28.1% respectively. To 
some extent, this dramatic surge in new supplier affiliates relates to the Yen-Dollar 
realignment arising from the Plaza Accord in 1985, which reduced both asset and 
production costs in the USA and other countries relative to Japan (Kogut and Chang, 
1996). However, it should be noted that, from an industrial organisation perspective, 
transnational corporations base their long-run international production strategies upon 
fundamental factors, rather than short-term exchange rate fluctuations. These 
fundamental factors relate to the global strategic behaviour of Japan’s large OEMs and 
their determination to establish control over a new keiretsu and to create an 
international division of labour. Indeed as Dunning (1988b) has argued, currency 
fluctuations may affect the timing of FDI, but not its long-term trend. The Yen’s 
appreciation may, therefore, have (partially) affected the timing of these offshore 
automotive investments but it is unlikely to have had any long-term effect upon the 
extent of the industry’s globalisation.
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4.4.3 Regional Density Patterns and the Concentration o f Supplier Affiliates 
So far, our analysis has only provided data on the number of offshore supplier 
affiliates. However, our hypothesis maintains that the new keiretsu principally consist 
of the same cluster of supplier firms and that the same OEM/supplier linkages are 
primarily being recreated across the globe (see also Martin et.al, 1994). This is 
important, since it is the recreation of domestic linkages that allows the OEMs and 
their core suppliers to directly control technology and operations, while also 
facilitating the direct monitoring of cost differentials between locations. In addition, 
the arrangements also allow the Corporate Group to achieve organisational scale 
economies at an international level.
By recreating domestic industrial linkages, in different overseas locations, some core 
suppliers have become global actors themselves. The extent to which this is occurring 
is captured in Figure (4.2), which shows the number of offshore manufacturing 
affiliates per Japanese supplier, by Corporate Group9. In other words, the graphs 
highlight the global density patterns of the suppliers’ offshore affiliates. The mean 
number of all offshore affiliates -  per Japanese supplier firm - is approximately 3.0, 
although the distribution is strongly skewed to the right. Approximately 40% of all 
suppliers have only one affiliate outside Japan (see Figure (4.2)). The remaining 
graphs break down the distribution into Independent suppliers and the Corporate 
Group suppliers. The graphs reveal that while the distribution(s) of Independent 
supplier affiliates are similar to the general pattern, the Group supplier transplants are, 
in contrast, significantly less skewed to the right. The skew-ness of the distribution of
9
In the few cases (less than 2%) where the supplier affiliate has more than one Japanese parent (i.e. a 
joint Japanese venture), the largest parent equity-holder is assumed as “the firm" to avoid double­
counting (see also Section (4.4.4).
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the Group supplier affiliates reflects the fact that the Group suppliers are “few” in 
actual number. It appears that only a small, core of Group suppliers have moved 
offshore to support their main OEM’s overseas activities. This is supported by the data 
in Figure (4.2) and Table (4.7). For instance, the data reveals that, for Toyota, only 22 
Group suppliers have established offshore affiliates, although 10 of these firms have 
more than two affiliates (see Figure (4.2)). Furthermore, Table (4.7) data also shows 
that only 4 Toyota Group suppliers have at least one affiliate in each of the North and 
Central American, European and East Asian markets. These 4 suppliers account for 37 
out of 77 Toyota Group affiliates that have been established in these regions (a ratio of 
48.1%).
In comparison, 33 Nissan Group suppliers have offshore bases, with a mean number of 
affiliates (3.0) that is close to the general pattern (see Figure (4.2)). Again, only 6 
Group suppliers have at least one affiliate in each of the main automobile markets of 
North and Central America, Europe and East Asia (Table (4.7)) These 6 suppliers 
account for 40 (out of 98) Nissan Group affiliates established in these regions (i.e. 
40.8%). Honda’s offshore supply base consists of 22 Group supply firms, which is the 
same number as Toyota, although the Honda Group suppliers’ mean number of 
affiliates is lower at 2.1. Only 2 Honda suppliers have affiliates in each of the three 
major automobile markets, accounting for 11 (out of 45) Group transplants (i.e. 
24.4%). With regards to Independent suppliers, 109 firms have overseas production 
facilities, with a mean of 3.35 affiliates. However, only 19 of these firms have 
affiliates in each of the main automobile markets, accounting for 143 transplants (or 
42.3%) of supplier transplants. In the aggregate, the total number of Japanese supplier 
firms, with international operations is 143, which represents only 10% of the total
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number of domestic suppliers (Dodwell, 1997). The new keiretsu is clearly heavily 
concentrated and is dominated by a few core Japanese suppliers, with transplants 
across the globe.
An adjunct to this data is the regional density patterns of supplier offshore affiliates, 
which are reported in Table (4.8). The first column gives the number of supplier firms 
in the Corporate Group, with manufacturing operations in the region. The second 
column provides the mean number of affiliates per supplier, while the third column 
indicates the number of supplier firms with more than one affiliate in the region. Both 
columns (2) and (3) indicate the degree of regional industrial concentration in the new 
keiretsu, and the regional division of labour within the Group’s operations. The 
column(s) (4) to (6) are correlation matrices of supplier affiliate numbers across the 
North American, European and East Asian economies. These correlation matrices try 
to capture the association between the number(s) of one (Group) supplier’s affiliates in 
one region against the number of manufacturing operations the same firm has in 
another region10. Again there is a caveat to treat the value of correlation coefficient(s) 
with caution, given the data’s small-sample properties and its qualitative nature. 
However, the fact that all but one of the correlation coefficients are positive and 
statistically different from zero, suggests that there is evidence that the number of one 
supplier’s affiliates in one region is positively associated with the number of supplier 
affiliates that it has established in another. This may also indicate the recreation of 
specific Japanese OEM-supplier linkages across the globe (see also Martin et.al,
1994).
For instance, the correlation coefficient for the number of individual Toyota Group suppliers’ 
affiliates in East Asia against the same supplier firms' operations in Europe is calculated as 0.72. This is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.
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4.4.4 Ownership of Supplier Affiliates
We now (briefly) present data on the actual ownership of the supplier affiliates. The 
data in Table(s) (4.9) provide details of the equity stake of the Japanese parent in the 
supplier affiliates in the North American, European and East Asian economies as at 
31/12/1996. In the few cases, where there is more than one Japanese partner, the 
Japanese parent firm’s equity position is defined as the sum of equity holdings of 
affiliated firms within the Corporate Group".
From the data in Table(s) (4.9), it is clear that the majority of Japanese supplier 
affiliates involve some form of joint venture with an indigenous supplier. The 
rationale for the joint ventures, particularly in the Western economies, is that 
indigenous (Western) suppliers saw the opportunity to gain access to (what were 
regarded) as superior Japanese technology and automotive products (Cusmano and 
Takeishi, 1991; Inkpen, 1994). For the Japanese participants, the opportunity of 
combining resources with (Western) indigenous suppliers eased the financing of new 
capital expenditure and, more significantly, widened their customer base to include 
European and Western OEMs. This allowed the transplant(s) to achieve greater 
economies of scale.
The Japanese equity involvement in the subsidiaries differs between Asia and those in 
North and Central America and Europe. In East Asia, a Japanese parent wholly owns 
only 10.3% of supplier affiliates and the majority of Japanese suppliers have an equity 
stake of less than 50% (see Table (4.9a)). This may reflect tighter government 
legislation on transnational equity participation within the region. For instance, in
11 This approach is suggested by Beamish et.al (1997, p.22). The actual number of affiliates that had 
more than one Japanese partner was less than 2% of the total data set.
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Malaysia, foreign investors have to follow strict guidelines and require special 
governmental authorisation before acquiring equity in indigenous firms. Until the 
1997 Asian Crisis, similar arrangements were also in place in South Korea and other 
East Asian economies (see UNCTAD, 2000, p.147-151). However, in contrast to East 
Asia, the majority equity holder in both the North and Central America and European 
supplier affiliates are predominantly the Japanese participant(s). This can be expected, 
given the importance of control in the Japanese automobile industry, since majority 
ownership allows the core Japanese firms to direct operations. The nature of these 
joint venture relationships is examined, in further detail in Chapter (5).
4.5 Concluding Comments
In this Chapter, we have presented new data and new evidence on the scale, pattern 
and scope of the Japanese OEMs’ global operations and the development of the new 
keiretsu. This data has allowed us to consider the role of Japan’s automotive 
transnationals in the globalisation of the Japanese automobile industry.
First, we focused upon the large Japanese OEMs, their strategic behaviour and 
overseas entry patterns. In this respect, there is evidence of strategic interdependence 
given the “bunching” overseas entry patterns of Japanese OEMs, which provides 
support for the Knickerbocker (1973) hypothesis. Second, we also considered the 
internationalisation of the Japanese auto-components industry. This was important, 
since Japan’s OEMs have exploited their domestic control mechanisms and have been 
strategically developing their own transnational production networks - by directing 
their core suppliers to join a new (overseas) keiretsu. We noted that the majority of 
Japanese supplier subsidiaries involve joint ventures with indigenous suppliers.
no
However, in the Western economies, the Japanese participant has usually acquired 
majority ownership. This is important, since it allows Japanese suppliers to maintain 
control and to take the initiative in the resolution of conflict (see Chapter (5)).
The new keiretsu comprises, at most, only 10% of the domestic Japanese auto­
components industry and consists of both Group and Independent suppliers. These 
suppliers are “few” in actual number and, typically, the same suppliers have 
production facilities in each of the main automobile markets: East Asia, North and 
Central America and Europe. In short, the new keiretsu is seen as recreating important 
Japanese OEM-supplier linkages around the globe. This is important since these 
linkages help to re-enforce the OEMs’ control mechanisms with their suppliers, at an 
international level. They also help to maintain the OEMs’ specific (competitive) 
advantages, which relate to the “close ties” that are typical of Japanese OEM-supplier 
relationships. The new keiretsu also provides the Japanese OEM with an international 
division of labour. This is also important, since, as we will see in Chapter (5), it 
provides the OEM with greater control over international wage bargaining. Il
I l l
Figure (4.1)
Domestic Output, Sales and Overseas Production in the Japanese Automobile 
Industry (1990-1996)
The Japanese Automobile Industry in the 1990‘s
Sources: Am erican Autom obile M anufacturers Association (1998) 
Dodwefl M arketing Consultants (1997)
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Table (4.2)
Examining the Knickerbocker (1973) Hypothesis:
Correlation between the dispersion of Japanese OEM Plants, by Economic Region
Table (4.2a)
Correlation Matrix of Dispersion of Japanese OEM plants as at 30/6/2000
Toyota Nissan Honda Mitsubishi
Motors
Toyota 1.00
Nissan 0.82 1.00
Honda 0.89 0.81 1.00
Mitsubishi Motors 0.86 0.90 0.74 1.00
Table (4.2b)
Correlation Matrix of Dispersion of Japanese OEM plants as at 31/12/1980
Toyota Nissan Honda Mitsubishi
Motors
Toyota 1.00
Nissan 0.36 1.00
Honda 0.40 0.93 1.00
Mitsubishi Motors N/A N/A N/A 1.00
0 Ta k k (s ) (4 .2a and b ) ihow  the corretetioe cotffldeat r . between the global (regional) dbpenlon o f Japanese O E M  
plants, as at 31/12/1996. A 1  the bivariate relalionahlpa are calcnlnted on the barfa o f the regional location of Japanese 
O E M  m anufacturin g operations as MghMghted in  Table  (4 .1 ). These correlation coefficients attempt to capture the global 
strategic riva lry , between Japan's fonr m ajor O E M 's . Correlations for M itsubishi were not calculated for 1980, since it 
only had one overseas plant in  operation at that tim e, and b  therefore an outlier. AD correlations are statistically 
significant at the 1 %  level.
U ) It was felt that it was better captnre global strategic interaction on a regional basis, rather than a country basis, since 
O E M 's typically regard regions as strategic locations for global production. T o  allow for sufficient degrees of freedou^ 
■he "economic regions" w ere used, baaed upon geography and viable trading areas. The  regions were North and Central 
Am erica, South Am erica, the E U , non-EU economies, the Pacific R im  economies, China, West Asia, A frica , and Oceana. 
China and W est Asia (Le. operations in  India  and Pakistan) were not amalgamated as a "region" w ith the Pacific Rim  
economies, because they are areas, which have only recently  begun to open their trading borders and are regarded 
strategicaly as separate sites (U N C T A D , 2000). F o r a sim ilar reason, O E M  operations hi E U  and n on-EU  countries were 
not amalgamated together. G iven tin t the first overseas O E M  affiliate was in  19S9, and the data In Table (4 .1 ) ends at 
2000, It seas felt that 1980 ndght be reasonable benchm ark date w ith w hich to compare strategic behaviour.
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Table (4.5)
Distribution of Japanese Group Suppliers' Manufacturing Affiliates by Overseas 
Location as at 31/12/1996
\  Group
Toyota Nissan Honda Mitsubishi Other Independent Total
Country Group Group Group Group Group Suppliers
China 4 3 0 0 1 14 22
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
India 2 1 1 0 0 6 10
Indonesia 4 6 4 0 1 29 44
Malaysia 3 5 1 1 1 22 33
Philippines 3 2 1 0 0 9 15
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 18 18
South Korea 3 4 0 1 2 28 38
Taiwan 10 17 4 0 0 32 63
Thailand 7 4 9 1 3 40 64
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Asia 36 42 20 3 t 201 310
Belgium 0 0 0 0 2 2 4
France 3 1 0 0 0 1 5
Germany 1 0 0 0 0 7 8
Italy 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Netherlands 0 1 0 0 0 4 5
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Slovak Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Spain 1 2 1 0 1 S 10
Sweden 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
UK 5 8 4 0 0 13 30
Europe 11 13 J 0 3 37 69
Canada 3 0 2 0 5 9 19
Mexico 0 6 0 0 1 7 14
USA 27 37 18 5 7 94 188
North America 30 43 20 5 13 n o 221
Brazil 3 0 1 0 0 7 11
Columbia 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
South America 3 0 1 0 0 i 12
Australia 3 1 0 0 0 8 12
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Oceania 3 1 0 0 0 9 13
Total 83 99 46 8 24 36S 625
Source: Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1997).
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Table (4.6a)
Correlation Matrix for Dispersion of Japanese Automotive Affiliates (By Country) as at 31/12/96*
A ll O EM s Toyota — Honda Mitsubishi O ther O EM s IndependentSuppliers
Toyota G roap 
SapfUer. a s i 0.94
Nissan G roap 
Suppliers 0.44 0.91
Honda G roap 
SuppUere 0.76 0.92
Mitsubishi
G roup 032 0 3 9
O ther G roup 
SappUer. 033 0.76
AU G roup 
Suppliers 0.95
Independent
S a p p lk n 0.65 aso o.4i 0.69 0.42 031 1.00
Table (4.6b)
Correlation Matrix for Dispersion of Japanese Automotive Affiliates (By Region) as at 31/12/96**
AU O EM s Toyota Nissan Honda Mitsubishi O th er O EM s Independent
S u p p lie »
Toyota G roup 
S .ppiicm 0.69 0.95
Nissan G roup 
S ap pile ., 0.75 0.93
Honáa Groap 
SappUer, 0.92 0.95
Mitsubishi
Groap
SappUer,
031 0.78
O ther G roap 
Suppliers 0.44 0.81
AU G roup 
SappU tn 0.93
SappUero 0.92 030 0.92 0.95 034 037 1.00
Notes:
I) T  able (4 .6s) show» the correlation coefficient r , k t w m  the global (c o— try ) te p e rrio a  o f O E M  « M  n p p H tr affiliates, by 
Corporate G ro up, as at 31/12/1996. AU the bivariate relationships are calculated on Ike teak of tbe country location o f Japanese 
antoambUe m anufacturing production and oa the bash of the data available, there were Jap anese O E M  and/or supplier operations 
hi 34 cont r i t i  outride Japan. A l coefficients are stattetlcaly significant at the 1 %  level
U) Table  (4 .6b) shows the correlation coefficient r , between the global (regional) dispersion o f O E M  and supplier affiliates, by 
Corporate G roup, as at 31/12/1996. AU the bivariate reiationridps are calculated oa the bash of the regional location o f Ja  p íe se  
automobile m snafai t a ih f  production. Nine regions were need, based apon geography and viable trading areas. Th e y were North 
and C entral Am erica, South Am erica, the E U , non-E U , the Pacific R im  m o n d e s , China, West Asia, A frica, and Oceania.
AU coefficients are stnthtfeaUy sigrtflcaut at the 1 %  le va
IU) la  each table, the fina l cohuan reports the corrdatloa coefficient betw een Independent sa pp ier affiliates and G ro a p  sappMer 
afHUatea, thas captaring the strategic dasteristag o f the new betreten. AU the raw  data was re late d  from  DodweU (1997) and h  
reported hi Tablea (4 .1 ) and (4 3  to 4 3 ).
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Table (4.7)
The Global Concentration of the N ew Keiretsu Suppliers
The first number in each column shows the number of supplier firms that have affiliates in both 
regions. The figure in parenthesis indicate the number of transplants, in both regions, where these 
supplier firms have an equity stake e.g. There are 11 Toyota Group suppliers that, collectively, have 
SI transplants located across East Asia and North/Central America.
Group
East Asia &
North/Central
America
East Asia & 
Europe
Europe &
North/Central
America
East Asia, 
Europe & 
North/Central 
America
Toyota Group 11 (51) 4(26) 4 (21) 4(37)
Nissan Group 18 (69) 6(27) 7(26) 6(40)
Honda Group 11(30) 2(9) 307) 2(11)
Mitsubishi Group 2(4) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0)
Other Group 4(10) 2(6) 2(6) 2(9)
Independent
Suppliers
45 (214) 21 (107) 24(85) 19(143)
Source: DodweO M arketing Conm ltaiits (1997)
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Chapter (5)
Relationships Inside the N ew Keiretsu - The Case of Japanese Auto-suppliers 
Based in the UK
5.1 Introduction
The analysis and data presented in Chapter (4) highlighted the extent to which 
Japan’s automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and their core 
suppliers have (strategically) been establishing transnational production networks 
- the new keiretsu - around the globe. The main aim of the new keiretsu has been 
to control and maintain the specific (competitive) advantages of the Japanese 
automobile industry, in international production. It was argued that these specific 
advantages primarily relate to the nature of the close relationships, which exist 
between the OEMs and their suppliers, within Japan’s domestic industry. In 
order to replicate these relationships internationally, the nucleus of each of the 
major Japanese OEMs’ new keiretsu consists of the same core (Japanese) players 
within each of the major regional trading blocs (see Chapter (4)).
The establishment of the new keiretsu raises some interesting questions, 
particularly relating to the extent to which Japanese business relations and 
industrial practices have been replicated at the operational level. While the 
nucleus of the new keiretsu resembles that in Japan, the new keiretsu also 
consists of a mix of Japanese and indigenous managerial staff and personnel, and 
also indigenous suppliers required for the supply of raw materials and other
135
inputs'. In some cases, Japanese suppliers have established joint ventures with 
indigenous manufacturers. These all involve developing new relationships with 
new employees and business partners, the majority of whom are generally 
unfamiliar with Japanese culture and industrial practices. Ultimately, the success 
of the new keiretsu and the ability of the Japanese automobile industry to protect 
its specific (competitive) advantages, in the global economy, lie within 
developing “close ties” with both these new and existing partners.
This Chapter explores a number of issues that arise from the various relationships 
within the new keiretsu. In considering these issues, we draw upon fieldwork 
research from a Case Study of the experiences of Japanese auto-suppliers, based 
in the UK. This involved interviews with 7 Managing Directors (MDs) and also a 
survey questionnaire that was completed by 27 Managing Directors/Senior 
Managers of UK based Japanese auto-suppliers. The questionnaire response rate 
was 71.1% (see Appendices (A) and (B), for further details). The Case Study is a 
first attempt to explore the operational experiences of Japanese auto-suppliers, at 
the affiliate level, in the UK. It allows us to derive direct insights into the 
strength and nature of the various relationships - within the Japanese automobile 
industry - that have evolved within the UK.
In particular, this Case Study considers the autonomy of affiliates, their 
relationships with their Japanese parent in decision-making and manufacturing 
operations and their experiences with the indigenous labour supply (Section 1
1 In some regions (such as the EU), Japanese manufacturers have to abide by “rules of origin” and 
“local content rules” that insist upon a certain proportion of inputs being sourced within the 
region (Mackinnon, 1990).
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(5.2)). We then explore the business relationships between the OEMs and their 
suppliers, and also the indigenous supply chain, noting differences between 
Group and Independent suppliers (Section (5.3)). Finally we consider the 
experience of the Japanese-European automotive joint ventures. Here, we note 
the potential for conflict between both participants and discuss how such 
conflicts may be resolved (Section (5.4)). We also compare our results with those 
of Inkpen (1994), who considered the performance of Japanese-North American 
joint ventures, in North America.
We should note that there are caveats with regards to our Case Study approach 
and that it would be unwise to generalise the results to make inferences about the 
experiences of Japanese supplier affiliates elsewhere. The results reported here, 
are based upon a survey of MDs from UK based Japanese suppliers. As such, 
they relate specifically to their experiences in the UK2. A further caveat is that 
some questions ask the MDs to quantify their experiences using a 7-point scale 
(see Appendix (B)). In these cases, the absence of comparable data-scores (e.g. 
from non-Japanese component suppliers) may preclude a wider interpretation of 
these results. Nevertheless, the insights gained from this Case Study are both 
important and useful, particularly since the UK is at the centre of the Japanese 
automobile industry’s European operations (see Chapter (4)). Furthermore, in 
interview, almost all of the MDs had either visited and/or spent secondments at 
sister transplants in the USA and Japan. Apart from minor differences, the MDs’ 
reported that business operations, in the US and Japanese transplants, were 
similar to those in the UK. In this respect, the UK transplants may be regarded as
2 An attempt was made to survey MDs from US based affiliates. Unfortunately there was a poor 
response rate and the results are not reported here (See Appendix (A), for further details).
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typical new keiretsu affiliates. The Case Study, therefore, provides an indication 
of the various transnational linkages and relations that exist within the new 
keiretsu, while also highlighting several of the control mechanisms used by 
Japanese OEMs in their global operations.
5.2 Affiliate Characteristics and Operations
5.2.1 B usiness A ssociations
The data in Table (5.1) provides details of the main characteristics of the UK 
based Japanese supplier affiliates in the sample. The affiliates S1-S13 have been 
or are still part of a joint venture between a Japanese supplier and an indigenous 
European component manufacturer. These joint venture relationships are 
examined in further detail in Section (5.4). The affiliates S14-S27 have always 
been wholly owned Japanese transplants.
In terms of Group suppliers, 13 of the 27 affiliates have Japanese parent(s) who 
could be identified as belonging to particular Japanese OEM Corporate Groups. 
The Japanese parents of the other 14 affiliates could be classified as Independent 
suppliers. As expected, the affiliates’ main customers are the Japanese OEMs: 
Nissan (9 affiliates), Toyota (7) and Honda (6). There were 3 affiliates that 
regarded all the major Japanese OEMs as equally important, while 2 suppliers 
suggested other non-Japanese OEMs were their most important customer. The 
Japanese parent(s) of these 5 affiliates are all Independent suppliers.
5.2.2 A ffilia te R elations with H eadquarters
All the affiliates in the sample have one or more Japanese expatriates in the top 5 
managerial and executive positions. This is not unusual since, compared to 
Western transnational corporations, Japanese transnationals have a higher than
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average expatriate presence, particularly in the automobile industry (see also 
Harzing, 1999). The expatriates’ main role is to ensure that the affiliates’ 
organisational development is consistent with that defined by the Japanese parent 
firm. In this respect, the affiliates’ management teams (which include non- 
Japanese executives) have significant operational control over manufacturing 
operations, although they are usually required to report semi-annually to the 
Japanese parent firm’s Board of Directors in Japan. These reports assist the 
company’s hierarchy in monitoring the affiliate’s performance.
Approximately two-thirds of the MDs indicated that they were in regular 
communication with the affiliates’ company headquarters in Japan, to discuss 
corporate strategy. These discussions are mainly focused upon the 
implementation of corporate strategy, at the affiliate level, rather than its 
formulation. Indeed, while affiliate executives are encouraged to proffer their 
advice and express their opinions, the MDs regard their actual influence upon 
corporate strategy as being minimal. In this respect, the MDs were asked to 
indicate their degree of influence over corporate strategy on a 7-point scale 
(where ascending points indicated higher influence)3. The mean score was 3.7 
(s.d. 1.43) - at the lower to the middle end of the scale. There is a caveat in the 
wider interpretation of this result, given the absence of comparable data from 
Japanese affiliates elsewhere. Nevertheless, it appears that, in UK affiliates, 
corporate strategy follows a “top-down” approach, with affiliates being expected 
to comply with directives from headquarters. This would appear consistent with 
our hierarchical view of the Japanese transnational corporation (see Chapter (2)).
3 Corporate strategies were identified as issues relating to the location of new investment, product 
development and production processes.
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5.2.3 M anufacturing O perations
The activities of the affiliates in the sample range from the manufacture of 
complete sub-assemblies, such as vehicle bodies and air conditioning, to the 
production of less specialised components, such as aerials and bearings (see 
Table (5.1)). In almost all cases, the affiliates’ main activities are primarily at the 
manufacturing end of the research-development-manufacturing continuum. Most 
of the basic research, design and the development and testing of prototypes are 
conducted in Japan. The affiliates are generally responsible for adhering to 
detailed specifications and the final production of the components.
In this respect, the affiliates are generally equipped with similar equipment to 
that used in Japanese factories, with tools and machinery that are manufactured 
and designed in Japan. However, the quality and flexibility of this equipment 
does vary between the affiliates. Some affiliates have the latest technology, while 
others are still relying upon older machinery that can reduce the efficiency of 
operations. The variance in the quality of capital depends mainly upon its age 
and also upon its activity rate. Machinery and equipment is usually replaced at 
the end of its useful life. This means that those affiliates with high production 
volumes have a high replenishment rate of their capital stock. Furthermore, those 
suppliers responsible for major sub-assemblies usually install new (specific) 
machinery when their major OEM introduces a new model cycle, which is 
between 4-8 years (Asanuma, 1989).
Given these observations about equipment, it was no surprise that 23 out of the 
27 affiliates reported that their production processes were generally similar to
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those practiced by their Japanese parent in Japan. This does not mean that each 
of the 23 affiliates employed Just-In-Time delivery systems, kanban and kaizen 
quality control processes. It does suggest, though, that whatever processes and 
procedures the parent firm follows in Japan, similar processes are adopted in the 
UK affiliate (see Chapter (2), Womack et.al, 1990). However, while it does 
appear that Japanese industrial processes are being replicated at the operational 
level, a number of MDs were concerned that their affiliate did not match the 
efficiency levels of their sister transplants in Japan. For some, this was because 
of inadequate machinery (see above), although a major factor related to the skill 
level and flexibility of the indigenous labour force. This latter point is discussed 
further, in Section (5.2.4).
Finally, although the affiliates generally have little input into actual product 
development, 15 of them did have access to their parent’s Research and 
Development (R&D) centres within the European Union. A further 6 affiliates 
expected their Japanese parent to establish such facilities within the next 5 years. 
The main research that tends to be carried out in these R&D centres is primarily 
aimed towards adjusting and improving prototypes and products - that have been 
developed in Japan - for European specification. The majority of these R&D 
centres are in the UK, although for 3 affiliates, the main R&D facilities are in 
Germany (see Table (5.1)). In these 3 cases, the MDs indicated that their parent 
had comparable facilities in Japan and that research there was more basic and 
intensive, and revolved around actual product development. Interestingly, 
Germany was chosen as the preferred site for these R&D centres since it was 
perceived as having a technological advantage in product development.
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particularly within the automobile industry. The Japanese OEMs and their 
suppliers see their German R&D centres as an opportunity to exploit German 
expertise in engineering.
5.2.4 R elations w ith the Indigenous L abour Supply
It was noted, in Section (5.2.3), that some MDs had concerns about the skill level 
and flexibility of the indigenous labour supply, which may, in turn, affect the 
affiliate’s level of efficiency. As a measure of the “skills” of the indigenous 
labour force, the MDs were asked to rate the “skills level” of their employees 
using a 7-point scale. The mean score was 4.66 (s.d.1.03), which indicated that 
most MDs thought that their employees had an average ability to carry out 
required tasks. However, MDs also noted that the indigenous workforce were 
generally less flexible than comparable (Japanese) workers in Japan, particularly 
in the range of tasks and the degree of responsibility that they could cover.
The main problems appear to revolve around the nature of the UK labour market 
where, compared to Japan, there is a higher turnover of employees. As Abegglen 
and Stalk (1985) and Aoki (1990) have pointed out, the Japanese labour market 
is characterised by a system of lifetime employment, with employees usually 
remaining with one company throughout their entire career(s). This allows 
Japanese employees the time and opportunity to develop a range of skills and 
flexibility, through continuous (long-term) job rotation within the firm. However, 
the culture of “short-term” employment in the UK labour market, suppresses 
these possibilities, since a significant proportion of employees are unlikely to 
remain with their employer for a long enough period to develop a portfolio of
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firm specific tasks. This problem is exacerbated in the UK’s “tighter” labour 
markets, such as the Midlands and the South, where rival firms, in the machinery 
sector, have engaged in “poaching” the affiliates’ key personnel. Indeed, one of 
the MDs major concerns was a shortage of qualified engineers, technicians and 
information technology staff. For the Japanese suppliers, these are all problems 
that would not necessarily be encountered in Japan. Consequently, it is difficult 
for the affiliates to recreate the long-term management-labour relationships that 
are regarded as a key part of Japan’s industrial success (see also Abegglen and 
Stalk, 1985).
To overcome personnel shortages and to aid staff development, the affiliates 
have introduced some job rotation and encouraged “teams of workers” to 
develop problem-solving skills and to generate new ideas. Furthermore, at 25 of 
the 27 affiliates, employees are provided with assistance to study for applicable 
external qualifications to aid their development. In 7 cases, this assistance is 
conditional upon the employee fulfilling certain contractual obligations, such as 
remaining with the firm for a specified time4. At 17 of the affiliates, specialist 
employees are offered the opportunity of a secondment at the parent firm’s 
transplants in Japan. Secondments are also used to internationally re-deploy 
specialist personnel - on a temporary basis - to complete specific tasks at 
affiliates around the globe. The secondments enable employees to develop their 
skills and experience, while also helping to establish a degree of loyalty and 
attachment to the company.
4 We should note, however, that the majority of these employment practices are not unique to 
Japanese corporations. Indeed, they have become standard practices within UK (and Western) 
manufacturing.
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We noted in Chapter (2) that, in Japan, Japanese corporations do not tend to deal 
with independent trade unions, but rather those that are “company sponsored” 
(Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). It was argued that are these arrangements 
nullify the union’s effective bargaining power. Not surprisingly, the Japanese 
affiliates tend to be non-unionised transplants. From the sample, only 10 
affiliates officially recognised a trade union, while the other 17 did not. This 
situation is similar to the Japanese affiliates in the USA where, according to 
Dicken (1998), the majority of automotive transplants do not recognise trade 
unions. A non-unionised labour force may reduce the potential for conflict at the 
affiliate level, since employees are less likely to engage in organised protests. At 
the operational level, the affiliates’ management monitor labour relations through 
regular (monthly) meetings between selected employees and managers to review 
operations and to resolve any grievances. The Japanese managerial style was also 
in evidence at 5 of the 7 transplants visited. These transplants had an open office 
lay out and both senior management and employees wore the same uniform. This 
was said to create a more informal working environment.
5.3 Affiliate Relationships with O EM s and the Indigenous Supply Base
5.3.1 R elationships a lo n g  the Value C hain
As we have noted, an important feature of the Japanese automobile industry is 
the nature of the many close business relationships that exist between the OEMs 
and suppliers within Japan’s domestic vertical keiretsu (Smitka, 1991). In the 
global economy, it was argued that these relationships are the source of the 
Japanese automobile industry’s specific (competitive) advantages. We now
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explore the extent to which these relationships have been replicated, at an 
operational level, within the new keiretsu of the UK.
In this respect, the MDs were first asked to indicate how “close” they regarded 
their relationship with the affiliate’s main OEM. A “very close” relationship is 
described as one that involves regular discussion(s) between management and 
employees at the OEM and supplier transplants, on a significant number of 
operational issues. This would include regular communications, support and 
advice over component specification, equipment, production processes and 
“open-book accounting”. These are practices that epitomise the (very) close ties 
in the Japanese automobile industry (see Chapters (2) and (4); Smitka, 1991). 
Some of these practices may also be part of a “close relationship” although in 
this case, the OEM has less direct involvement in the supplier's business 
operations. A “normal relationship” may reflect traditional Western OEM- 
supplier practice, where the supplier is required to meet the OEMs component 
specifications, but otherwise the supplier has a greater degree of independence 
over its own operations.
The nature of the supplier affiliates’ relationship with their main OEM, as 
perceived by the MDs, is highlighted in Figure (5.1). Almost half of the MDs 
described the relationship with their main OEM as being “very close”. The 
majority of these supplier affiliates had parents who were Group suppliers. Only 
4 MDs indicated that their affiliate had a “close relationship” with their main 
OEM, while 11 MDs (mainly Independent suppliers) believed that their OEM 
relationship was “normal”. A cross tabulation revealed that the Group supplier
affiliates were significantly more likely to be involved in either a “close” or 
“very close” relationship - with their main OEM - than the Independent supplier 
affiliates (r = 0.43, chi-sq = 5.21, p< 0.025)5. This is an expected result and is 
consistent with the strategic role that Group suppliers, in particular, play in Japan 
(see Chapter (4)). It appears that the close ties between Group suppliers and the 
OEMs are being sustained within the new keiretsu. In contrast, Independent 
suppliers have built up a wider clientele, which generally involves looser 
relationships with OEMs (see Chapter (4), Dodwell, 1997)6.
An interesting extension to the OEM-supplier relationship is to consider 
relationships along the value chain, particularly those between the Japanese 
supplier affiliate(s) and their main indigenous input supplier(s). This is important 
since, for both the Japanese and the indigenous suppliers, the relationship may 
represent the first business association with a foreign company. In this respect, 
the relationship may involve some compromise, by both parties, since Japanese 
industrial organisation differs significantly from Western practices. These 
business relationship(s) were also examined by asking the MDs to indicate how 
“close” they regarded their relationship with the affiliate’s main input supplier. 
The categories were the same as before - “very close”, “close” and “normal”. 
The responses are shown in Figure (5.1), with the majority of relationships being 
described as “normal”. In these cases, the indigenous supplier has complete
5 The first statistic is the correlation coefficient, Pearson’s r, which provides information on the 
direction of association between the two variables. The second statistic is the test statistic. The 
third statistic indicates the level of statistical significance (see Appendix (C), for further details).
6 As we pointed out in Chapter (4), it is not correct to assert that all Independent suppliers do not 
build up “close" relationships with OEMs. Indeed, within Japan, some Independent suppliers play 
an integral part in the domestic keiretsu (Dodwell, 1997). In our sample, for instance, 4 MDs 
from Independent suppliers indicated that their affiliate was involved in a “very close” 
relationship with the main OEM.
146
control over its own operations, with no direct involvement from the Japanese 
supplier.
Interestingly, the nature of these relationships was significantly different, 
depending upon whether or not the Japanese supplier belonged to a Corporate 
Group. A closer look at the data reveals that Group suppliers are more likely to 
have developed “close or very close” relationships with their main indigenous 
suppliers compared with Independent suppliers (r = 0.48, chi-sq = 6.38, p 
<0.025, see also Figure (5.1(b))). We have already noted that the Group supplier 
affiliates have established “close or very close” relationships with their main 
OEM, and it now appears that they are trying to develop and establish similar 
relations further down the value chain. Indeed, Japanese suppliers who had a 
“close or very close” relationship with their main OEM also had a similar 
relationship with their main indigenous supplier (r = 0.38, chi-sq = 4.05, p<0.05).
As would be expected, those Japanese affiliates that do establish “close or very 
close” relationship(s) with their main supplier(s) are also most likely to introduce 
new Japanese techniques - such as kaizen, Just-In-Time delivery systems and 
“open book accounting" - to the indigenous supply base (r = 0.55, chi-sq = 8.22, 
p<0.01). In this respect, a Senior Manager of a Toyota Group supplier, 
acknowledged:
“We are in regular contact with our main supplier(s). However, the nature of our involvement 
often extends beyond product specification. As company policy, we undertake periodic audits of 
our supply chain. In effect, we provide our suppliers with a free consultancy service to try and 
identify cost savings. Our experts and those from Toyota review their operations; providing
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advice on their equipment, production processes and even their choice of suppliers. Our 
supplier(s) generally co-operate since, although we do not generally operate a dual-sourcing 
policy, they realise that we can easily find an alternative supplier. However, the aim is to build a 
long-term relationship and this requires trust and co-operation on both sides”.
It is clear that, in Europe at least, Group suppliers play a strategic role within the 
new keiretsu, particularly in developing and enhancing the close relations 
between OEMs and suppliers that are reminiscent of the domestic Japanese 
automobile industry. This helps to maintain and protect the industry’s specific 
(competitive) advantages. We should also note, however, that these “close ties” 
are re-establishing the OEMs’ domestic control mechanisms on an international 
level. The insistence upon Japanese industrial practices (e.g. kaizen and Just-In- 
Time delivery systems), effectively subordinate the supplier affiliates to use 
production processes, to suit the OEMs’ requirements (see also Chapter (2)). The 
extension of these practices to also include the indigenous supply base would 
appear to widen the OEMs’ span of control.
5.3.2 A ffilia te C ontracts, Pricing an d  G lobal S ou rc in g
A central characteristic of the OEM-supplier relationships are the negotiations 
that relate to contracts and prices for auto-components. Japanese contracts are 
generally less formal and more flexible than those encountered in the Western 
economies, although they will include some agreement over price and delivery 
schedules (Smitka, 1991). As we noted in Chapter (2), a system of “open book 
accounting” is usually employed, where an “agreed” or “target price” is set, after 
consultations between the OEM and the core supplier. The “target price” is based 
upon a detailed cost analysis of the supplier’s manufacturing operations. There is
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usually an expectation that the “target price” will fall over time, which 
encourages the supplier to reduce costs and generate productivity gains (Aoki, 
1988, Smitka, 1991). In short, “open book accounting” and “target pricing” 
involves the OEM playing a significant role in the business of its core suppliers, 
with regular monitoring and audits of the latter’s manufacturing operations 
(Smitka, 1991). We have argued, in Chapter (2), that the arrangements would 
appear to strengthen the bargaining position of the OEMs along the value chain 
(see also Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995).
The bargaining relationship at the affiliate level was examined by asking the 
MDs how their final bid prices for a contract would affect the “long-term” 
relationship with their main OEM, particularly when the bid price in question 
was regarded as being on the “high side”. In response, 8 MDs revealed that there 
would be “no loss of work and that the OEM would provide assistance in trying 
to lower costs to the desired level”. This answer appears consistent with the 
principles of “open book accounting” and “target pricing”, with the OEM taking 
more responsibility for cost reduction through greater control over the supplier’s 
manufacturing operations. A cross tabulation revealed that this approach was 
significantly more prevalent among Group suppliers than Independent suppliers 
(r = 0.35, chi-sq = 3.4, p<0.10). This would appear to re-enforce the close ties 
between Group suppliers and the OEMs within the new keiretsu.
However, the sample also revealed that 8 affiliates believed that a high bid price 
would lead to “the contract being lost, although the OEM relationship would 
remain strong because of other long-term contract work”. In these cases, the
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nature of the OEM-supplier relationship may be “long-term”, but the OEM 
creates a competitive environment by not guaranteeing the affiliate every 
possible contract. Finally, 11 affiliates (mainly Independent suppliers) replied 
that their OEM relationship could not be regarded as being “long-term” and that 
a high bid price would result not only in “the contract being lost” but could also 
“place future work with the OEM in jeopardy”.
These latter two responses could be described as being closer to Western style 
competitive bidding processes than the Japanese practice of “open book 
accounting” and the use of “target prices”. In this respect, 70% of the affiliates, 
in our sample, appeared to indicate that contracts are now ultimately won or lost, 
on the basis of a competitive bid. The question arises as to whether this 
represents a change in emphasis from the use of “open book accounting” and 
“target pricing” towards more competitive bidding amongst rival suppliers within 
the core Japanese OEM-supplier relationships? This question is particularly 
relevant given that Japanese OEMs are now said to be considering a greater use 
of competitive bidding as part of a Western style restructuring of their 
manufacturing operations7.
The answer is not so straightforward. In reality, Japan’s OEMs now use a 
combination of “open book accounting”, “target pricing” and competitive 
bidding, as the basis for their global sourcing strategies. With some core (mainly 
Group) suppliers, the Japanese OEM provides direct assistance to the supplier to 
meet a “target price”; while with other suppliers it invites a competitive bid.
7 For instance, Nissan are now considering a sourcing strategy that includes an increased role for 
competitive bidding (Nikkei Weekly, 25/10/99 and also 21/8/2000).
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However, with competitive bidding, it is often the case that the affiliate is 
competing for a contract against other transplants that belong to its parent firm. 
Indeed, in a follow up question to the 19 affiliates where it was felt that a 
competitive bidding process was in place, 12 MDs believed that a lost contract 
would be retained by their parent firm, but allocated to another transplant, where 
costs were lower. There were 3 (Independent supplier) affiliates, where the reply 
was that the contract would be lost to a rival supplier, while 4 MDs were not sure 
what would happen to the contract and/or did not respond to the question.
The nature of “target pricing” and competitive bidding at the affiliate level, is 
described succinctly by an MD, of a UK based Honda Group supplier, who was 
asked about the nature of competition in the industry:
“In general our competitors are (XYZ Ltd)............ However, it is unlikely that Honda would use
any of these companies. They set us a “target price”, for a particular component, which is based 
upon the lowest cost of production that our (parent) supplier can achieve around the world. The 
“target price” includes adjustments for transport costs and there is some leeway for our higher 
overheads. In the past, Honda has sometimes provided us with some technical assistance to meet 
the “target price”. However, in general, if we are unable to meet the “target price”, then the 
contract work goes to one of our sister plants, probably in either Taiwan or Korea”.
These comments and the other MDs’ revelations are important insights that 
indicate the extent to which Japan’s OEMs are using the new keiretsu to generate 
a form of intra-firm competition. When an affiliate is unable to meet a “target 
price”, the OEM is likely to retain its core supplier but source its production from 
the supplier’s transplants elsewhere. This avoids the substantial transaction costs 
and risks that are associated with switching core suppliers. These transaction
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costs are particularly high when the OEM-supplier relationship is long standing, 
and the supplier is responsible for the (often complex) design and manufacture of 
complete sub-assemblies (see Smitka, 1991; Chapter (2)). When a global 
sourcing strategy is not feasible - for instance, when there are capacity 
constraints at certain sites - the OEM will then resort to providing the affiliate 
with direct assistance to try and meet the “target price”.
From the discussion, it is apparent that the new keiretsu provides the Japanese 
OEM with even greater bargaining power, vis-à-vis its supplier affiliates and 
international labour. In the parlance of game theory, the new keiretsu presents the 
OEM with an “inside option” to switch component production to its supplier 
affiliates elsewhere around the globe. For the Japanese OEM, this “inside option” 
acts as an additional control mechanism, which enables it to pursue a “divide and 
rule” strategy to resolve (labour) conflict and reduce costs within the value chain 
(see Chapter (3); Cowling and Sugden, 1994). The costs of this “inside option” 
are the transport costs and any tariff levies that the OEM must incur for sourcing 
production from elsewhere. Nevertheless, the ability to source globally allows 
the OEM to generate a form of intra-firm competition among the new keiretsu 
supplier affiliates. These supplier affiliates have to be globally price competitive, 
in order to gain or retain the component contract. Ultimately, the general 
equilibrium effect is that the downward pressure upon supplier affiliate costs 
falls upon the local labour force and the bargained wage. Any labour (or other) 
conflict at a particular transplant can be resolved by the OEM switching or 
threatening to switch component production elsewhere (see also Chapter (3)).
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5.4 Japanese-European Automotive Joint Ventures
5.4.1 O verview
As we saw in Chapter (4) (see Table (4.9)), approximately 55% of Japanese 
supplier affiliates in both Europe and North America involve some form of joint 
venture8. In the majority of cases, these joint ventures involve a Japanese 
supplier and an indigenous supplier (Dodwell, 1997). These joint ventures 
provide an interesting area for analysis since they represent the first close 
relationship between a Japanese and an American/European firm, and also, in 
many cases a Japanese customer. In particular, for our understanding of the 
command structure of the Japanese transnational corporation and their associated 
transnational networks, joint ventures raise a number of important questions. 
These predominantly relate to the degree to which the Japanese TNC can control 
operations with the involvement of foreign partners, the extent to which it has to 
compromise objectives (and cooperate) and, finally, the resolution of conflict.
Joint ventures have received considerable theoretical and empirical attention, 
particularly in the management and international business literature. Much of this 
research has been based upon various issues that have arisen from actual case 
studies. The research undertaken here follows a similar approach and is based 
upon the small number of Japanese supplier affiliates, in the UK sample, that 
have been or are still involved in a joint venture. Although, we shall again be 
careful not to generalise our results, the research presented may be indicative of
8 A joint venture exists when 2 or more legally distinct firms (the parents) pool a portion of their 
resources within a jointly owned legal organisation (Inkpen, 1994).
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the nature of the joint venture relationships between Japanese and European 
suppliers.
Our results may also be comparable with those of Inkpen (1994), who 
interviewed managers from 40 North American-Japanese auto-supplier joint 
ventures, based in North America. Inkpen’s (1994) study considered the 
characteristics and performance of these joint ventures. In particular, Inkpen 
(1994) studied the differences in performance expectations between the 
American and Japanese participants and the consequences for joint venture 
control. Inkpen’s (1994, p.105) main conclusion was that a significant number of 
these joint ventures "performed far below expectations”. For Inkpen (1994), this 
reflected the conflicting objectives of each participant, with American firms 
being generally geared towards short-term profitability, while their Japanese 
partners were more focused upon long-term issues, such as improving customer 
satisfaction and maintaining product quality. Interestingly, when these joint 
venture conflicts could not be resolved, Inkpen (1994) found that it was usually 
the Japanese participant that acquired additional equity to assume full control. 
The main reason for this appeared to be the Japanese participant’s determination 
to use the production facilities to continue to serve their main OEM.
5.4.2 Sam ple Size
The sample for our study of the Japanese-European joint venture relationships is 
significantly reduced from the 27 completed questionnaires. This is because only 
13 of the questionnaire responses indicated that their affiliate had originally been 
established as a joint venture (see Table (5.1)). We should note that all 13 of
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these joint ventures had involved a Japanese and a European based supplier. In 9 
cases, the affiliate’s Japanese parent was identified as being a Group supplier in 
Japan9. Similar joint venture arrangements also existed in 4 cases elsewhere in 
the EU, while 2 affiliates reported that their parents were also involved in a joint 
venture in the USA. Furthermore, 4 of the 7 interviews were conducted at 
affiliates where a joint venture had originally been set up.
The ownership details of the 13 affiliates, as at 31/10/2000, are as follows (see 
also Table (5.1)). There were 5 joint ventures that had ended and were now 
classified as wholly owned Japanese affiliates. Reasons for the cessation of the 
joint venture are discussed in further detail below (see Section (5.4.3)). In 4 
cases, the Japanese partner held the majority equity holding, while in a further 3 
cases there was equal ownership. Only in 1 case, did the Japanese partner have a 
minority equity holding.
5.4.3 J o in t Venture F orm ation
The response data on reasons for the formation of the joint venture are presented 
in Table (5.2). Respondents were asked to rank their main formation objectives 
on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being most important, and 5 being least important). 
On the questionnaire, the respondents were also given the opportunity to indicate 
any other specific reasons for joint venture formation, although no affiliate 
indicated any other particular motive(s). For each formation objective, Table
(5.2) shows the rank frequency and also, in the final column, the mean rank.
9 In terms of Corporate Group, the breakdown was as follows: four Nissan Group, three Toyota 
Group and two Honda Group suppliers.
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The most important reason, as indicated by the rank frequency and the mean 
rank, was the opportunity “to widen the customer base”. For the European 
participant, the joint venture offered the opportunity to gain (market) access to 
the new Japanese OEM client base10. In all cases, the affiliates’ main customers 
were Japanese OEMs, although the clientele did include Western OEMs. For the 
majority of Japanese suppliers, this also opened up new markets and, more 
significantly, allowed the supplier transplants to achieve both economies of scale 
and scope. This was an important consideration - particularly for the Japanese 
suppliers - since these economies enhance price competitiveness along the value 
chain.
The possibility of thè joint venture generating production synergies, through the 
sharing of knowledge and techniques, was also a significant factor (see Table
(5.2)). For the European participants, it was an opportunity to gain first hand 
experience of Japanese production processes such as the Just-In-Time (JIT) 
delivery system and kaizen quality control - processes that had been defined as 
industry “best practice” (see Chapter (2); Womack et.al, 1990; Dicken 1998). 
From the Japanese perspective, the joint venture also provided learning 
opportunities. These were particularly related to learning about local working 
practices, which could enable them to reduce the risks of labour conflict that can 
occur as a result of a different cultural approach to labour relations.
10 This was particularly important for European suppliers since the entry of Japanese OEMs, into 
the (stagnant) European market, had threatened their market position. Inkpen (1994) makes a 
similar point about the formation of US-Japanese auto-supplier joint ventures in North America.
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The relative importance of the other joint venture formation objectives is less 
clear-cut. Both “collaboration on Research and Development” and the “joint 
financing of capital equipment” had an equal mean rank of 3.2, while the role of 
the Japanese OEMs in “finding their core suppliers suitable joint venture 
partners” had a slightly lower mean ranking of 3.3. This latter ranking may be 
rather surprising, given our observations in Chapter (4) about the important 
(strategic) role of the Japanese OEMs in the development of the new keiretsu. 
However, a closer look at the data revealed that those who regarded the influence 
of the main Japanese OEM, in the formation of the joint venture, as “most 
important” had Japanese parents who belonged to either the Nissan or Honda 
Corporate Group11. Those respondents, which regarded this reason as “less 
important”, had Japanese parents who, primarily, could be described as being 
Independent suppliers. As we noted in Chapter (4), Japanese OEMs generally 
have less influence in these suppliers’ strategic decision-making process.
5.4 .4  S tren g th  and Sustainability o f  the J o in t Venture(s)
The questionnaire data revealed that, by October 2000, 5 of the joint ventures 
had ended with the Japanese participant taking full control of operations (see 
Table (5.1)). Furthermore, in response to the question “How long do you expect 
the joint venture arrangements to continue?” only 3 respondents claimed that the 
joint venture was for the “long term” (10-20 years), while 2 indicated that it was 1
11 This was probably expected given the history of the Japanese OEMs entry into the UK. Nissan 
was the first Japanese OEM to build fully integrated automobile manufacturing facilities in the 
country and was naturally cautious in establishing supplier linkages. Honda's entry was more 
gradual and it was initially involved in a joint venture with the UK manufacturer, Rover. As part 
of this relationship, Honda encouraged its suppliers to work closely with the indigenous supply 
chain (see Chapter (4)). Toyota’s three suppliers all had a majority stake in the joint venture, 
which would allow them a greater degree of autonomy and control.
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for the “medium term” (5-10 years) and 3 were seen as “short term” (less than 5 
years). In total, this meant that 8 of the 13 original joint ventures had either 
ended or were “short-term”. For our empirical analysis, we will classify these as 
“weak joint ventures”. The 5 joint ventures that were seen as being for the 
“medium to the long term” will be classified as “strong joint ventures”12.
Our raw data indicates that the majority of Japanese-European supplier joint 
ventures may be regarded as being a “transitional organisational form”, with the 
Japanese participant (usually) acquiring full ownership after a period of time. 
These incidences of essentially “joint venture failure” may or may not have been 
intentional on the part of the Japanese participants. However, they do highlight 
the degree of conflict that can arise in relationships between Japanese and foreign 
partners.
According to Killing (1983), the sources of joint venture conflict relate to the fact 
that there is more than one parent firm, each with disparate skills and conflicting 
objectives. At the corporate level, these conflicting objectives may relate to 
differing attitudes to the financial performance of the joint venture (see Section 
(5.4.5); Inkpen, 1994). Conflict and disagreement between the parent firms can 
then manifest themselves at the operational level of the joint venture, which can 
also weaken performance. This is particularly the case when the parent firms 
place their own executives into key management positions to further their own 
(i.e. the parent firm’s) objectives, thus generating factionalism within the joint
12 We ignore the possibility that the joint ventures were set up for a particular purpose for a 
specified time-span. This seems reasonable, given the nature of the formation objectives and the 
firms involved (see Section (5.4.3)).
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venture (Pearce, 2001). These problems, coupled with the absence of an 
appropriate governance structure - through which to build trust and monitor 
opportunistic behaviour - can raise the possibility of joint venture failure 
(Buckley and Casson 1988, Brown et.al. 1989).
Our questionnaire asked respondents to identify the main sources of conflict at 
the operational level13. The majority of respondents indicated that the major 
problems could be described as “cultural differences”. The phrase “cultural 
differences” does, of course, cover a plenitude of potential differences between 
the partners. However, the main problems were said to relate to difficulties in 
“establishing trust” and “developing mutual respect” between the partners, at 
various levels of manufacturing operations. Invariably, this included tensions 
between the parties, concerning the imposition of Japanese production techniques 
and, in particular, “the acceptance (from both parties) that other ways of doing 
things may be better”. Such “cultural differences” could also be exacerbated 
through “language problems” that lead to “poor communications between 
partners” (particularly at the transnational level) and/or when “Head Office 
directives are open to (wide) interpretation”. These problems are reflected in 
comments by a Senior Manager of a joint venture, involving a UK and Japanese 
supplier, that primarily supplies Nissan:
“On the whole, operations run smoothly. However, we do encounter problems when our Japanese 
partner insists upon reviewing operations and making changes such as increasing the rate of 
changeover of machinery or to the order of doing things. Usually, these changes have originated
13 The questionnaire was addressed to Managing Directors at the affiliate level, and it was felt 
that their experiences would reflect operational conflict rather than corporate conflict. However, 
during the interviews, some managers did reflect upon issues of conflict at the corporate level.
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from Japan and are designed to suit our main (Japanese) OEM. Unfortunately, it is often the case 
that little attention is paid to the logistics of the factory here, which is often unable to cope with 
these new (Japanese) requirements efficiently. We endeavour to make the required changes, but 
inevitably we end up abandoning them and returning to the original arrangements. Not 
surprisingly, this generates mistrust and suspicion on both sides”.
Despite instances of conflict, the joint ventures did appear to deliver some 
mutual benefit for the affiliates. The response to the question of “What has been 
the main benefit of the joint venture?” was favourable, with 12 affiliates 
indicating that the joint venture had provided some (mutual) benefit and only 1 
affiliate noting that the experience had not been beneficial. In this respect, the 
raw data did not indicate any clear “main benefit”. The responses were not 
ranked and replies were evenly split between the “successful development of 
new products for the customer”, “increased sales for both participants” and the 
generation of “production synergies” (see Figure (5.2)).
5 .4 .5  F inancial P erform ance o f  the J o in t Ventures
We have noted above, that one of the main sources of conflict in Japanese and 
Western joint ventures is the financial performance of the joint venture. It is 
often the case that the Japanese and Western parent firms have different 
perceptions on the appropriate level of affiliate profitability. Inkpen’s (1994, 
p97) study, into US-Japanese auto-supplier joint ventures, notes "short-term 
financial issues was a common characteristic o f the failed joint ventures". In 
particular, the American partners were reported as being “unprepared for the
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level of profit margins their joint ventures experienced" and "were generally 
unwilling to absorb losses to the same extent as their Japanese partners".
These differences often reflect the fact that the Japanese supplier is part of a 
much wider transnational production network than their Western partner. In 
Chapters (2) and (4), we argued that the ambit of the Japanese OEM is quite 
extensive and often includes direct control over its supplier operations - 
particularly Group suppliers. In the new keiretsu, the Japanese supplier 
transplants are expected to compete competitively with their sister transplants 
around the globe and, consequently, component prices are often set at levels to 
suit the main (Japanese) OEM. These prices are often too low to generate a 
satisfactory financial return for the Western parent (see also Section (5.3.2); 
Inkpen, 1994)). The situation creates a paradox for the global Japanese 
automobile industry. We have argued that one of the main functions of the 
supplier affiliates, within the new keiretsu, is to provide the Japanese OEM with 
an “inside option” to resolve any potential labour conflict at a particular site (see 
Section (5.3.2)). However, when such affiliates are involved in a joint venture 
with a foreign supplier, the use of the new keiretsu for competitive tendering is 
likely to raise conflicts at the managerial and executive levels. These conflicts 
can then lead to a loss of co-operation and trust, between both participants, which 
are likely to raise costs.
In our study, there is some evidence to suggest that financial factors afflict the 
Japanese-European supplier joint venture relationships. For instance, consider the
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comments of a Managing Director from a Honda supplier, on the reasons for the 
cessation of their joint venture with a UK parent:
“Our UK partner became involved in a management buy-out, where the incumbent management 
purchased the auto-supplier firm. The management buyout was financed through an increase in 
financial gearing. Suddenly their objectives changed and they demanded a much higher return on 
their joint venture investment to satisfy their bankers. We were unable to meet this request, since 
we are primarily trying to build a long-term relationship with Honda in Europe. Our medium 
term strategy is to provide low cost components to Honda, to enable them to be price competitive 
and expand their position - and consequently our own position - in the European market. Because 
of the conflicting financial objectives, our Japanese parent decided to end the joint venture”.
In order to test the hypothesis that the sustainability of the Japanese-European 
supplier joint ventures is related to financial performance, we considered the 
average profitability of the 13 joint venture affiliates for a three-year period 
1998-2000. Profitability is measured by the ratio of Gross Profits to Sales, which 
is a recognised proxy for the Price Cost Margin (Mueller, 1986). The data was 
obtained from the recorded Annual Accounts of the affiliates (downloadable 
from the FAME database). All of the affiliates had been in operation since at 
least 1995, which reduces the potential bias of significant start-up costs that may 
lead to some affiliates recording losses. There are other caveats, however, to 
consider, especially when dealing with affiliate accounts of transnational 
corporations. In particular, the issue of transfer pricing can sometimes disguise 
the true extent of affiliate profitability while other firm specific factors may 
affect the annual accounts. To counteract some of these problems, we use a 
dummy variable to capture average profitability over the period, rather than a 
quantitative measure of profits (see Table (5.1)).
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We first note, however, that, in quantitative terms, the average profitability for 
each of the 13 affiliates was less than the average return of 6.7% for the whole of 
the UK auto-components sector, during the period 1998-2000 (FAME DataBase, 
2001). Furthermore, as highlighted in Table (5.1), only 6 joint venture affiliates 
were profitable, while the other 7 affiliates have recorded losses. This may 
suggest that the affiliates’ main strategy has been to price competitively, 
sometimes at a loss, to the benefit of their main Japanese OEM. If this is the 
case, then the European participant may have had to absorb losses or enjoy a 
lower profit dividend than it would have done as an independent entity. 
However, for our analysis, the question to consider is whether the profits/losses 
per se, have contributed to “joint venture failure”?
A simple cross-tabulation tells us that there is a significant association between 
those affiliates classified as a “strong joint venture” and being profitable (r = 
0.54, chi-sq = 4.02, p<0.05)14. This would appear to support our preceding 
analysis and also Inkpen’s (1994) observations about US-Japanese supplier joint 
ventures. Profitability, therefore, appears to matter for a sustainable joint venture. 
However, we should note that, given our observation that the level of profits for 
all joint venture affiliates is lower than the UK sector average, actual recorded 
profit levels may not be as important. This would indicate that a degree of 
compromise between both parent firms - over the appropriate level of profit 
margins - is required for a successful, sustainable joint venture.
14 A similar result is obtained when we considered the profitability of all 27 Japanese affiliates. 
The cross-tabulation suggested the 5 affiliates involved in a “strong joint venture” were more 
likely to be profitable than the 22 affiliates who were either involved in a “weak joint venture” or 
had never been involved in a joint venture (r = 0.42, chi sq = 5.19, p < 0.025).
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A related issue is the Japanese participant’s membership of a Corporate Group. 
In the light of our analysis regarding the nature of Japanese OEM-supplier 
relationships, it may be that Group suppliers are more likely to reduce profit 
margins and accept short-term losses, to support their main Japanese OEM. This 
is quite possible if there is significant transfer pricing between Group supplier 
affiliates and the OEMs. This will then lead to a conflict of objectives within the 
joint venture. However, the cross-tabulations revealed that there was no 
significant association between a Japanese participant’s membership of a 
Corporate Group and the profitability of the joint venture (r = -0.05, chi sq = 
0.391, n.s.). Similarly there did not appear to be any significant association 
between the Japanese participant’s membership of a Corporate Group and the 
strength of the joint venture (r = 0.18, chi sq = 0.88, n.s.).
The relationship between the Japanese participant’s equity stake in the joint 
venture and the profitability of the affiliate was also examined. It could be that, 
with a majority stake in the joint venture, the Japanese participant can use its 
greater autonomy to decide component prices and the affiliate’s level of profit 
margin. The cross-tabulation, based upon Japanese affiliate equity holdings of 
less than and/or equal to 50 percent and more than 50 percent, revealed no inter­
group differences in financial performance (r = 0.07, chi-sq = 0.39, n.s.)15. 
Interestingly, Inkpen (1994), using a scaled measure of performance (as opposed 
to profitability), also found no differences in performance on the basis of equity 
share in US-Japanese auto-supplier joint ventures.
15 The exercise was repeated considering only the 8 affiliates that were still involved in a joint 
venture as at 31/10/2000. Again no significant inter-group differences were found (r = 0, chi- 
sq=0.5, n.s.).
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5.4 .6  Im portance o f  L ong-term  C o-operation  fo r  Sustainable Jo in t Ventures 
As we have argued, it is primarily the conflicting objectives of the parent firms 
that are the source of conflict in the Japanese-European automotive joint ventures 
(see also Killing, 1983). Disagreements between the parent firms, over corporate 
strategy and the affiliate’s role, ultimately affect both manufacturing operations 
and performance. This may eventually lead to a cessation of the joint venture. 
This has certainly been the case in both Europe and North America (see also 
Inkpen, 1994).
The resolution of conflict, in international joint ventures, requires much further 
investigation. In this respect, Brown et.al (1989, p.88) have argued that problems 
of essentially "developing trust” between joint venture partners may be improved 
through a “greater mutual understanding” of each other’s economic practices and 
cultural ideals. A greater tolerance of each partner’s corporate culture may lead 
to greater stability in the agreement. Of course, such “mutual understanding” and 
“tolerance” may take some considerable time to nurture. However, it appears that 
this can be achieved through the cultivation of long-term agreements between the 
parties involved, across the globe rather than in one particular location. This is 
because the replication of joint venture relationships, across the globe, 
encourages co-operation throughout the network. Furthermore, from the Japanese 
perspective, there is significantly less risk associated with working with 
established partners than working with new indigenous partners in particular 
locations.
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Our sample appears to support this view. The cross tabulation between a strong 
Japanese-European automotive joint venture in the UK and similar arrangements 
existing elsewhere, suggests that there is a significant association between the 
long-term sustainability of the relationship and experience of the partnership 
elsewhere in the globe (r = 0.68, Chi-sq = 6.1, p<0.025). It appears that through 
global joint ventures - as opposed to just regional joint ventures - there are more 
opportunities for both parents to develop greater trust, tolerance and co-operation 
and also to resolve conflict. At this point, we should note that global joint 
ventures also offer both parties the opportunity to achieve organisational and 
other scale economies. This in itself enhances sustainability and reduces the 
potential for conflict, since conflict in one location may have implications for the 
viability of the joint venture as a whole (see also Buckley and Casson, 1988).
5.5 Concluding Comments
This Chapter has used a Case Study of the experiences of UK based Japanese 
auto-suppliers to explore various relationships within the new keiretsu. The UK 
transplants are at the centre of the Japanese automobile industry’s European 
operations and, in many ways, are typical new keiretsu affiliates. As such, the 
results reported in this Case Study might provide insights, into the experiences of 
new keiretsu affiliates elsewhere. The affiliates were mainly involved in 
manufacturing components, which have been designed and developed within 
Japan. The managerial teams (which include Japanese expatriates) have 
significant operational control, but they have little influence on their parent 
firm’s strategic objectives - an observation which is consistent with our view that
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the Japanese transnational corporation is typically controlled from a centre of 
strategic decision-making (see Chapter (2)).
At the operational level, there was evidence to suggest that Group supplier 
affiliates are more likely to form “close or very close” relationships with their 
main Japanese OEM, than Independent supplier affiliates. This supports our 
observations in Chapter (4), concerning the nature of the “close ties” between 
Japanese OEMs and their Group suppliers. It appears that the OEM Corporate 
Groups are successfully replicating their domestic relationships at the operational 
level, within the UK (and Europe). Along the value chain, relations between 
Japanese suppliers and the indigenous supply base can generally be described as 
being “normal”. However, Group suppliers are more likely to establish “close or 
very close” relations, and encourage the adoption of Japanese industrial 
practices. This is an important distinction and illustrates the extent to which 
Japan’s OEM Corporate Groups have attempted to widen their ambit and extend 
their span of control to include indigenous suppliers. In this respect, the 
Corporate Group’s insistence upon indigenous suppliers to adopt Japanese 
industrial practices (e.g. kaizen and Just-In-Time delivery systems), may be 
regarded as effectively subordinating and “locking in” the latter, to the 
requirements of the new keiretsu.
One of the main results in this Case Study, is the determination of contract prices 
for components. These are set by the Japanese OEMs, through a combination of 
“open-book accounting”, “target pricing” and “competitive bidding”. In this 
respect, there was significant evidence to suggest that the new keiretsu affiliates
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offer the Japanese OEM an “inside option” to (globally) outsource component 
production. This “inside option” enables the OEM to adopt a “divide and rule” 
strategy to generate lower component prices through a form of intra-firm 
competition. Each affiliate has to compete on price, with its sister transplants, in 
order to earn and retain new contracts. The new keiretsu enhances the bargaining 
power of the OEMs vis-à-vis the supplier affiliates and international labour, with 
the (credible) threat of global outsourcing allowing the OEM to resolve labour 
conflict.
However, our Case Study also revealed that the “divide and rule” strategy could 
also raise conflict at the executive level when supplier affiliates are involved in a 
joint venture. From our sample, almost half of the 27 affiliates involved a joint 
venture between Japanese and European component manufacturers. Of the 13 
joint ventures, only 5 could be described as being “strong joint ventures”. Further 
analysis revealed that the main sources of joint venture conflict related to 
manufacturing operations and, most importantly, to financial performance. It 
appears that, in many cases, the participants’ had conflicting objectives, 
particularly over profitability. In general, the profits, prices and financial 
performance of the joint ventures were unsatisfactory for the European 
participants.
The Japanese participants were more likely to accept lower profit margins, than 
their European partners. We argued that the Japanese participants were 
compelled to accept lower profit margins, since they were part of the new 
keiretsu and were engaged in some form of competitive bidding. This appeared
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to be a major source of conflict between participants. When the joint venture 
broke down, it was the Japanese participant that acquired full control, taking 
advantage of the production facilities to maintain an operational relationship with 
their main OEM at the local level. Our results were comparable with those of 
Inkpen (1994), who found similar evidence for Japanese-American automotive 
joint ventures in the USA. Interestingly, where the joint venture could be 
described as being “strong”, there appeared to be a degree of compromise over 
profitability, between both Japanese and European participants.
Although our Case Study relates only to the experience of Japanese affiliates in 
the UK, the results are indicative of what we may expect in the other regions 
where the new keiretsu has been established. In particular, the research presented 
here has underlined the fact that the affiliate is very much a small satellite in the 
Japanese transnationals’ global operations. The affiliate is in regular 
communication with company headquarters, in Japan, but ultimately it accepts 
the company’s directives and product designs. Its managerial team have little 
impact upon corporate strategy. The affiliate is also forced to compete on price, 
within the new keiretsu, with its sister transplants, to win new contracts.
The analysis appears to support the view that the new keiretsu provides the 
Japanese OEM and the Corporate Group with even greater control over its 
(global) operations. The credible threat of global sourcing allows the OEM to 
resolve conflict with supplier affiliates. The successful replication of “close ties” 
with Group supplier affiliates, extended to include indigenous suppliers, 
facilitates the adoption of Japanese industrial practices. These allow the OEM to
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use its traditional control mechanisms to maintain and protect its specific 
(competitive) advantages, in international production. When conflict does arise, 
as in the case of joint ventures, some degree of compromise may be required but, 
where it does not, it is the Japanese participant that assumes full control.
As we pointed out at the beginning of Chapter (4), the Japanese automotive 
transnational is representative of Japanese transnational corporations. In the other 
machinery industries - such as electronics and consumer durables - Japan’s 
leading corporations have been developing similar transnational networks, or 
new keiretsu. In the aggregate, their continuing offshore activities will have real 
effects upon Japan’s domestic manufacturing base. It is this issue that we now 
consider in Chapter (6).
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Figure (5.1) Relationships Along the Value Chain
Figure (5.1 (a))
Supplier Affiliates' Relationship with Main OEM
Very Close Close Normal
M u r i  of Relationship
Figure (5.1 (b))
Affiliates' Relationship with Main Suppliers
Very Close Close Normal
Nature of Relationship
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Chapter 6
The Real Effects of Transnational Activity Upon Japan’s Domestic 
Machinery Sector: Theory and Evidence1
6.1 Introduction
Throughout this thesis, we have examined the global role of Japan’s large 
transnationals and the expansion of their overseas activities, particularly through 
their involvement in transnational production networks - the new keiretsu. The 
new keiretsu has, of course, contributed to a significant increase in Japanese 
global outsourcing, particularly in the machinery sector (see Table (3.2), Chapter 
(3)). The importance of these networks is further reflected in the fact that MITI 
(2001) now estimate that 48.7% of trade flows, involving Japan’s transnationals, 
are intra-firm.
One real effect of the new keiretsu is that it has altered the nature of traditional 
keiretsu relations, within Japan. In particular, Japan’s large transnationals now 
have greater leverage in bargaining negotiations with their domestic suppliers 
and their labour force. We saw, in Chapter (5), how Japan’s automotive 
transnationals have been able to use the new keiretsu to generate intra-firm 
competition and exert direct control over an international divisional of labour. In 
the long run, such “divide and rule” strategies will have a real effect upon 
Japan’s domestic industrial structure, as domestic activities become more 
peripheral to the large transnationals’ global requirements. This may lead to a
1 A shorter version of this Chapter forms the basis of Tomlinson (2002). Arguments from 
Cowling and Tomlinson (2000, 2002) are also included and, where applicable, these are indicated 
in the text.
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situation where Japan’s domestic industry experiences relative economic decline 
or is “hollowed out” (küdoka), as foreign sites become more attractive for 
(Japanese) transnational production (Fujita and Hill, 1989; Cowling and 
Tomlinson, 2000).
This Chapter examines the real effects of transnational activity upon Japan’s 
domestic machinery sector. In doing so, we recognise the important role that 
transnational networks and the new keiretsu now play in Japanese transnational 
production. Japan’s large transnationals have used these networks to create 
interdependent links between their transplants around the globe, in order to 
control their (international) cost functions through “divide and rule” strategies. 
This has meant that domestic Japanese manufacturing is now more sensitive to 
the behaviour of international (cost) conditions than at any time since the 
liberalisation of FDI, in the early 1970’s. The consequent increase in global 
outsourcing has also had implications for the performance of Japan’s small firm 
sector, the vitality of Japan’s industrial districts and domestic employment.
In the remainder of this Chapter, we first formulate a partial equilibrium model 
of investment and labour demand - for each of Japan’s five machinery industries 
- in the context of a global economy. Both of these variables are key indicators of 
the performance of the (Japanese) economy. Indeed, during the 1990’s, Japanese 
firms curbed their domestic capital spending, which, according to Yoshikawa 
(2000), was the fundamental factor in explaining Japan’s declining growth rates 
of Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Over the same period, Japanese 
manufacturing employment also fell by approximately 20% (Japanese Statistical
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Yearbook, 2001). In this respect, there are increasing concerns that Japanese 
firms are substituting foreign investment for investment and labour demand 
within Japan (Nikkei Weekly, 13/8/2001). Furthermore, Japan’s domestic capital 
stock is not being replenished by inward flows of FDI. Indeed, in 1997, the ratio 
of Japan’s outward to inward stock of FDI was 12:1 (OECD, 1999).
In the light of these trends, this Chapter estimates the sensitivity of both Japanese 
machinery investment and labour demand to international cost conditions. The 
approach taken closely follows that proposed by Hollingsworth (1997), who 
argued that, in order to capture the real effects of transnational activity, within 
any one economy, it was important to augment foreign wage variables into the 
economy’s domestic production function. This is because transnationals take a 
global perspective for production decisions and foreign wage costs will, 
therefore, affect the domestic investment rate (and also employment).
The theoretical model for this approach is presented in Section (6.2). In Section
(6.3) , an empirical specification is set out and estimated, using a simultaneous 
equations estimator. For each industry, the results indicate the sensitivity of 
domestic Japanese investment and employment to international wages and also 
the degree of substitutability between Japanese and foreign production. Section
(6.4) then considers some further evidence of the real effects of global 
outsourcing within the machinery sector, particularly at the regional level. The 
macro economic implications of transnational activity are then also (briefly) 
discussed. Finally, Section (6) concludes.
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6.2 Transnationals, Investment and Labour Demand: Theoretical 
Considerations
6.2.1 M easuring T ran snational A ctiv ity  - A n Indirect Approach
In attempting to capture the real effects of transnational activity, this Chapter 
adopts an indirect approach by including foreign wage variables in Japan’s 
domestic production function. It is, perhaps, first important to justify this 
approach, since it is very different from traditional models of transnational 
behaviour, which rely heavily upon published FDI data. The majority of these 
studies use FDI data to describe either the foreign activities of “domestic” 
transnationals or the domestic activities of “foreign” transnationals. However, 
while such studies have provided some useful insights, they do not capture the 
effects of all transnational activity within an economy since they implicitly 
ignore, either the activities of “home” or “foreign” transnationals. A similar 
approach would, therefore, be unsuitable for considering the importance of all 
transnationals in the determination of investment and labour demand within 
Japan’s machinery industries.
A possible solution to such a problem may be to include data on both inward and 
outward flows/stocks of FDI in any empirical specification. This may allow us to 
take account of the presence of both “home” and “foreign” transnationals in an 
economy. However, there are also potential problems in using FDI data to 
capture the real effects of transnational activity - particularly when investigating 
the effects upon domestic investment. For instance, the majority of FDI flows 
relate to mergers and acquisitions, and this may be misleading when considering 
the determinants of new physical investment and/or labour demand. Although
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FDI outflows may divert investment funds away from Japan, any inflows are 
unlikely to add to the existing capital stock. In addition, FDI statistics relate to 
the ownership of foreign assets and yet transnational control over production, 
investment and employment has wider implications than ownership. The 
Japanese case is a particular example since, as we have seen in earlier Chapters, 
keiretsu networks of small firms are often subjected to the control of Corporate 
Japan.
6.2.2 R ecen t R esearch  using Indirect A pproaches
The problems associated with traditional studies have led a small group of 
authors to consider a more indirect approach, in an attempt to estimate the real 
effects of transnational activity within an economy. This has typically involved 
the inclusion of foreign variables in a domestic country’s production function, on 
the basis that they indicate the attractiveness of alternative sites for production, 
investment and employment. The papers argue that economies have become 
more open to transnational activity and so, in a global market, the behaviour of 
domestic variables will also be sensitive to foreign conditions. This reflects the 
influence of transnationals and their ability to re-allocate their resources between 
international locations.
In the few published studies of this kind, the emphasis has focused upon 
estimating aggregate macro economic effects. Examples include Bradley and 
Fitzgerald (1988, 1990) who found that, for Ireland, between 1964 and 1982, 
there was a constant elasticity of substitution between Irish production and 
production elsewhere, which was dependent upon Irish unit costs relative to a
180
measure of the world’s unit costs. For the USA, Koechlin (1992) found that a 
weighted average of foreign profits and foreign output were significant in 
determining the domestic demand for the US capital stock. In Young (1999), UK 
average costs relative to OECD countries were found to be statistically 
significant in explaining UK investment.
More recently, Hatzius (2000), using data for the UK and Germany, finds 
evidence, for both countries, that the elasticity of domestic investment with 
respect to unit labour costs has risen significantly since the liberalisation of FDI, 
which began in the early 1970’s. Interestingly, Hatzius (2000) concluded that 
these trends will consequently lead to a flatter labour demand curve, with 
implications for both workers’ bargaining power and the level of employment. 
Finally, Hollingsworth (1997) estimated a partial equilibrium model of aggregate 
investment behaviour - taking account of foreign wage conditions - for four 
countries, over the period 1967-1991: the UK, the USA, Canada and Japan. 
Hollingsworth (1997) found that, for each country, foreign wages were 
significant in explaining domestic investment behaviour and he took this as 
indicative of the real effects of transnational activity within these economies. 
Interestingly, in the case of Japan, the only significant foreign wages were those 
of South Korea, where a 10% fall in real wage growth was found to decrease 
Japanese domestic investment by 3%. Hollingsworth (1997) argued that, in the 
Japanese case, the insignificance of OECD wages may reflect MITI’s post- 
Second World War industrial policies and its close control of transnational 
corporations. These may have nullified the impact of changes in international 
wages (and transnational activity) within the Japanese economy.
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6.2.3 In terdependen t Linkages
Hollingsworth’s (1997) model is particularly relevant to our own study. This is 
because Hollingsworth’s (1997) approach was the first attempt to capture, 
empirically, the real effects of interdependent transnational networks and the 
“divide and rule” strategies of transnationals upon the behaviour of domestic 
variables. For Hollingsworth (1997), the basic premise was that, since a 
transnational can use such strategies to depress (international) labour costs, it 
creates interdependent linkages between its global transplants. As we first noted 
in Chapter (3), the credible threat of a global relocation of production, allows the 
transnational to control its international labour force and reduce its wage costs. 
However, in addition and given integrated global product markets, the 
transnational would also regard a lower bargained wage - in any particular 
location - as the fundamental factor, in determining the location of new 
investment. This then implies that the behaviour of investment, in a particular 
location, is affected by the outcome of the transnational’s wage bargains at other 
(global) locations2.
Our own direct observations in Chapter (5) indicated that Japanese automotive 
transnationals have adopted a “divide and rule” strategy to generate intra-firm
2 In many respects, there is a certain degree of endogeneity within Hollingworth’s (1997) model. 
The transnational’s use of international wage bargaining depresses wage costs across locations 
and, in turn, particular locations may attract new capital investment, where the bargained wage is 
lower. However, if we consider a particular location, then any new investment may subsequently 
raise the demand for labour and put upward pressure upon the bargained wage at that site. This is, 
of course, to some extent, nullified by the transnational's credible threat of being able to switch 
production to alternative sites. However, any new investment, at a particular location, will also 
put downward pressure on real wages elsewhere, since the new investment increases the 
transnational's “inside option” to source from that particular transplant. Unfortunately, an 
insufficient number of observations meant that Hollingsworth (1997) was unable to specify an 
endogenous system using a so-called Vector Auto Regression (VAR) framework, and so he only 
estimated a partial equilibrium model. This is a problem we also encounter.
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competition. It, therefore, appears particularly appropriate to use Hollingsworth’s 
(1997) framework to investigate, empirically, the real effects of transnational 
activity upon the behaviour of investment and employment within Japan’s 
domestic machinery sector3. More formally, this means that we include relevant 
foreign wage variables within the sector’s domestic production function. This is 
justified because transnationals have created interdependent linkages between 
transplants around the globe and those in Japan.
At this point, we should note that, while Hollingsworth’s (1997) approach relies 
exclusively upon the international wage bargaining process to generate such 
interdependent linkages, this is not the only mechanism whereby such 
interdependencies are created. For instance, interdependent linkages will exist 
when the transnational integrates both its home and foreign plants as part of a 
vertical production chain - such as the linkages between domestic Japanese 
transplants and their export platforms in East Asia (see Chapter (3), Wells, 
1993). Interdependent linkages may also occur if the transnational faces capital 
market constraints. Since the early 1970’s, the majority of Japanese and other 
Western firms have relied extensively upon retained earnings as the major source 
of net finance for new industrial investment (see Corbett and Jenkinson, 1996; 
Yaginuma, 1997). Stevens and Lipsey (1992) have shown that, when there are 
imperfect capital markets, transnational firms are likely to distribute their 
internally generated funds between competing international locations.
3 Hollingsworth (1997) only estimated investment equations.
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6.2.4 A Formal Model o f Investment and Labour Demand
The formal modelling of investment and labour demand for Japan’s machinery 
industries, follows - in a domestic context - the format proposed in Denny and 
Nickell (1992) and Dinenis and Funke (1994). The actual derivations presented 
here are adapted from Hollingsworth (1997), who placed the model of 
investment, into an international context by including relevant foreign wages.
The model considers a representative transnational firm that operates in the 
machinery sector, and owns n manufacturing plants located in Japan and across 
the globe. In theory, the transnational could allow each subsidiary to operate as a 
separate entity that takes decisions on output, new investment and employment, 
and maximises profits independently. However, because of the international 
wage bargaining process, there are interdependent linkages between the 
transplants. This means that a transnational’s strategic decisions, relating to a 
particular plant, will have an effect upon the production functions of other plants.
At each plant, the transnational employs a variable input, labour (Li), and a quasi- 
fixed input, capital (Ki), which depreciates geometrically at a constant rate of & 
The transnational is assumed to have a degree of market power, in a global, 
integrated market and sells its total output at a price of P,. The assumption of a 
global integrated product market seems reasonable, given that we are modelling a 
sector characterised by global component sourcing, with a high proportion of 
trade-flows being intra-firm. In addition, the transnational uses the same basic 
technology at each plant and purchases investment goods (/,), at a uniform price
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of p'. However, each plant will have a different wage structure, which is defined 
by
W ,=  wCKj.-.Kn, W i) (1)
where K represents the capital stock and w represents the local outside wage. The 
bargained wage at plant 1 is increasing in Ki, because of increased revenues 
generated at that site by higher capital and it is also increasing in w. However, 
the bargained wage is decreasing in K at the other plants, since capital elsewhere 
strengthens the transnationals “inside option” to source production elsewhere.
The transnational is free to alter its capital stock and employment at any of its 
plants, although it faces internal non-separable adjustment costs when it 
undertakes new capital investment (see Lucas, 1967; Gould, 1968). When there 
are non-separable adjustment costs, the level of variable inputs (labour) will 
influence the cost of changing the quasi-fixed variable, capital (see Dinenis and 
Funke, 1994). Internal adjustment costs represent lost output when new capital is 
installed and reflect a requirement to switch a proportion of the labour force from 
production to expanding the firm. The model assumes convexity in adjustment 
costs, which implies that the cost of adjustment is higher, the faster the 
adjustment of the capital stock. This will lead the firm to undertake investment 
over a longer period (see Brechling, 1975; Chirinko, 1993). The possibility of 
employment adjustment costs is ignored, since these are likely to be small (see 
Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983).
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There is a production function F, for each plant, which includes capital and 
labour inputs and an investment variable to account for the existence of internal 
non-separable adjustment costs. For simplicity, we assume that this net 
production function has constant returns to scale, is continuous and fully 
differentiable (see Dinenis and Funke, 1994). Following Hollingsworth (1997), 
the transnational’s net present value includes the aggregated output and costs 
from all its plants and is then defined by the objective function:
max V, = J e'rt ¿ ( 1 F[K„ L„ /,]- -p7,}dt (2)
(K (t) ,U t) l2 0 )  (=0 1=1
where r is the discount factor and T is the effective tax rate, net of capital 
allowances and subsidies. The time path of investment, employment and the 
capital stock is obtained by maximising equation (2) subject to the capital 
accumulation constraints:
•
Kt = Ij-  SKi  V i = l...n . (3)
Using equations (2) and (3), the Hamiltonian is given as:
H= e " S( 1 -^ {P , F[Kit Lit /,]- -p7,}+ A,(/, - SK,) (4)
ia l
where, in the optimal control terminology, the state variables are K, and the 
control variables are L„ /,. The X’s represent the co-state variables, which provide 
a measure of the effect upon the transnational’s net present value, for a small 
increase in Kj at time t. The problem is solved using the Maximum principle and
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t h e  f i r s t - o r d e r  H a m i l t o n i a n  c o n d i t i o n s  a re :
m  =e n(l-Ti){P,(l-l/e)Fu[Kh Lb /,] - w,}= 0 ; V i =1...« (5)
dL,
dH_=e rt( 1 -T,){/•,( 1 -1 /e)/7/,fAT,, L„ /,] - p'} = -A, ; V i =1 ...n (6)
dl,
dH_= e "{P,( 1 -Ti)( 1 -1 /e )^ ,[Kh L„ /,]-!( l-Tt)vv*,L,}-J/l,= -A, 
dK,
V i= l . . .n  (7)
where e is the price elasticity of demand.
There is also a tranversality condition that ensures a stable solution and non­
negativity of the capital stock:
lim (A, Ki) e'rt = 0; V i= l . . .n  (8)
t—>oo
In addition, the derivative of the value function with respect to the state variables 
relates the capital stock, at each site, with the co-state variables (Àj):
dV = A.| ; V i = 1 ...n (9)
dK,
Equation (9) defines X as the shadow price of an additional unit of capital at each 
site. This means that Equation (6) provides the transnational with the standard 
rule for investment: the marginal cost of investment must equate to its present 
value. In equilibrium, the transnational will equate the shadow prices at all of its
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plants, so that the co-state variables will all be equal. Following Dinenis and 
Funke (1994), the implicit function theorem implies the existence of both an 
investment equation and a labour demand equation at each plant:
/, = cp [ w/p. .. .wjp,  q]Kj V i = \...n (10)
L,= Q [ w/p....Wn/p, I/K,] Ki V i =1 ...n ( 11)
where q = (A/p). Equations (10) and (11) represent a system of simultaneous 
equations for Japan’s domestic machinery industries. The investment equation 
(10) implies that gross investment is a function of Japanese real wages, the real 
wages at the overseas sites and Tobin’s q. The foreign wages are present because 
of the existence of interdependent linkages between all plants. The inclusion of 
Tobin’s q captures the transnational’s optimal investment rule given in equation 
(6) (see Hayashi, 1982). In line with standard investment theory, it is expected 
that gross investment, in Japan’s machinery industries, will be negatively related 
to Japanese real wages, but positively related to q. The sign of the coefficient on 
the foreign wages will depend upon what Hollingsworth (1997) calls the 
organisational elasticity. If the transnational regards foreign investment as a 
substitute for production in Japan, then a positive sign on the foreign wages 
would be expected which would indicate the direct substitutability of foreign for 
Japanese labour. However, if the overseas site is seen as complementary to 
domestic production, then a negative sign is plausible, since the effect of an 
increase in foreign wages will lead the transnational to raise the capital stock - 
and adjust (reduce) the UK  ratio - at the foreign site.
188
The labour demand function (equation (11)) follows a similar format with the 
inclusion of Japanese and overseas real wages. It is expected that the demand for 
labour, in Japan’s machinery industries, will be negatively related to Japanese 
real wages but positively related to the foreign wages, which reflects the direct 
substitutability of Japanese and foreign labour. Equation (11) also includes the 
investment rate, which reflects the fact that there are adjustment costs in 
changing the capital stock. The investment rate will have a positive effect on 
labour demand if, to maintain a given output, the firm has to raise employment to 
compensate for the non-separable adjustment costs. However, there may be a 
negative effect if the increase in investment leads the firm to substitute capital for 
labour (see Dinenis and Funke, 1994).
6.3 Empirical Specifications and Econometric Estimation
6.3.1 E m pirical Specification
The model defined by equations (10) and (11) provides a framework to assess the 
real effects of transnational activity upon the behaviour investment and 
employment within Japan's machinery industries. The inclusion of the foreign 
wages, in both the investment and labour demand functions, provide an 
opportunity to estimate directly, the extent to which overseas sites have become 
viable and attractive, alternative sites -  compared to Japan - for investment and 
production. This section now considers the empirical implementation of the 
model, for each of the five industries that comprise Japan’s machinery sector. 
The data used are annual observations for the years 1968-1994. This time- 
interval captures the whole period since Japan’s FDI restrictions were relaxed in 
1971.
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Given the duality of investment and labour demand decisions, the general 
specification is a simultaneous system as given in equations (12a) and (12b) for 
industry i:
2 2
A In (Ij , / K j = a,  + Xfr A In q„ + XX ^A In (w /p )\.
i=i k j= i
+ 8 jD t +  |d|t (12a)
2 2
j=0o j=o
2 2
+ XX<fr,A In (w/p)„ + XcTjAlnYt.j + p2t (12b)
k j=0 j=0
where k is the index of real product wages with k=l representing Japanese wages 
and k>l being overseas wages. The lag structures are denoted by j. The system 
includes domestic and foreign wages, a measure of Tobin’s q, output (Y) and a 
dummy variable (D) to capture the effects of the oil shocks. The variables are all 
discussed below. The system is in logarithmic form and is written in first 
differences, which allows for the estimation of both the growth rates of 
investment and labour demand. There are no error correction terms, which is 
consistent with the view that transnationals do not establish any long-run 
equilibrium over production locations. This seems realistic, given that new 
(global) sites continually emerge as alternative sites for production, while 
existing ones become redundant.
The investment equation (12a) follows a distributed lag of past variables to allow 
for the existence of internal non-separable adjustment costs. The dependent
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variable (I|/Ki.t-i) is the ratio of real investment to the capital stock for each of the 
Japanese machinery industries. The data is obtained from the OECD’s 
International Sectoral Database (1997). The dummy variable is included to 
account for the effects of the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979. During the 1970’s, the 
Japanese Diet encouraged domestic firms to invest in new energy saving 
equipment4. These energy saving measures are believed to have had a positive 
effect upon investment in the machinery sector, particularly in the capital goods 
industries responsible for producing industrial and electrical machinery (see 
OECD, 1980).
The wages variables are the indices of Japanese and foreign real wages, which 
are chosen in preference to traditional International Labour Office (ILO) 
measures of unit labour costs. The latter take account of productivity differences 
between countries but, for a transnational firm, it is the hourly wage rate that is 
the most appropriate measure of labour costs. This is because the transnational 
can impose the same, basic technology at any location, which, in turn, will 
determine the level of labour productivity at each site. It is, therefore, the local 
industry wage, which is relevant in attracting investment flows. The indices of 
the real product wages are calculated, separately, for each industry, using data 
provided by UNIDO (1998) and the ILO (1998). They represent the average, 
hourly industry wage, in US dollars, which is paid to an employee in each 
country. In constructing these wages, salaries are assumed to form part of the 
transnational’s variable costs, which is consistent with the view that, with
4 An example is the 1979 Energy Conservation Act. This set Japanese industry specific targets for 
energy conservation. MITI supported the policy with a range of fiscal incentives and the 
imposition of fines for non-compliance (see OECD Economic Surveys, 1980).
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transnational production, all labour costs are (potentially) variable. Given an 
international market for finished goods, the wages are deflated by an 
international average of industry specific producer price indices, each weighted 
by output at purchasing power parity.
The choice of foreign wages needs some further clarification. It is important to 
include the industry wages of those countries that are most likely to have offered 
all transnationals, in Japan’s machinery sector, with a viable alternative site for 
production. The most likely sites will be those that have received the greatest 
proportion of outward Japanese FDI in the machinery sector and also those 
countries, which have provided Japan’s machinery industries with the largest 
stock of inward FDI. Unfortunately, the relevant data on sectoral FDI flows are 
unavailable. However, given the prominence of Japanese transnationals in 
Japan’s machinery sector, it seemed sensible to choose foreign wages - for which 
there are available data - based upon what appeared to be the most important 
sites for the location of Japanese affiliates. These foreign wages were, therefore, 
chosen on the basis of the aggregate dispersion of Japanese manufacturing FDI 
(see Table (1.1), Chapter (1)) and, for Transport Equipment, on the basis of the 
location of Japanese affiliates, as reported in Chapter (4). This approach appears 
reasonable, given the data restrictions and the fact that over 60% of Japanese 
manufacturing FDI emanates from Japan’s machinery sector.
The final variable in the investment function is a measure of Tobin’s q. For 
investment purposes, the focus should be upon marginal and not average q but, 
for a transnational firm, only average q is observable. In this respect, it could be
192
considered that the inclusion of both Japanese and foreign wages captures the 
effects of a change in marginal q abroad on investment in Japan. This is because 
changes in international labour costs will, indirectly, affect the marginal benefit 
of investment in Japan. However, in addition to labour costs, Tobin’s q should 
also account for future expectations and, for a transnational firm, reflect 
differences in international tax rates. The real Japanese share price index, for 
each industry, was, therefore included, using data taken from The Japanese 
Statistical Yearbook (various issues). Barro (1990) has argued that stock market 
prices perform better, empirically, to conventional measures of average q and 
provide a closer approximation to marginal q. Barro (1990) also suggests that 
share prices capture new information faster. The empirical superiority of using 
share prices rather than conventional measures of q is also supported by 
Blanchard et.al. (1993). The vast majority of transnationals, operating in Japan, 
are quoted on the Tokyo Exchange and it can be expected that rational market 
traders will fully discount changes in global conditions -  such as changes in 
international taxation and oil prices - into the share price.
The dependent variable in the labour demand function (12b) is the ratio of total 
hours worked to the real capital stock (Lj/Kj). The wage variables and the 
investment rate correspond to those in the investment equation. In addition, the 
domestic output, for each industry is also included to capture cyclical effects. 
The output variable is expected to have a positive effect upon labour demand. 
Japanese wages and the output variable are considered to be contemporaneous 
with the dependent variable (Lj/Ki), and are treated as endogenous. Similarly, if 
there is sufficient capacity at each site, the foreign wages are also
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contemporaneous, since the transnational will be able to alter the demand for 
labour at each plant, in order to maintain a given output during each time period.
For each industry, the variables entering the system were tested for unit roots and 
were 1(0). The equations (12a) and (12b) were estimated using the full 
information system estimator, Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS). This estimator 
was chosen on the basis that it is asymptotically efficient in minimising the 
variance-covariance matrix and provides unbiased estimates (see Greene, 1997). 
The exogenous variables and the lags of the endogenous regressors were utilised 
as appropriate instruments. In order to find a simple, satisfactory model 
specification, general to specific modelling was applied with the residuals being 
tested to check for the desirable properties of a white noise process. Finally, 
systematic testing was used to find the model’s most parsimonious 
representation.
6.3.2 E m pirica l Results
The estimated equations, for each industry, are presented in Tables (6.1 (a) to 6.1 
(e)). The final results are very interesting and appear to provide strong support 
for the view that transnational activity has had a real effect within Japan’s 
machinery sector. In particular, the international investment functions appear 
well specified with the coefficients having the correct a priori signs and highly 
significant t-ratios. Furthermore, the adjusted R2 values are high and all 
diagnostic tests are passed5. For all industries, there are significant foreign wage 
variables from each of the North American, European and East Asian economies.
5 Where the DW statistic is inconclusive, the Ljung-Box statistics indicate no residual 
autocorrelation.
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The significance of the Western wages is particularly interesting as it compares 
with Hollingsworth’s (1997) result, which found that OECD wages were not 
significant in determining aggregate Japanese manufacturing investment - a 
result Hollingsworth (1997) attributes to MITI’s post Second World War 
industrial policy, which controlled the activities of transnationals (see Section
(6.2.2). Hollingsworth’s (1997) conclusions are valid, since, even after the 
liberalisation of FDI restrictions in 1971, institutions were still in place to 
monitor and possibly influence transnational activity (see Bailey et.al., 1994a). In 
this respect, the results in Table (6.1) may indicate that, after 1971, MITI adopted 
a more liberal policy towards transnationals within the machinery sector. This is 
quite plausible, since the sector was the Japanese economy’s major source of 
exports and it was also the sector from which Japan’s “national champions” 
originated (see also Chapter (3)). The reasonable conclusion from both 
Hollingsworth’s (1997) study and the results in Table (6.1) is that, in the 
aggregate, Japanese industrial policy may have been successful in nullifying 
transnational activity and reducing relative international wage effects. However, 
the more liberal policy in the machinery industries has resulted in the sector 
becoming more global and open to transnational activity than Japanese 
manufacturing as a whole.
The results, for each industry, will now be compared and discussed. As expected, 
Japanese wages have had a significantly negative effect upon investment in all of 
Japan’s machinery industries. The Japanese own wage elasticities range from -  
0.782 in Transport Equipment to -0.385 in Agricultural and Industrial Machinery 
(see Table (6.1)). The sign and size of the foreign wages indicate the nature and
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scale of transnational production linkages that have been created between Japan 
and other economies, in each industry. Given Japan’s low inward stock of FDI, 
these linkages are probably more reflective of the activities of Japanese, rather 
than foreign, transnationals.
Throughout the machinery sector, the US and European wages have had a 
positive effect upon Japanese investment, which indicates the direct 
substitutability of Western and Japanese production. These economies have a 
long manufacturing tradition within the machinery sector and it would appear 
that transnationals have been able to exploit both the experience and 
technological capability, at each location, to develop alternative sites of 
production. The East Asian economies were late to industrialise but in Fabricated 
Metal Products, Agricultural and Industrial Machinery and Electrical Machinery 
and Electric Goods, the positive wage coefficients also indicate that 
transnationals have also created similar industrial linkages between Japan and the 
region. These industries produce standardised products and are relatively labour 
intensive (see Table (2.1), Chapter (2)) and the results probably capture the 
activities of those Japanese transnationals who have used the Pacific Rim as a 
direct source of cheap labour.
In contrast, the East Asian wage coefficients are significantly negative for 
Transport Equipment and Precision Tools. These results are entirely consistent 
with the respective industry's logistics and would indicate that production at each 
site is regarded as being complementary. In the case of Transport Equipment, 
over two-third’s of Japan’s output is in automobile production which is highly
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automated. We have already pointed out, in Chapter (4), that the imposition of 
high import tariffs on finished cars, throughout the region, meant that it was not 
cost effective for Japanese manufacturers to operate full car production, in any 
East Asian economy. However, there is a long history of a vertical production 
chain, between Japan and the region in the automobile industry (see Dicken, 
1998). This is reflected by the significant negative coefficient of -0.379 
attributed to Indonesian wages in column (lb) of Table (6.1 (d)). Similarly, 
column (lb) of Table (6.1 (e)) indicates that, in Precision Tools, significant long­
term vertical linkages exist between Japan and, respectively, Indonesia, 
Singapore and Taiwan. A possible explanation for these vertical linkages is that 
although the Precision Tools industry is relatively labour intensive, the industry 
is small and the nature of the output is highly specialised, with many products 
designed for niche markets such as professional and scientific research. It is quite 
conceivable that transnationals carry out product development in Japan, and 
utilise plants in East Asia as part of their downstream operations.
In terms of magnitude, the highest foreign wage coefficients - across the 
machinery sector - are those of the USA. The US wage elasticities range from 
0.985 in Fabricated Metal Products to 2.16 in Transport Equipment. These results 
suggest a high degree of substitutability of investment between Japan and the 
USA. We have noted in earlier Chapters the strategic importance of the USA for 
Japan’s machinery transnationals and the results, reported here, would suggest 
that they have successfully integrated their production operations between the 
two economies.
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The European wage coefficients are rather more inelastic. These wage elasticities 
range from an estimate of 0.204 for UK wages in Transport Equipment to 0.619, 
again for UK wages, in Precision Tools. The low elasticities possibly reflect the 
fact that Japan’s transnationals did not start to significantly expand into the 
region until the early 1980’s. In this respect, the fragmented nature of European 
markets encouraged the early Japanese transnationals to develop a vertical 
production chain, with final products often being assembled in “screwdriver” 
facilities, using parts sourced in East Asia. It is only since the subsequent growth 
in the European single market - and the rise in regional trade barriers - that 
Japanese transnationals have moved towards full production within the region 
(see MacKinnon, 1990; Gittelman and Dunning, 1992). Consequently, although 
strong industrial linkages have now been created, it is quite likely that, over the 
period estimated, Japanese manufacturing capacity, in Europe, was insufficient, 
to provide transnationals with a perfect substitute for production in Japan.
The magnitudes of the East Asian wage coefficients are also quite inelastic and, 
in general, they are lower than the European estimates. This may appear 
surprising, given the large presence of Japanese transnationals within East Asia 
and the region’s close proximity to Japan. From an empirical perspective, this 
may reflect the fact that there is a fairly even distribution of Japanese machinery 
affiliates within East Asia (MITI, 1998). This may have resulted in estimates, 
which indicate that individual Asian locations are imperfect substitutes for 
Japanese investment although, for the region as a whole, this may not be the 
case. In addition, the early strategies of Japan's transnationals were to vertically 
link domestic production with their offshore plants in East Asia, which were used
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as export platforms to Western markets (see Wells, 1993). It is only since the 
mid-1980’s that Japanese transnationals have begun to invest extensively in full 
production facilities - particularly in the consumer goods industries - within the 
region (MITI, 1998).
It is interesting to note that the q-variable is very significant and fairly similar in 
value across the machinery sector, which suggests that the Tokyo stock market is 
a good indicator of future investment opportunities. The actual size of the q 
coefficients’ range from 0.488, in Transport Equipment, to 0.726 in Electrical 
Machinery and Electric Goods. These estimates are on the high side when 
compared with other q studies of investment behaviour (see Galeotti and 
Schiantarelli, 1991). However, the greater volatility in the results presented here 
are more a reflection of the international investment environment that 
transnationals now face, which, of course, is also captured by the significance of 
the foreign wage variables. Finally, the dummy variable to account for the oil 
shocks of 1973 and 1979 is, as expected, significant and positive across the 
machinery sector. This indicates that Japanese policy, to encourage investment in 
new energy-saving capital goods, had the desired effect.
In comparison to the investment functions, the labour demand estimates are less 
impressive but, nevertheless, offer support to the conclusions above. In all 
industries, current Japanese wages are, as expected, negatively related to 
domestic labour demand, while current output has a significantly positive effect. 
The lag of investment has a significant negative effect across the sector, which 
indicates that new capital has been used as a substitute for labour. However, the
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magnitude of these coefficients range from -0.068 in Transport Equipment to -  
0.176 in Agricultural and Industrial Machinery, which suggests that the effect is 
quite small.
For both Agricultural and Industrial Machinery and Electrical Machinery and 
Electric Goods, it was found that Japanese labour demand responded to the lag of 
foreign wages. A possible reason for this is that both of these industries are 
labour intensive and rely upon large-scale production technologies. It could be 
that transnationals required a longer time period to install additional capacity in 
their overseas plants, to facilitate the substitution of foreign for Japanese labour. 
In the other machinery industries, there was an instant adjustment of Japanese 
labour demand to foreign wage changes, which would indicate spare capacity at 
each location.
The most important foreign wages are those of the USA, which is consistent with 
the conclusions drawn from the investment equations. Across the machinery 
sector, the US wage elasticities for Japanese labour demand are positive but 
inelastic, suggesting there is not perfect substitutability. The size of the European 
and East Asian wage coefficients are lower and, in some cases, it appears that 
whilst these wages may have affected Japanese investment, they do not appear to 
have correspondingly affected labour demand. These low foreign wage 
elasticities may reflect capacity constraints at overseas sites, although longer lag 
structures did not appear to be significant. Another possibility is that the 
existence of labour market institutions may have diminished the possibility of 
labour substitution between these economies and Japan. With regards to the East
200
Asian wages, the fact that only those from South Korea, in the case of Fabricated 
Metal Products, and Malaysia, in Electrical Machinery and Electric Goods, were 
significant may indicate the existence of collinearity between these wage 
variables. The unexpected (significant) negative signs on Indonesian wages in 
the labour demand equations for Transport Equipment and Precision Tools is a 
concern, although the coefficient’s small value suggests it is not important.
6.4 Some Further Evidence of the Real Effects of Global Outsourcing
6.4.1 Overview
The sensitivity of Japan’s machinery sector’s domestic investment and labour 
demand to changes in international cost conditions, reflect the dominance of 
transnationals and the significance of transnational production networks within 
Japanese manufacturing. The results in Section (6.3) also reflect the direct 
substitutability of Japanese and foreign production. In this respect, the results are 
also supported by survey evidence from Japanese manufacturers, who are 
increasingly sourcing production from overseas sites, because of lower 
production costs (Nikkei Weekly, 13/8/2001).
In Chapter (3), Table (3.2) highlighted the extent to which Japan’s transnationals 
have increased their global outsourcing. This increase in global outsourcing has 
raised a number of concerns about the real effects of overseas production upon 
Japan’s domestic industry. For instance, we noted in Chapter (3) that the 
Japanese Electronics Industry Association has raised concerns that global 
outsourcing has been a substitute for domestic production and has led to 
domestic stagnation (EIAJ, 1997). Furthermore, in Chapters (4) and (5), we
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noted a similar trend within the automobile industry. Given the nature of 
Japanese transnational networks and the move towards substituting overseas for 
Japanese production, this Section now considers some anecdotal evidence, to 
examine the real effects of global outsourcing within the machinery sector. The 
evidence presented considers the real effects upon Japan’s small firms, problems 
of regional “hollowing out” and also possible macro-economic effects.
6.4.2 The Isolation  o f  J a p a n ’s S m all Keiretsu F irm s
The first observation is that due to their increasing involvement in transnational 
production networks, Japan’s large corporate firms have established a stronger 
bargaining position vis-à-vis their smaller (domestic) keiretsu partners. In this 
respect, surveys consistently show that Japan’s smaller firms have experienced a 
significant fall in order books and have felt under severe pressure to accept lower 
profit margins because of their main contractor’s threat of global sourcing (see 
for instance, JSBRI, 1996). An indication of this new environment is, of course, 
Nissan’s greater emphasis upon global sourcing and its ultimatum to its smaller 
keiretsu partners to reduce costs or lose future contracts (see Chapter (5) and also 
Nikkei Weekly, 25/10/99, 21/5/2001).
The increased global activities of Japan’s corporate firms have led to a 
weakening of the traditional Japanese keiretsu relationships, and has left many of 
Japan’s smaller firms feeling isolated. The procurement of intermediate goods, 
from Japan, for instance, fell by a third in the decade between 1986 and 1996, 
while there was a notable increase in component sourcing from East Asia (MITI,
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1998)6. For Japan’s small keiretsu firms, the problems posed by global sourcing 
are particularly acute, since over 80% of them are “locked in” to vertical 
relationships with their main contactor (see Chapter (2)). Consequently, global 
outsourcing has created a demand crisis for the keiretsu, often leaving small 
firms with insufficient revenue to repay long-term loan commitments. 
Furthermore, the inability of Japan’s small firm sector to diversify, and its over­
reliance upon the Corporate Group, has been a key contributor to their faltering 
financial performance and the unprecedented rise in the number of small firm 
bankruptcy cases during the 1990’s (JSBRI, 1996, Nikkei Weekly, 19/10/1998). 
In this respect, the profitability of Japan’s small firms was significantly lower 
throughout the 1990’s - when the Japanese economy was more sensitive to 
transnational activity - than in earlier periods (see Table (6.2)). Furthermore, the 
decline was particularly profound within the machinery industries - Japan’s most 
global sector - where small firms have seen their Gross Profit Margins fall by 
almost 60% and the Return on Capital fall by approximately 45% since the mid- 
1980’s (see Table (6.2))7.
At this point, we should note that while we have emphasised the negative 
consequences of outsourcing for Japan’s small firms, Whittaker (1997, p.60) 
maintains “small firms are not simply passive victims of 
internationalisation..........  such pressures act as a spur for further innovation ”,
‘Procurement from Japan is on a downward trend. In 1986, Japanese offshore affiliates procured 
55% of all inputs from Japan. In 1996, this had fallen to 37% (MITI, 1998). MITI (2000) has 
noted that procurement rates from Japan continue to fall. In 1998, reverse imports accounted for 
14% of all Japanese imports, compared with 4.5% in 1986. Japan’s East Asian affiliates account 
for over 80% of all reverse imports and have increased four-fold during the 1990’s (MITI, 2000).
To some extent, the data in Table (6.2) reflects Japan’s long cyclical downturn since the late 
1980’s. However, it is highly probable that the problems for Japan’s small firms have been 
exacerbated by the global activities of Japan’s transnational corporations (see Cowling and 
Tomlinson, 2000).
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He notes that Japan’s small firms "have established their own regional division 
of labour (within Asia) through trading and manufacture abroad, either 
individually or in consortia" (p. 60). Yet further on, Whittaker (1997, p.60) is 
aware that “surveys show that many small firms either pull out or "fade out" (i.e. 
divest) their foreign investments, with serious consequences fo r  the company". It 
seems fairly clear then, that moving offshore is a very different proposition for 
the small Japanese firm than it is for the corporate giant.
6.4.3 R eg ion a l “H ollow ing O ut”
The problems experienced by Japan’s small firms and the growth in overseas 
production has raised the prospect of a “hollowing out” (küdoka) of Japanese 
industry. This occurs when the higher profitability of overseas production 
reduces the relative importance of Japan’s core domestic industrial base. This 
eventually leads to a decline in Japanese international competitiveness, de­
industrialisation and the problem of “structural holes”, where once prosperous 
manufacturing regions experience long-term social and economic decline.
A clear example of “hollowing out” can be seen in the Ota-ku Ward of Tokyo, 
once a large urban industrial area, which thrived upon promoting “specialist 
networks” of keiretsu firms within the machinery sector. In recent years, the area 
has experienced a dramatic contraction in industrial activity, as small firms have 
struggled to sustain demand, while others have followed their main contractors) 
overseas, in order to maintain their vertical supply chains (as clearly evident in 
the automobile industry). Reports suggest that Ota-ku will lose its “specialist
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networks” completely, reducing the area’s functional vitality and raising the 
spectre of long-term economic decline (JSBRI, 1996).
More generally, the “hollowing out” of Japanese manufacturing industry and the 
machinery sector can be seen in Table (6.3). In all prefectures and across 
industrial sectors, Japan has experienced a significant decline in real output, the 
number of business establishments and employment during the 1990’s. The 
depression appears to have affected both the machinery and non-machinery 
sectors with equal magnitude, particularly in terms of lost jobs and factories (see 
Table (6.3)). At the regional level, the large industrial belts of Kanagawa, Tokyo, 
Osaka and Saitama, which all rely heavily upon Japan’s large (global) machinery 
corporations, have particularly seen a significant fall in industrial capacity and 
now experience higher than the national average rate of unemployment.
Interestingly, the decline of the machinery sector in the neighbouring Aichi and 
Shizuoka prefectures was less marked than in the other major industrial belts - 
although the non-machinery sector has suffered considerably (see Table (6.3)). 
The relative insulation of Aichi’s machinery sector may reflect the fact that it 
still remains at the core of Toyota’s global operations, particularly for research 
and development and the testing of new products (Ruigrok and Tate, 1996). 
Similarly, Shizuoka prefecture contains the city of Hamamatsu, which remains at 
the centre of Honda’s global motorcycle business. In addition, Hamamatsu is 
regarded as a high-tech industrial city that, to some extent, has successfully been 
able to take advantage of regional assistance through MITI’s Technopolis 
Program (see Chapter (7); Whittaker, 1997, p48-49). It could be that, in the
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machinery sector at least, Toyota’s continuing commitments in Aichi and the 
relative success of Hamamatsu City have, so far, been partial antidotes to the 
effects of globalisation. However, as the pace of globalisation continues, it is 
likely that both the strategic importance of Toyota City, in Aichi and Hamamatsu 
City, in Shizuoka, to Toyota and Honda will weaken, as offshore production 
becomes more attractive. If this occurs, the machinery industries in both Aichi 
and Shizuoka prefectures will face serious long-term decline.
At this point, we should note that Ozawa (1991, 1992) has argued that the growth 
in outsourcing is an opportunity for Japanese industry to restructure and upgrade 
its manufacturing technology by re-deploying resources into the development of 
higher value added products, while traditional, declining industries are moved 
offshore. The theory is that this will lead to a “flying geese formation” of 
production, where advanced technological work is done in Japan, medium value 
added work is done in the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) and so on 
throughout Asia. The benefits of this pattern are seen as a combination of rising 
technological standards and the extension of product life cycles beyond Japanese 
and Western markets.
However, in the 1990’s, Ozawa’s arguments would appear to have lost their 
validity. Japanese offshore affiliates are increasingly being used as a direct 
substitute for production and, in some cases, for product development (JSBRI, 
1996). In this respect, Beamish et.al (1997, p.26) report a notable change in the 
strategy of Japanese transnationals, from establishing offshore “assembly 
(plants), using parts sourced in Japan, to full manufacturing, to, in some cases,
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R&D located in the host country". According to the Nikkei Weekly (18/6/2001, 
p.4), the rising technological competence of the NIEs has led "to an increasing 
number o f (Japanese) firms transferring research and development activities, 
once considered the epitome o f Japanese excellence, to (Asian) offshore 
affiliates". Whittaker (1997, p58) has also noted that, in production, it now only 
takes a matter of months before the latest Japanese designed, sophisticated 
products are able to be manufactured offshore - in East Asia - to serve both the 
Japanese and Western markets. Furthermore, as these trends continue, it is only a 
matter of time before similar outsourcing takes place in Japan’s new higher 
value-added industries, particularly in higher technology and computer research. 
Indeed, in a 1996 JSBRI survey, it was predicted that, by 2001, the proportion of 
overseas production in these more profitable sectors, would increase by 150%, 
while the comparable prediction for lower value-added products was an increase 
of 30% (JSBRI, 1996).
These trends have become widely apparent in Japan’s machinery industries, 
raising genuine concerns of a “hollowing out” of Japanese industry. De­
industrialisation in Japan’s industrial belts hampers the country’s long-term 
prospects for economic recovery and a revival in manufacturing employment 
(EPA, 1995). At the regional level, the decline of Japan’s small firm base and the 
loss of industrial vitality in the industrial districts, weaken the capability for self­
regeneration. The contraction of Japan’s keiretsu networks also reduces the 
potential for agglomeration economies, which contribute to Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) and economic growth. Indeed, in the latter respect, studies 
have shown that Japan’s TFP growth, has been declining in all of Japan’s major
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industrial sectors during the 1990’s (Jones, 1995, JETRO, 1997). The decline in 
Japanese TFP growth appears to correspond with the growth in globalisation and 
the deterioration in Japan’s domestic, manufacturing base.
6.4.4 Possible Macro-economic Effects
At the aggregate level, the growth in Japanese transnational activity will have a 
real effect upon both the short and long-term performance of Japan’s macro 
economy. Initially, the growth in global outsourcing might adversely affect 
Japan’s current account in the Balance of Payments, which, in turn, will lower 
both domestic output and manufacturing employment. Furthermore, as we noted 
in Section (6.4.3), the demise of the keiretsu relationships and the transfer of 
higher value added activities overseas will, in the long run, reduce both total 
factor productivity and economic growth.
In this respect, MITI (1998) provide some (preliminary) empirical evidence, 
which may suggest a causal link between Japan’s current economic stagnation 
and global outsourcing. Based on information from their annual surveys of 
Japanese transnationals, MITI occasionally publish estimates of the net effects of 
overseas production upon Japan’s trade balance. These calculations are then 
extrapolated to provide estimates of the real effects of global outsourcing for 
both Japan’s domestic production and employment. The calculations take 
account of both the positive and negative aspects of global outsourcing and 
include both export induction effects, such as the procurement of capital and 
intermediate goods from Japan, along with estimated export substitution and 
reverse import effects.
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In Figure (6.1), the net real effects of Corporate Japan’s overseas production, on 
both the trade balance and domestic output, are shown. The graphs clearly show 
that, since 1992, there has been an increasingly negative impact upon the 
domestic Japanese economy. With regards to the trade balance, there are 
particular concerns about the significant rise in the proportion of reverse imports, 
from overseas affiliates, into Japan. In 1996, these accounted for 11.2% of 
Japan’s total imports, of which 80% were from Asia (MITI, 1998). This negative 
impact of Japanese outsourcing may (partially) explain the recent decline, in both 
nominal and real terms, of Japan’s persistent long running trade surplus which 
has, in turn, contributed to the stagnant growth in domestic output (Japanese 
Statistical Yearbook, 2001).
MITI (1998) have also estimated that the impact of global outsourcing upon 
output weakens Japanese GDP growth by 0.66% per annum. These trends also 
reduce the level of Japan’s domestic employment as foreign labour is 
increasingly used as a substitute for Japanese production (see Figure (6.2)). 
Between 1992 and 1996, Japanese manufacturing employment fell by over one 
million, and according to Figure (6.2), approximately 35% of lost jobs were due 
to global outsourcing. It is worth noting that, over the same period, the number of 
workers employed in Japanese overseas (manufacturing) subsidiaries more than 
doubled to 2.22 million (see Table (3.2), Chapter (3)).
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6.5 Concluding Comments
This Chapter has considered the real effects of transnational activity and, in 
particular, the significance of transnational production networks - the new 
keiretsu - for Japan’s domestic machinery sector. We have argued that, by 
adopting “divide and rule” strategies, Japan’s transnationals have had a real 
effect upon the behaviour of domestic economic variables, small firm 
performance and the structure of industrial production. There have also been 
particular concerns that the increasing move towards overseas production has 
exacerbated a “hollowing out” of Japanese industry. These concerns are real, 
given the disproportionate balance between Japan’s outward and inward stock of 
FDI.
In order to capture the real effects of transnational activity, this Chapter 
employed an indirect approach, which was adapted from a model proposed by 
Hollingsworth (1997). This involved including relevant foreign wage variables in 
a domestic production function. The empirical results suggested that, for each of 
Japan’s machinery industries, both investment and labour demand are highly 
sensitive to international wage effects. These results illustrate the ability of 
transnationals to substitute foreign for Japanese production. The results differed 
from Hollingsworth’s (1997) aggregated study, in that both US and European 
wages were found to be significant in determining Japanese machinery sector 
investment. Indeed, in our study, changes in US wages appeared to have the 
largest effect upon Japanese investment. Both sets of results do, however, appear 
consistent, when considered in the light of Japanese industrial policy. At the 
aggregate level, industrial policy may have nullified the effects of changes in
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international wages. However, this is not the case in the machinery sector, where 
a more liberal policy was adopted.
The empirical results were also important in that they allowed us to identify the 
nature and scale of industrial linkages, which have been created through 
transnational production networks. It appears that, for all industries, there is a 
direct substitutability of production between Japan and the Western economies 
and similarly between Japan and East Asia in Fabricated Metals, Agricultural and 
Industrial Machinery and Electrical Machinery and Electric Goods. The foreign 
wage elasticities indicated the degree of substitutability between Japan and the 
other economies. In Transport Equipment and Precision Tools, there appeared to 
be strong vertical linkages between Japan and East Asia.
The Chapter also considered the implications of diverting investment away from 
Japan and substituting foreign for Japanese labour through global outsourcing. In 
particular, we noted the isolation of Japan’s important small firm sector, 
particularly within the machinery sector. There are also serious concerns about 
de-industrialisation and the regional “hollowing out” of Japan. At the aggregate 
level, the real effects of transnational activity also appear to manifest themselves 
in contributing to lower output and TFP growth and higher unemployment. Such 
economic problems warrant an appropriate policy response. In the light of our 
results in this and previous Chapters, we will now consider possible policy 
options, for the Japanese State and MITI, in the final Chapter.
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6.6 D ata Sources
The data is annual for the period 1968-1994. All indices are defined equal to 100 
in the base year 1990. Where applicable, data is converted into US dollars ($), at 
current exchange rates quoted in the International Monetary Fund’s IFS 
Yearbook. For each industry, data was collated for the following variables:
K -  Real Gross Capital Stock. Source: OECD (1997).
I - Real Gross Investment. Source: Source: OECD (1997).
L -  Total Labour Hours Worked. Defined as Number of employees * Total 
Hours Worked pier employee (assuming 52 weeks in a year). Sources: UNIDO 
(1998), ILO (various years).
w -  Index o f Hourly Wages. Defined as Total Labour Compensation/Total 
Labour Hours Worked. Sources: UNIDO (1998), ILO (various years).
p -  Average o f Producer Price Indices for USA, UK and Japan (weighted by 
output at purchasing power parity). Sources: US Bureau of Labour Statistics, UK 
Office for National Statistics and Statistics Bureau, Government of Japan.
q -  Real Stock Price Index. Source: Statistics Bureau, Government of Japan.
Y -  Index of Real Japanese Output. Source: UNIDO (1998).
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Table (6.1a)
Investment and Labour Demand Estimates for Japan’s Machinery Sector 1968-1994
Fabricated Metal Products Industries
Three Stage Least Squares (Simultaneous Equations) Estimation
Investment Estimates Labour Demand Estimates
Variable Ain I/Kc, Ain I/Kc, Ain L/K, Ain 1VK,
(la) (lb) (2a) (2b)
Constant -0.106“** -0.11*** -0.0536*** -0.0507***
(-4.57) (-4.617) (-3.644) (-3.729)
J ip a a 0.123 -0.095** -0.079*
A In llt-i/Kt-z) (1.30) (-2.13) (-1.89)
Ja p m 0.496*** 0.493***
A In (Lti/K«.i) (3.90) (3.92)
Japaa -0.088 -0.093*
A In (w/p), (-1.58) (-1.88)
-0.637*"* -0.665***
A In (w/p),, (-4.62) (-4.679)
USA 0.217** 0.2037*
A In (w/p), (2.165) (2.21)
USA 1.048*** 0.985***
A In (w/pV, (3.43) (3.16)
UK 0.029
A In (w/p), (0.506)
UK 0.438*** 0.435***
A In (w/p),, (2.82) (2.70)
Swrth Karra 0.0589 0.063
A In (w/p), (1.457) (161)
S a « *  Korea 0.380*** 0.388***
A In (w/pV, (3.53) (3.486)
Stagapara 0.191* 0.197* 0.019
A In (w/p),, (1.80) (1.82) (0.533)
J a p a . 0.477*** 0.492***
A In q„ (5.42) (5.482)
J a p a . 0.231** 0.237**
Ain Y, (2.27) (2.36)
OU Shock(s) 0.126** 0.106*
Dummy (2.08) (1.729)
R-Bar Squared 0.72 0.71 0.57 0.61
Durbin Watson 2.02 2.01 2.60 2.69
Jarque-Bera x*(2) 0.92 [0.63) 0.99 |(L611 0.37 |083| 0.55 |0l75|
Ljung-Box Q(4) 4.31 |0.36) 4.47 |0i48| 6.35 |017| 7.55 |0l11|
Heteroscadasticity 0.48 |0.89) 0.64 1078) 1.11 (047) 1.57 (0.23|
Wald 1.69 ¡019) 0.49 (0.78)
Note*: The results were estimated by Kviews (version 3.1/ The associated t ratios are In parenthesis beneath the 
estimated coefficients and Indicates statistically significant at the 134 level, ** at 5 %  and * at 10% .
Th e  test for normality b  the Jacqne-Bera x’(2 ) test. Q (a ) b  the I .Jung Box / ’ statistic, for aerial correlation, with n 
decrees of freedom. Th e  test for hcteroscadasticfty b  White’s test (1980), which asymptotically follows a x‘ 
distribution, with degrees of freedom equivalent to the number of slope coefficients in the test regression. Finally, 
these diagnostic tests have compater-generated probabilities (In parenthesis) Indicating the probability of accepting 
the nail hypothesis of no model mlsspeciftcatlon. Th e  Wald test b  used as a variable deletion test. Imposing a linear 
restriction that coefficient values are zero.
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Table (6.1b)
Investment and Labour Demand Estimates for Japan’s Machinery Sector 1968-1994
Agricultural and Industrial Machinery Industries
Three Stage Least Squares (Simultaneous Equations) Estimation
Investment Estimates Labour Demand Estimates
Variable Ain I/K,, A In I/K|_i Ain IVK, A ln lV K ,
(la) (lb) J t e ___________ ___ i?b)_________
Constant -0.127*** -0.125*** -0.057** -0.050***
(-4.669) (-4.903) (-2.39) (-2.818)
a218* 0.262** -0.138 -0.176
A In fU,/K«.2) (1.78) (2.30) (-1.507) (-2.809)
0.277 0.379**
A In (L|.i/K«.i) (1.215) (2.417)
-0.3%** -0.2%**
A In (w/p), (-2.46) (-2.519)
Jap aa -0.369* -0.385**
A In (w/pVi (-1.94) (-2.121)
USA 1.808*** 1.964*** 0.918** 0.716***
A In (w/pk, (3.29) (3.83) (2.35) (2.91)
UK 0.158 -0.060
A In (w/p),., (0.917) (-0605)
C ira a —y 0.236 0.326** 0.074
A In (w/p),, (1-379) (2.27) (0.599)
Malaysia 0.057 -0.039
A In (w/p),. (0.298) (-0400)
S hn ap a re 0.293 0.334** 0.048
A In (w/p),. (1.565) (2.015) (0.439)
0.546*** 0.525***
A In q„ (6.18) (6.208)
0.202* 0.218-
Ain Y, (1-96)
(2.91)
Oil Shock(s) 0.365*** 0.390***
Dummy (4.81) (5.466)
R-Bar Squared 0.69 0.72 0.34 0.59
Durbin Watson 1.52 1.58 2.06 2.12
Jarque-Bera xl(2) 1.10 |0.57| 1.33 10.51) 4.73 [O09| 1.52 |047J
Ljung-Boi Q(4) 2.04 (0.731 2.41 [066) 6.10 |019| 2.9 [057|
Heteroscadastidty 1.34 |0.36| 1.09 |0l44J 0.45 [0911 0.89 [057]
Wald 0.84 |066| 0.67 |095|
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Table (6.1c)
Investment and Labour Demand Estimates for Japan’s Machinery Sector 1968-1994
Electrical Machinery and Electric Goods Industries
Three Stage Least Squares (Simultaneous Equations) Estimation
Investment Estimates Labour Demand Estimates
Variable Ain VKm 
( la)
A In I/Kt.| 
(lb)
AlnIVK,
J t e ____________
A In L/K, 
(2b)
Constant -0.297***
(-13.89)
-0.296***
(-13.76)
-0.092***
(-3.069)
-0.0957***
(-5.228)
Japaa
A In (1|.i/K|.2)
-0.006
(-0.128)
-0.179***
(-3.102)
-0.137***
(-3.438)
A In (L^i/Kti)
0.1%
(0.921)
A In (w/p),
-0.285*
(-1.895)
-0.333***
(-3.132)
Japaa
A In (w/pKi
-0.598***
(-5.96)
-0.613***
(-6.426)
USA
A In (w/pX,
1.806***
(6.07)
1.897* —  
(7.436)
0.343
(1.022)
0.452*
(1.65)
UK
A In (w/pk,
0.079
(0.80)
0.022
(0.179)
G in aaay
A In (w/p)n
0.527***
(5.41)
0.556***
(6.89)
0.112
(0.809)
Malaysia
A In (w/p)M
0.359***
(2.85)
0.329***
(2.875)
0.366"*
(2.27)
0.180*
(1.810)
A In (w/p)n
0.288***
(3.96)
0.286***
(4.01)
-0.033
(-0412)
Saath Korea
A In (w/pk,
0.161***
(2.53)
0.172**
(2.703)
A In (w/p)n
0.531*"*
(7.17)
0.532***
(7.267)
0.049
(0.692)
Japaa
A In q,.,
0.741***
(13.34)
0.726"**
(14.67)
Japaa
Ain Y,
0.149
(0.966)
0.351*"
(2.035)
OU Shock(s) 
Dummy
0.408*"*
(11.61)
0.415***
(12.79)
R-Bar Squared 
Durbin Watson 
Jerque-Bern x2(2) 
Ljung-Box Q(4) 
Heteroscadastidty 
Wald
0.94
2.08
0.25 (0.88)
4.26 (0.37]
1.27 (0.481
0.95
2.19
0.27 (087) 
2.86 (058) 
0.47 (090) 
0.65 (072)
0.44
1.63
0.19 [O90| 
4.77 (0311 
4.54 (012)
0.59
I. 42
0.42 (081]
II. 6 [007] 
0.77 (065] 
2.55 (077]
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Table (6.1d)
Investment and Labour Demand Estimates for Japan’s Machinery Sector 1968-1994
Transport Equipment Industries
Three Stage Least Squares (Simultaneous Equations) Estimation
Investment Estimates Labour Demand Estimates
Variable Ain I/K,,
da)
A In I/K,, 
(lb)
AlnIVK,
(2a)
AlnL/K,
(2b)
Constant -0.048**
(-2.469)
-0.048**
(-2.513)
-0.088***
(-4.440)
-0.901***
(-13.25)
Japaa
A In fI(.|/K(.2)
-0.032
(-0.343)
-0.087*
(-1.984)
-0.0686**
(-2.502)
Ja p a a
A In (Ln/Kti)
0.026
(0.131)
A In (w/p),
-0.192***
H.30)
-0.171*** 
(-4.168)
Jap aa
A In (w/p),,
-0.810***
(-5.914)
-0.782***
(-6.993)
USA
A In (w/p),_________
0.653***
(3.05)
0.699***
(3.553)
USA
A In (w/p),,
2.22***
(3.122)
2.16***
(3.70)
UK
A In (w/p),,________
0.218
(1.511)
0.204*
(1.939)
0.048
(1.13)
A In (w/p),
-0.0466*
(-1.77)
-0.046*
(-1.95)
A In (w/p),,
-0398***
(-5.467)
-0.379***
(-6.068)
A In (w/p),
0.027
(0.321)
Malaysia
A In (w/p),,
-0.0048 
(-a025)
Japaa
A In q».,
0.499"**
(5.039)
0.488***
(7.335)
Japaa
Ain Y,
0.284***
(3.215)
0.309***
(3.849)
Oil Shock(s) 
Dummy
0.199***
(4.507)
0.203"**
(4.786)
R-Bar Squared 
Durbin Watson 
Jerque-Be ra x'(2) 
Ljung-Box Q(4) 
Heteroscadastidty 
Wald
0.82
1.54
2.63 [0.27] 
1.11 (0.89) 
1.14 (0.45]
0.84
1.51
3.42 (018) 
1.47 (083) 
0.49 (087) 
0.19 |O90|
0.70
2.04
0.77 (068) 
4.38 (035] 
2.11 [018]
0.75
1.86
016 |092) 
4.03 (040) 
2.6 (OlO) 
1.31 (072)
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Table (6.1e)
Investment and Labour Demand Estimates for Japan’s Machinery Sector 1968-1994
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Three Stage Least Squares (Simultaneous Equations) Estimation
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Chapter (7)
Review, Ways Forward for Industrial Policy and Future Research 
Possibilities'
7.1. Review
This thesis has examined the nature of the Japanese transnational corporation and 
considered some of the real effects of globalisation within Japan’s machinery 
sector. One of the main arguments in this thesis is that the activities of Japan’s 
large transnationals have precipitated a “hollowing out” of industrial Japan. This 
thesis has examined this argument using a mixed methodological approach, 
drawing upon a synthesis of the existing literature and using both qualitative and 
quantative techniques. In particular, we have argued that the roots of Japanese 
transnationality, the globalisation of the machinery sector, the nature of the new 
keiretsu networks and the “hollowing out” of Japanese manufacturing are 
intrinsically linked to Japan’s domestic industrial structure. We now briefly 
review the main arguments, before considering possible ways forward for 
Japanese industrial policy and a possible future research agenda.
The main characteristics of Japan’s industrial structure were reviewed in Chapter 
(2). The nature of Japanese industrial organisation primarily consists of keiretsu 
networks of subcontractors, who provide intermediate goods and services to 
larger corporations, in so-called “company castle towns”. Interestingly, this 
pyramidal structure was actively encouraged through Japanese industrial policy. 1
1 The policy proposals in this Chapter are also pursued in Cowling and Tomlinson (2002).
222
which contained an inherent bias towards promoting the activities of Japan’s 
“national champions”. Although Japanese industrial organisation is said to 
embody “trust”, “co-operation” and “close ties” between partners, it was argued 
that, through their various control mechanisms, Japan’s large Corporate Groups 
dominate the machinery sector. These control mechanisms are clearly illustrated 
in the automobile industry, where Japan’s corporate elites exercise their authority 
over a transactional hierarchy of their keiretsu partners.
The analysis in Chapter (2) led us to view Japanese corporations as hierarchical 
entities, which are controlled from a centre of strategic decision-making 
(Cowling and Sugden, 1994, 1998). This position, of course, contrasts sharply 
with an influential body of literature, initiated by Aoki (1984, 1988, 1989, 1990,
1994) , which considers Japanese industrial organisation as being a “non- 
hierarchical” mode of production and the (Japanese) firm as a nexus of treaties. 
Nevertheless, the arguments espoused in Chapter (2) appear consistent with other 
(independent) observations of Japanese industrial structure, where control is seen 
as being concentrated among a few large players (see Ruigrok and Van Tulder,
1995) . Aoki’s (1990) view of the Japanese firm might, therefore, be viewed as 
being somewhat superficial.
The oligopolistic description of Japanese firms and industrial structure is not 
only realistic, but it also provided a framework for analysing the evolution of 
Japan’s transnational corporations (Chapter (3)). It can be argued that an 
oligopolistic structure, characterised by mass production and industry-wide 
collusion, may have, in the aggregate, led to a climate of deficient domestic
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demand (Pitelis, 1996, 2000). This general business environment may then have 
precipitated a move overseas by Japan’s larger corporations, who sought to 
overcome both domestic and external demand constraints. The regression results 
reported in Chapter (3) suggested that there is some empirical support for the 
view that deficient domestic demand may have stimulated the growth in outward 
Japanese FDI.
For the Japanese firm, the actual decision to become a transnational corporation, 
as opposed to relying upon licensing/subcontracting or exporting, reflects supply 
side factors. In this respect, Chapter (3) also considered Hymer’s (1976) 
arguments that transnational firms possess a specific (oligopolistic) advantage 
and seek to use their international operations for the removal of conflict. In the 
Japanese case, these specific advantages may relate to their technological 
flexibility and organisational efficiency. The transnational option allows 
Japanese firms to directly control and protect their specific advantages, in the 
international market. In addition, the development of transnational networks of 
production allows Japan’s transnationals to pursue “divide and rule” strategies 
with international labour and world governments.
These supply side factors are clearly visible in the globalisation of the Japanese 
automobile industry (Chapters (4) and (5)). Domestic oligopolistic rivalry 
between the large Japanese assemblers (referred to as Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs)) at the domestic level is also seen at the international 
level, with evidence of a Knickerbocker (1973) effect in overseas entry patterns. 
Furthermore, Chapter (4) also revealed the extent to which Japan’s large OEMs
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have been strategically developing their own transnational production networks, 
the new keiretsu, which primarily involves their core domestic suppliers. The 
Japanese automobile industry’s specific (competitive) advantages primarily 
relate to the “close ties” between OEMs and suppliers, and the new keiretsu is an 
attempt to replicate these relationships at the international level.
The nature of new keiretsu relations was investigated in Chapter (5), using a Case 
Study of UK based Japanese suppliers. The UK is at the centre of the Japanese 
automobile industry’s European operations and the transplants are typical new 
keiretsu affiliates. One of the main results from this Case Study was the extent to 
which the supplier affiliates were engaged in intra-firm competition to set and 
meet designated “target prices”. The supplier affiliates appear to have provided 
the Japanese OEMs with an “inside option”, that facilitates a “divide and rule” 
strategy, through which they can resolve potential conflicts with their labour 
force. However, this weapon may actually become a source of conflict at the 
executive level, particularly when supplier affiliates are involved in joint 
ventures with indigenous manufacturers. In this respect, the Case Study revealed 
that the Japanese and European participants had conflicting objectives, 
particularly with regards to the determination of prices and profits. When the 
joint venture broke down, it was usually the Japanese participant that acquired 
full control to maintain the OEM-supplier relations at the local level.
The global activities of Japan’s transnationals appear to have had real effects 
upon Japan’s domestic machinery industries (Chapter (6)). In this respect, the 
econometric evidence suggested that both investment and employment had
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become sensitive to international cost conditions. Furthermore, as the large 
transnationals have begun to outsource production from offshore affiliates, 
Japan’s small firm sector has become isolated, which has raised concerns of a 
“hollowing out” of the economy’s traditional manufacturing regions. At the 
macro level, there is also some evidence to suggest that these trends appear to 
have contributed to lower output and total factor productivity growth and higher 
unemployment.
7.2 Industrial Policy - Suggestions for Renewal in Japanese Manufacturing
7.2.1 The Anglo-US model?
The continuing stagnation in Japan and the problems of “hollowing out” in 
Japanese manufacturing lead us to consider an appropriate policy response to aid 
economic revival. In this respect, we should first note that, over the past decade, 
Japan has engaged in much debate and introspection about its economy, its 
industrial structure and the relevance of the “Japanese model” in the global 
economy. The current policy debate appears to revolve around Japan abandoning 
its traditional Japanese values and institutions and moving towards an Anglo-US 
style of capitalism (Noguchi 1996, 1998). The proponents of this view argue that 
Japan should reduce both protectionism and State intervention, and pursue 
policies for greater de-regulation in both financial and industrial sectors. 
Moreover, some Western commentators argue that traditional keiretsu structures 
may also need to be dismantled, since they are regarded as being an impediment 
to encouraging both inward investment and foreign competition (see, for 
instance, Katz, 1998).
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At face value, the arguments in favour of Western style restructuring have some 
considerable appeal. The Japanese economy has been stagnant for over a decade 
and Japan has found it difficult to encourage inward FDI (OECD, 1999). It is 
argued that “opening up” the Japanese economy to greater foreign competition 
may reduce these imbalances and aid economic recovery. For instance, Katz 
(1998) argues that a reduction in protectionism and subsidies towards Japan’s 
declining firms and industries would weaken the Yen, and ease the pressure upon 
Japan’s more competitive exporters in the machinery sector. It is also argued that 
an increase in foreign competition may spur Japanese firms towards greater 
innovation, particularly in sectors where Japan has fallen behind, such as 
software development and information technology. Finally, it is envisaged that 
by encouraging inward FDI, Japanese manufacturing could replenish its capital 
stock and nullify the harmful effects of “hollowing out”.
7.2.2 S trategic Failure
While the Anglo-US approaches to policy have become fashionable and appear 
to be gaining a consensus within Japan (Katz, 1998, Noguchi, 1996, 1998), they 
should not be regarded as a panacea. Indeed, this thesis would argue that there 
are no guarantees that such policies would stem or even reverse the “hollowing 
out” of industrial Japan (see also Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000, 2002). There 
are two related reasons for this concern. First, the Anglo-US model is based upon 
a pre-conceived notion that free market capitalism is inherently superior to the 
Japanese model and the notion of the Developmental State. In Japan, such an 
ideological approach may prove counter-productive (Higgott, 1998). 
Furthermore, since advocates of the Anglo-US approach often ignore Japan’s
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polity, culture, history and industrial structure, it is unlikely that relying upon the 
Anglo-US model will yield any helpful, long-term policy proposals for Japanese 
manufacturing.
Moreover. Anglo-US approaches appear to contain a fundamental flaw in that 
they often favour the continued dominance of a corporate elite and the 
concentration of strategic decision-making. One of the main tenets in this thesis 
is that it these characteristics of Japan’s industrial structure and the dominance of 
the large transnationals, which are at the roots of Japan’s current malaise (see 
Chapter (6)). Consequently policy initiatives that further the dominance and 
interests of a corporate elite could even exacerbate Japan’s crisis. For instance, 
consider Renault’s purchase of a controlling interest in Nissan and General 
Motors increased equity participation in Isuzu. Both are recent examples of 
major inward FDI into Japan; examples of investments that Western 
commentators often purport that Japan requires for economic revival. However, 
both of these “investments” have led to major automobile plant closures, a 
dismantling of keiretsu ties and significant redundancies in Japan’s major 
industrial belts (see Nikkei Weekly, 25/10/99 and 21/8/00, 21/5/01)2.
These cases may be seen as an example of “strategic failure”. Indeed, in Cowling 
and Tomlinson (2000) we have described the “hollowing out” of the Japanese 
economy in such terms. “Strategic Failure” is a situation that occurs when elite, 
centralised corporate hierarchies make strategic decisions on key economic 
variables, such as investment, output and employment, and that these decisions
21 am grateful to John Connor, of Purdue University, for the point about GM and Isuzu.
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conflict with society’s broader interests. There is then no market mechanism 
available for society to redress the balance and achieve a socially desirable 
outcome (Cowling and Sugden, 1994). The arguments in this thesis would 
concur that it is the concentration of strategic decision-making in Corporate 
Japan and the ever-increasing global interests of Japan’s large corporations that 
has precipitated a “hollowing out” of Japanese manufacturing and raised the 
spectre of a “strategic failure”. It is only through recognising the roots of Japan’s 
“strategic failure” that policy-makers will be able to suggest directions for the 
renewal of Japanese manufacturing and, in particular, the machinery sector.
In order to reverse the current decline, it is necessary for Japan and MITI to 
engage in a strategic response and perhaps, once again, pursue an active 
industrial policy. However, a pre-requisite for such a policy is not only to learn 
from the experiences and mistakes of previous industrial policies, but also to be 
fully aware of the dominant role played by transnational corporations and the 
corporate elite. It can be argued that MITI’s apparent post-war favouritism 
towards the establishment of the Corporate Group and the promotion of “national 
champions” was misplaced, and has not been conducive to sustainable, long-term 
industrial success. These concerns lead us to consider alternative proposals for 
the future direction of industrial policy, with a particular emphasis upon a greater 
diffusion of strategic decision-making.
7.2.3 R eg io n a l P olicies an d  Sm all F irm s
Given the extent of regional “hollowing out” in Japan (see Chapter (6)), it is 
reasonable to suggest that the main focus of Japanese industrial policy should
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primarily be towards the regeneration of the prefectures. In this respect, it is 
perhaps first important to re-consider the Technopolis Project, which was an 
early attempt by MITI to counteract the effects of outsourcing and avoid 
problems of “hollowing out” (see Broadbent, 1989).
The Technopolis Project was launched in 1983, with the aim of establishing a 
number of high-tech cities throughout Japan’s prefectures. In many respects, the 
Technopolis Project reflected Japan’s determination to build and develop “world 
cities”, each of which could attract and retain major investors and modem 
industry in the global economy (for further details of the “world cities” concept, 
see Friedman, 1986). The emphasis was upon the creation of science parks, or 
advanced technological production sites with close linkages with universities and 
other research centres. By the mid-1990’s, approximately 30 projects had begun 
under the scheme (Whittaker, 1997). At best, the Technopolis Project has been 
only partially successful. In the early days, some smaller prefectures, such as 
Oita, were able to use their Technopolis status to regenerate industry within its 
towns and villages (Broadbent, 1989). Hamamatsu City, in Shizuoka prefecture, 
is also regarded as being a relatively successful high-tech, Technopolis city 
(Whittaker, 1997). However, as we saw in Chapter (6) (Table (6.3)), on the wider 
scale, the project has not been sufficient to negate the effects of globalisation and 
the problems of “hollowing out”.
In this respect, a closer look at the Technopolis Project might provide a reason 
for its relative failure to avert the “hollowing out” of industrial Japan. Under the 
scheme the main instruments of policy were tax breaks, depreciation allowances
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and special loan rates (Broadbent, 1989). These types of subsidy are all policies 
that generally favour the attraction of large-scale corporations rather than the 
development of an independent small firm base (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). 
In the global economy, this policy bias is unlikely to encourage long-term 
investment that is embedded within the local economy. As we have seen, large- 
scale corporations take a global perspective and their regional operations are 
likely to be regarded as being nothing more than footloose investments. Indeed, 
Broadbent (1989) first recognised this potential problem during the early stages 
of the Technopolis Project. Broadbent’s (1989, p250) study of Technopolis 
concluded “the Japanese State (and the Technopolis Project) is not very strong 
in the face o f  broad world economic trends, (which) affect the investment logic of 
individual companies, causing them to respond in ways similar to that in the 
West, leading to ever greater international investment” (own additions in 
parenthesis).
The inherent bias towards large firms within the Technopolis Project is very 
similar to MITI’s other post-war industrial policies, which have contributed to a 
concentration of strategic decision-making within Corporate Japan. In the light of 
Japan’s “strategic failure” and the recent experiences of “hollowing out”, perhaps 
it would be advisable for Japan to move towards less hierarchical modes of 
production, with strategic decision-making becoming more devolved at a local 
level. This might lead us to favour policies that strengthen Japan’s small firm 
base, with a specific focus upon nurturing independent small firm entities rather 
than subsidising a small firm base that is subservient to the interests of the large- 
scale transnationals.
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In particular, industrial policy could (primarily) be targeted towards the 
development and extension of horizontal small firm networks within Japan’s 
traditional sanchi regions. It is the expansion of Japan’s sanchi regions, which 
possibly offers Japanese manufacturing the best opportunity to arrest the current 
decline. The development of these small horizontal networks may provide the 
basis for what Best (1990) has described as “collective entrepreneurialism”. 
Here, co-operative clusters of small firms engage in a mode of flexible 
specialisation, where they are able to innovate, diversify and eventually emerge 
to compete with the large transnational corporations. These small firm networks 
are sometimes referred to as the “new competition”, and are best exemplified in 
the Italian industrial districts of Emilia-Romagna. It is, therefore, perhaps 
encouraging that MITI have been studying the Italian experience as a way 
forward for the revitalisation of Japanese manufacturing (JSBRI, 1996).
It is important to recognise that a wider role for Japan’s sanchi will require a 
significant change of emphasis within Japan. This is particularly the case within 
the machinery sector, where transactions are pre-dominantly vertical. Policies 
should be geared towards reducing the dependence of small firms upon their 
main contractors. They should also favour close co-operation both within and 
between small firm networks. At a practical level, the Japanese State could target 
aid to smaller firms to enable them to upgrade their technological capability. This 
may provide Japan’s small firms with an opportunity to become more 
independent from their main contractors, since it may allow them to diversify
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their product range and target niche markets3. In addition, MITI could also 
undertake substantial investment in the upgrading of public infrastructure and 
expand Japan’s public research and development facilities. These facilities 
should be designed to serve whole networks of small firms and would, therefore, 
be very different from some of the Public Testing and Research Centres (PTRs) 
that are currently controlled by Japan’s transnational corporations (see Ruigrok 
and Tate, 1996; Chapter (2)). Small firms should also be encouraged to foster 
closer links between themselves, both within and between prefectures. Such 
linkages could also be allowed to develop at an international level, between 
Japan’s sanchi firms and small firms elsewhere, effectively creating 
multinational webs, which embrace a true sense of multinationalism (Cowling 
and Sugden, 1999). These webs could be supported with appropriate institutional 
arrangements at a regional, national and supra-national level, involving industrial 
and commercial bodies, educational linkages and mutual research centres.
7.2.4 Increased M onitoring o f  T ransnational A c tiv ity
An important adjunct to these policies would be for Japan to undertake greater, 
and perhaps more effective, monitoring of its transnational corporations. This is 
important, since transnationals develop and extend linkages with many actors 
and small firms throughout the globe. Tensions arise when transnationals decide 
(or threaten) to re-locate production, and small firms may become isolated.
3 It was suggested to me that the hierarchical nature of Japan’s industrial structure might have 
actually stifled the potential for the Japanese economy to produce sufficient entrepreneurs, which 
would facilitate the promotion of such activities. In this respect, it may therefore be advantageous 
for MITI to encourage a greater entrepreneurial spirit amongst the wider Japanese small business 
community perhaps through trade associations and enterprise clubs. I am grateful to Marco 
Bellandi of Florence University for this point. For an in-depth review of Japan's small firm 
sector, see Whittaker (1997).
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particularly if they are “locked in” to a long-term relationship with their main 
contractor (see Chapter (6)). Part of the problem may be that small firms have 
insufficient information about the extent of their main contractor’s global 
activities, and so they often do not appreciate their own vulnerability. Insufficient 
information also prevents actors (such as small firms and labour) who are 
involved with transnationals from co-ordinating a response to strategies such as 
“divide and rule”.
If Japan’s industrial policy is to focus upon revitalising the small firm sector, as 
outlined above, then greater transparency is required so that small firms are more 
aware of their main contractor’s “inside options” and the dangers of becoming 
“locked in” to contracting relations. Such transparency may also improve co­
ordination between Japanese and other actors who encounter the same 
transnational corporation. In addition, increased monitoring of the activities of 
transnational corporations will also be required to ensure that public resources 
are directed towards their intended target - an independent small firm sector - as 
opposed to supporting a network of small firms, subservient to transnational 
interests.
At this point, it is worth noting that MITI conducts an annual survey of Japanese 
transnationals, publishing data of affiliates’ activities and occasionally estimating 
some of the effects of offshore production upon the Japanese economy (see 
Chapter (6)). In addition, the international offices of the Japanese External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO) also publish survey information about Japanese affiliates 
in North America, East Asia and Europe. This is useful data and can used for
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future research and to guide policy-makers. However the surveys have been 
criticised on the grounds that there is a wide variance in their coverage and 
response rates (Ramstetter, 1996). Consequently, the surveys can only provide a 
partial insight into the activities of transnational corporations. Interestingly, an 
independent research company, Toyo Keizai (TK), publishes annual data on the 
yearly operations of Japanese overseas subsidiaries, providing details of affiliate 
equity arrangements, overseas sales and employment levels. Ramstetter (1996) 
has argued that the Toyo Keizai (TK) publications are a more reliable source of 
information than the MITI surveys. Unfortunately, the Toyo Keizai’s high retail 
price confines it away from the wider public domain (Ramstetter, 1996).
The MITI, JETRO and Toyo Keizai (TK) surveys provide a benchmark for the 
collation of information about (Japanese) transnationals. Each survey is based 
upon voluntary information, provided by “willing participants”. To obtain more 
detailed information on transnational activity, it may be appropriate for Japan to 
establish a regular census of its domestic transnational corporations. This may be 
undertaken through the establishment of a transnational monitoring unit, with a 
remit for the accumulation and dissemination of information concerning the 
activities of Japanese transnationals (see Bailey et.al, 1994b).
There is a caveat with undertaking such a policy initiative in that, for its 
successful implementation, Japan will require wide international support. There 
is a danger that by adopting a unilateral policy to establish such a unit, Japan may 
become isolated both politically and economically. For instance, if transnationals 
view the monitoring unit as being over-intrusive, then they may reduce their
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investments in Japan even further by relocating to countries where the unit has 
no jurisdiction. This will, of course, exacerbate the “hollowing out” of Japanese 
industry. In this case, it would be preferable for Japan to effectively “close off’ 
the transnationals’ option of relocating to regimes where there are no monitoring 
units. Perhaps Japan could use her international influence to encourage an 
international agreement on the establishment of several transnational monitoring 
units around the globe. The geographical coverage of a country’s transnational 
unit should match the geographical extension of that country’s transnational 
corporations. The units themselves could be policed by the United Nations, 
whose annual conferences and reports have provided researchers with invaluable, 
although limited, information on transnational corporations (see UNCTAD 
reports for further details).
7.3 Future Research Possibilities
Before we draw our final conclusions, we should note that there remain a number 
of unresolved questions, which open up possible avenues for future research. 
These primarily relate to both the Case Study and potential econometric work. It 
is my intention to consider some of these issues further in later work.
7.3.1 E xten ded  Case S tudy A nalysis
One of the limitations of the analysis in Chapter (5) is that it is based upon a 
Case Study of Japanese supplier affiliates based in the UK. Although the 
experiences of the Managing Directors and Senior Managers of UK based 
suppliers were said to be typical of new keiretsu affiliates, an interesting 
extension would be to conduct a similar Case Study of Japanese supplier
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affiliates in the USA. Such a study would allow for a direct comparison between 
the experiences of Japanese affiliates based in the UK and the USA. A US Case 
Study could be seen as being complementary to Inkpen’s (1994) earlier research, 
but would focus more directly on the issues raised in Chapter (5). In particular, a 
US Case Study might reveal more details on the nature of transnational linkages 
between the affiliates and the extent to which Japanese OEMs engage in “divide 
and rule” strategies with their North American workforce.
At this point, we should note that in compiling this thesis, an attempt was made 
to survey Japanese supplier affiliates based in the USA. Indeed, in late 
September 2000, a similar questionnaire was also sent out to Japanese affiliated 
auto-suppliers in the USA (see Appendix (A), for further details). However both 
the cost and logistical considerations restricted the survey to a small sampling 
frame. Perhaps, not surprisingly, there was a poor response rate. In survey work, 
non-response combined with a small sample size is a “dangerous failing” and 
raises questions as to the legitimacy of any (US) results obtained (Moser and 
Kalton, 1971). Consequently, it was decided to ignore the results from the US 
survey. Nevertheless, this pilot US study offers the potential for future field 
research in this area.
7.3.2 Future E conom etric  Studies
The analysis in Chapter (6) may also be extended. The econometric work in 
Chapter (6) followed Hollingsworth’s model (1997), in taking an indirect 
approach to estimating the real effects of transnational activity upon the
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behaviour of investment and employment. We also reported survey data to gauge 
the extent of regional “hollowing out” in Japan.
In future research, it may be a useful extension to consider using econometric 
techniques to explore further issues related to the “hollowing out” of Japanese 
manufacturing. We might, for instance, wish to consider estimating, directly, the 
real effects of transnational activity upon other key economic indicators, such as 
Japanese productivity and real output growth. These studies could be done at the 
aggregate and, preferably, at the regional level, thus allowing researchers to 
identify the full extent of regional “hollowing out” in Japan. Given the nature of 
Japan’s keiretsu groupings, and concerns about small firm isolation, it would also 
be interesting to examine the effects of transnational activity upon small firm 
performance.
An implicit assumption behind these proposals is that we can accurately measure 
transnational activity. Chapter (6) used an indirect measure, since we were not 
satisfied with the properties of FDI data. Future research may also be geared 
towards constructing appropriate indices of transnational activity. In this respect, 
Davies and Lyons (1996) have begun to initiate work in this area. These authors 
have constructed a firm level transnationality index, which is based upon a 
weighted measure of a firm’s total output, in each of the markets in which it 
operates. The Davies and Lyons (1996) data set is based upon an extensive Case 
Study of transnationals in the European Union. Unfortunately, because of the 
enormity and complexity of data collection, their data set only relates to one 
year, 1987. The authors recognise the limitations of their time-span, but they
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report that they intend to replicate their studies in further research. This is a 
welcome step in the right direction. We should, however, note that 
transnationality indices based upon output might not always be the relevant 
measure to use. For instance, as with FDI data, such indices may not capture the 
transnational’s span of control or the extent of their “inside options” (see Chapter 
(6) ) .
These issues raise interesting questions and offer a challenging and exciting 
future research agenda. The main impediment to such research appears to be 
accessibility to appropriate data sets. In particular, econometric investigation 
requires access to wider and more extensive data sets, with the most appropriate 
data being at the firm or cluster level. Unfortunately, this type of data is not 
published and is not easy to accumulate. For the questions raised in this thesis, 
further Case Study work - in Japan itself - may alleviate some of the data 
problems.
7.4 Conclusion
For a long period in Japan’s post-war economy, the success of the machinery 
sector and the cultivation of Japan’s large-scale corporations appeared congruent 
to Japan’s industrial development. This thesis has explored the nature of the 
Japanese transnational corporation and the recent problems of “hollowing out” 
within Japan’s machinery industries. We have argued that the current problems 
of de-industrialisation are linked to the hierarchical nature of Japan’s industrial 
structure and also a misguided industrial policy that appeared to favour the 
development of large-scale corporations. This has led to a concentration of
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strategic-decisions within Corporate Japan. In the global economy, this elite 
group now regards its future as being increasingly involved in transnational 
production networks to such an extent that it has precipitated a “hollowing out” 
of Japan’s industrial base, raising the prospect of “strategic failure”.
At a fundamental level, it is only through recognising the roots of Japan’s 
“strategic failure” that we are able to suggest directions for the renewal of 
Japanese manufacturing and, in particular, the machinery sector. In this final 
Chapter, we have advocated that Japan move towards a less hierarchical mode of 
production, with a policy emphasis towards the extension of the Japanese sanchi 
and the development of horizontal small firm networks. Such a shift in industrial 
policy-making is more likely to lead to sustainable industrial development and 
serve the wider public interest. For industrial policy-makers elsewhere, Japan’s 
recent experiences serve as an important lesson for the consideration of new 
policy initiatives.
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Appendix A
Data Sources for the Automotive Case Study (Chapters (4) and (5))
Chapters (4) and (5) considered a Case Study of the Japanese Automobile 
Industry, using data and information from three sources: The Dodwell Report 
(1997), Interviews and a Questionnaire. The following is a description of these 
data sources.
A 1.1 The Dodwell Report (1997)
In Chapter (4) the primary data source used was the latest Dodwell Report (1997) 
into the Japanese Auto-Parts Industry. In Japan, Dodwell Marketing Consultant’s 
have become renowned for publishing English translated reports about various 
Japanese industries. Dodwell’s Report into the structure of the Japanese Auto- 
Parts Industry is usually published every 5 years, and the 1997 report was the 
sixth edition. The Dodwell Reports have become a standard reference for 
previous academic research into the Japanese automobile industry (see for 
example, Smitka 1991, Sako 1996).
The Dodwell Report (1997) provides a range of information collated from annual 
company reports, surveys and questionnaires and also selected data from some of 
renowned Toyo Keizai’s annual publications. The 1997 report contains short 
profiles of each of the 11 Japanese OEMs; including a summary of both their 
domestic and overseas activities and details of their keiretsu supply structures. 
The report also publishes details of approximately 660 First and Second Tier
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Japanese auto-suppliers. Such information is provided in a typical Directory 
format and includes the name of the Company President, Year of Formation, the 
Head Office and main Japanese Factory Address, Shareholder Details, Product 
Range and Main Customers, Corporate Grouping and Supplier Association 
Memberships. The report also provides some information on 756 overseas 
subsidiaries and joint ventures of these Japanese automobile manufacturers and 
auto-suppliers. Information on these offshore affiliates is limited to details of the 
Date of Entry, the Parent’s Equity Stake, Names and Equity Stakes of Joint 
Venture Partners (if applicable) and the Type of Overseas Activity Engaged (i.e. 
sales, manufacturing and/or R&D).
While the Dodwell Report (1997) is the most comprehensive (English translated) 
source for data on the Japanese automobile industry, its limitations should also 
be noted. The first anomaly is that, for Japanese auto-suppliers, only the 
company’s main domestic factory and/or head office are listed, along with its 
major offshore affiliates. This is unfortunate, since it rules out the possibility of 
distinguishing between suppliers who have more than one plant in Japan and 
those that have several domestic plants. It also precludes the possibility of 
performing a “truly global count” of a firm’s supply plants across the globe. In 
addition, the report gives no details of the capacity or size or output and 
performance of subsidiaries. Another drawback is that the report does not 
provide any quantitative data on sales procurement between assemblers and 
suppliers, which limits the possibility of measuring “contract dependence” 
between firms.
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A final point is that the data in the Dodwell Report (1997) represents the position 
of the industry as at 31/12/1996. This means that the analysis and data presented 
in Chapter (4) is very much concerned with published information up to and 
including that date. Given the pace of globalisation, it is quite likely that the 
global position and strategies of Japan’s automobile companies have changed 
considerably since then1. Where possible, the Case Study updated some of the 
Dodwell data from other sources such as company reports, trade journals, the 
internet and newspaper articles. This is indicated in the text1 2.
A 1.2 Interviews
To supplement the Dodwell (1997) data, interviews were carried out with 
Managing Directors and/or Senior Managers at Japanese affiliated auto-suppliers 
based in the UK. The aim of the interviews was to obtain direct insights from 
these Japanese auto-suppliers particularly about their experiences in Europe. The 
UK was the most suitable sampling frame for both logistical reasons and the fact 
that the European manufacturing operations of Japanese OEMs and auto­
suppliers are concentrated in the country (see Chapter (4)).
According to the FAME database, by June 2000, there were 38 Japanese 
affiliated auto-suppliers with manufacturing operations in the UK. However, the 
choice of interviewees was dictated by those firms, which were willing to
1 For instance, in 1998, the French OEM, Renault, purchased a controlling 37% stake in Nissan. 
This has led the company to begin reviewing its global operations and supply network.
2 It should be noted that - in this line of research - the use of historical data, from secondary 
sources, is usually the only feasible means of analysis. For instance, Davies and Lyons’ (1996) 
study on the position and importance of transnationals in the European Union relates to data from 
1987, while Beamish et.al’s (1997) book describes data on the global activities of Japanese 
transnationals in 1993.
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participate. In total, only seven interviews were conducted, with the sample 
consisting of three firms that primarily supplied Toyota, three firms closely 
connected to Honda and one firm associated with Nissan. There were no firms 
that produced the same type of component and products ranged from the 
production of wheels to air-conditioning units. Finally, four of the firms were 
involved in some form of joint venture, while a Japanese parent solely owned the 
other three.
The interviews took place in offices at the firm’s main UK factory. Each 
interview was recorded, and the total interview time ranged from fifty minutes to 
one and a half hours. The interviews followed a semi-structured format, based on 
guidelines laid out in Moser and Kalton (1971). The questions were generally 
open-ended with interviewees being encouraged to express their views on a 
range of specific issues. The topics related to the company’s history in Europe, 
their relationships with the Japanese OEMs and other OEMs, production 
processes, the nature of competition, corporate decision-making, personnel and 
training issues and also opinions upon how the firm has adapted within the 
European Union.
A1.3 Questionnaire
The final set of data was collated from a questionnaire of Japanese auto-suppliers 
based in both the UK. In contrast to the interviews, the questionnaire was more 
focused upon seeking specific answers for evaluation. It also had the benefit that 
- in the UK at least - more firms were willing to participate and so more of the 
population was covered. This probably reflected the fact that questionnaires were
244
less time-consuming for firms to complete than, say, arranging an interview. A 
sample questionnaire is included in Appendix (B).
The first questionnaires were sent out, in September 2000, to all 38 Japanese 
auto-suppliers with UK subsidiaries. A covering letter asked for the 
questionnaire to be completed by either the Managing Director or a Senior 
Manager, and for them to state their company position on the completed form. 
Each respondent was promised complete confidentiality, although the firm could 
be identified by a serial number on the stamped addressed return envelope. This 
facilitated the monitoring of responses and enabled the “chasing up” of non­
respondents by telephone. By mid-November 2000, 27 completed questionnaires 
had been received - an impressive 71.1% response rate. From the 27 responses, 
13 were from subsidiaries involved in a joint venture of some form. In addition, 
the Japanese parent of 13 of the 27 firms were identified as belonging to a 
particular Japanese OEM Corporate Group, while the parents of the other 14 
could be classified as Independent suppliers. In response to the question of as to 
whom was their most important customer, eight respondents indicated it was 
Nissan, six went for Toyota and five for Honda. There were two firms that 
replied that all three Japanese OEMs were equally important, while six firms 
suggested other non-Japanese OEMs were their most important customer. These 
six firms all had Japanese parents who could be identified as Independent 
suppliers. As expected, the affiliates’ main customers are the Japanese OEMs: 
Nissan (9 affiliates), Toyota (7) and Honda (6). There were 3 (Independent) 
supplier affiliates that regard all the major Japanese OEMs as equally important.
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while 2 (Independent) suppliers suggested other non-Japanese OEMs were their 
most important customer.
Of the 11 UK non-respondents, 7 firms were identified as being involved in some 
form of joint venture. In addition, 8 of the subsidiaries were identified as having 
parents belonging to Japanese OEM Corporate Groups, while the other 3 had 
Japanese parents who were Independent Suppliers. This may suggest that there 
was a small proportionate bias towards responses from firms not involved in a 
joint venture, and also those from Independent suppliers. However, the 
questionnaire did include a separate section for joint venture firms to consider 
issues specific to those firms.
In late September 2000, a similar questionnaire was also sent out to Japanese 
affiliated auto-suppliers in the USA. The aim was to compare the experiences of 
US based affiliates with those in the UK. According to Dodwell (1997), there 
were 140 Japanese affiliated auto-supplier firms with 188 manufacturing plants 
in the USA. However, both cost and logistical considerations restricted the 
survey to a smaller sampling frame3. A reasonable sampling frame may have 
been to consider the US affiliates of the same 38 Japanese companies that were 
based in the UK. This seemed sensible and would facilitate a reasonable 
comparison of Anglo/American experiences. However, only 30 Japanese auto­
suppliers were identified as having production facilities in both countries. There 
were also concerns about obtaining an adequate response rate, given the
The average cost to send out a single questionnaire to the USA was £5.00. This included a 
covering letter, an 8 page questionnaire, UK outward international postage and a US international 
postage for the return envelope.
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geographical distance between the UK and the USA - it being more difficult to 
“chase” non-respondents across the Atlantic. Given these concerns it was 
decided to take a survey sample of 70 US affiliates and these were chosen 
randomly - from the Dodwell Report (1997) - using a process of random 
numbers (see Moser and Kalton, 1971). The 70 firms were deliberately evenly 
split between Group and Independent Suppliers and, in the final sample, 19 had 
production facilities in both the UK and the USA. The 70 questionnaires were 
sent out to the US Head Offices of Japanese auto-suppliers.
Not surprisingly, the US response rate was disappointing. In total, only 17 
questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 25% from an adjusted survey 
population of 68 (two questionnaires were returned as “unknown at this 
address"). From the 17 responses, 10 were identified as being subsidiaries of 
Japanese parents who were Independent Suppliers and 7 had parents who were 
Group suppliers. Only 7 respondents also had production facilities in the UK. 
The poor US response rate, combined with the small sample size, is a “dangerous 
failing”. It was felt that any statistical comparison between the UK and US 
results would therefore raise serious questions as to its validity (Moser and 
Kalton, 1971). The US survey was, therefore, not considered any further, 
although the possibility remains of future research in this area (see Chapter (7)).
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A ppendix B
University Research into the Global Japanese Automobile Industry 
Questionnaire
This Questionnaire forms the main basis of a PhD Research project, investigating 
globalisation and international business relationships within the Japanese 
automobile industry. The project is being overseen by Professors’ Michael Waterson 
and Keith Cowling at the University of Warwick, and is sponsored by both the 
Economic and Social Research Council (E.S.R.C) and The Royal Economic Society 
(R.E.S). The project has also received written support from the Japanese Auto- 
Parts Industry Association (JAPIA).
The Questionnaire is anonymous and all answers and information provided will be 
treated as confidential. Any information provided is for University research 
purposes only. If requested, a copy of the final (collated) research results will be 
made available.
The Questionnaire has 25 questions split into six sections (A-F). Please answer all 
questions in each section. The Questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes 
to complete. If there are any questions or enquiries regarding any aspect of the 
Questionnaire, then please do not hesitate to contact me at the address below. On 
completion of the Questionnaire, please return it in the stamped addressed envelope 
provided, as soon as possible.
Thank you for your time and kind co-operation.
Phil Tomlinson 
Department of Economics 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV47AL
Tel: (02476) 524930 
Fax: (02476) 523032 
Email: ecrez@csv.warwick.ac.uk
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Section (A) - Entry into the European market
1). In entering the UK market, what was the type of investment made by the 
company?
Please place a tick next to the most appropriate response.
a) . Acquired an equity stake in an existing UK (or European) supplier’s facilities (i.e.
Plant and/or Equipment).
b) . Invested in a new, purpose built plant on a green/brown-field site.
c) . Other (please explain).
2). In your opinion, what were the most important reasons for the company to locate 
in your geographical area? PLEASE RANK 1 to 7 (with 1 being MOST important 
and 7 being LEAST important).
a) . Close geographical proximity to the company’s main automobile manufacturer.
b) . The opportunity to establish a “joint venture” with an established “local” supplier.
c) . Close geographical proximity to the industry’s supplier base (in order to benefit
from industry synergies).
d) . The availability of a skilled labour force.
e) . Lower production costs than other locations.
0- Actively encouraged by the local authority/investment agency.
g) . The region has a good infrastructure, service sector and communications and transport
network.
h) Other (please specify).
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Section (B) - Joint Ventures
The following questions relate to JOINT VENTURES only. Please answer ONLY if 
your company is/or has been involved in a Joint Venture (i.e. between Japanese and 
European firms). Otherwise please go onto Question 8 in Section C (Page 3):
3). What were the main reasons for both firms to agree to set up a joint venture? 
Please RANK 1-5 (1 being MOST important, 5 being LEAST important).
a) . To finance the capital expenditure of new plant and equipment.
b) . Actively encouraged by the main (Japanese) assembler.
c) . The potential for all participants to widen their customer base.
d) . The potential for all participants to “pool” resources for Research and Development.
e) . The possibility that participants may obtain efficiency gains by sharing
knowledge/techniques and making appropriate changes in working practices.
0- Other (please specify).
4). Do these joint venture arrangements exist elsewhere within and/or 
outside the European Union ? YES/NO
If YES, please (briefly) provide further details.
5). What would you say have been the main benefits of the Joint Venture? Please 
place a tick next to the most appropriate response.
a) . Successful development of new products that meet the customer’s requirements.
b) . A significant increase in sales growth for all participants.
c) . Greater efficiency savings achieved through changes in organisational behaviour.
d) . There have been no obvious benefits from the joint venture.
e) . Other (please specify).
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6). What would you say have been the main difficulties in the operation of the Joint 
Venture so far? Please provide brief details.
7). How long do you expect the Joint Venture arrangements to continue? Please 
place a tick next to the most appropriate response.
a) . For the long-term (i.e. 10-20 years and beyond)
b) . For the medium term (5-10 years)
c) . For the short-term (less than 5 years)
d) . Uncertain - will depend upon winning future contracts.
Section (C) - Relationships with other Companies within the Industry
8) . Who is you r most important customer?
a) . Honda
b) . Nissan
c) . Toyota
d) . Other (please identify)
9) . How “close”  a working relationship do you have with your main customer? 
Please place a  tick next to the most appropriate response.
a) . A “very close " relationship, which involves regular discussion with the assembler on 
all aspects of the your firm’s business (i.e. upon products, raw material suppliers, 
production processes and an acceptance of “open-book” accounting or “cost-down”).
b) . A “close” relationship, where the assembler has a “limited” involvement in the 
“running” of your firm’s business.
c) . A “normal ” business relationship, where the assembler has no direct involvement in 
the “running” your firm’s business.
d) . Other (please specify).
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10) . If, in negotiating a new contract with your main customer, your final bid price 
is regarded as being “on the high side”, how is this likely to aiTect the “long-term” 
relationship with the assembler? Please place a tick next to the response that best 
describes the situation.
a) . The contract is lost. There is no “long-term” relationship.
b) . This particular contract is lost, but the relationship remains strong through other 
contract work that we do for the assembler.
c) . We lose this contract, and feel under pressure that the assembler will look elsewhere 
when other contracts become available.
d) . There is no loss of work - the assembler accepts the initial price and we accept 
assistance in trying to lower costs. The relationship is for the “long-term”.
e) . Other (please specify).
If you answered either (a), (b) or (c) to Question 10, please now answer Question 11. 
Otherwise please move onto Question 12.
11) . If you lose a contract with your main customer because your bid price is “too 
high” what happens to the contract?
a) . The contract work is still retained by our parent firm, but is carried out by another 
plant elsewhere, where costs are lower (possibly elsewhere around the globe).
b) . A rival firm will usually win the contract.
c) . We are not sure what happens to the contract.
12). How do you see your future relationship with your most im portant customer? 
Please place a tick next to the most appropriate response.
a) . Maintain current relations.
b) . Reduce the dependence upon the main assembler (through winning new contracts with 
other assemblers).
c) . Strengthening the relationship with the main assembler.
d) . Other (please specify)
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13). How “close” a working relationship do you have with your suppliers? Please 
place a tick next to the most appropriate response.
a) . A "very close” relationship, which involves regular discussion with the suppliers on 
all aspects of their business activities (i.e. upon products, production processes and an 
acceptance of “open-book” accounting or “cost-down”).
b) . A “close" relationship, where your firm has a “limited” involvement in the “running” 
of your suppliers’ businesses.
c) . A “normal” business relationship, where your firm has no direct involvement in the
“running” of your suppliers’ businesses.
d) . Other (please specify).
14). Have you encouraged, or do you expect to encourage, your suppliers to adopt 
“Japanese style” business practices (such as “open book” accounting)? YES/NO
If YES, please give brief details.
Section (D) - Product Development and Production Processes
15) . Does your company have an active Research and Development Centre in the
European Union? YES/NO
If YES, please say where it is located and then go onto Question (17).
If NO, please answer Question (16)
16) . How likely do you think your company will invest in Research and Development 
facilities in the European Union? Please place a tick to next to the most 
appropriate response.
a) . Very Likely - within the next 1-2 years.
b) . Quite Likely - within the next 5 years.
c) . Not in the medium term, but maybe in 10 years.
d) . Unlikely.
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17). Are your production processes similar to those carried out in Japan?
Please briefly highlight any major differences (If necessary, please feel free to 
continue overleaf).
Section (E) - Decision-Making and International Linkages
18). In the formulation of the company’s “global strategies” (in particular strategies 
concerning the location of new investment, new production processes and product 
development), to what extent are the management of the UK factory in 
“communication” with their counterparts at the company’s other factories in Japan 
and elsewhere? Please place a tick next to the most appropriate response.
a) . There is close and regular “communication” on these issues (i.e. more than once a 
month).
b) . There is regular “communication” on these issues (i.e. once or twice every three 
months).
c) . There is occasional “communication” on these issues (every six months or more).
d) . There are usually no “communications” between management teams on these issues.
e) . Other (please specify).
19). On a scale of 1-7, how much influence does the management team at the UK 
factory have upon the company’s “global strategies”?
Please circle the most appropriate response.
1 2 3 4 5
Little Influence Some Influence
6 7
Very Influential
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20). Are there regular exchanges of management and/or staff between the 
company’s factories around the globe? YES/NO
If YES please give a reason for the main purpose of these visits.
Section (F) - Personnel Issues
21). On a scale of 1-7, how would you describe the average “skills base” of your 
geographical recruitment area? Please circle the most appropriate response.
1 2 3 4 5
POOR AVERAGE
6 7
EXCELLENT
22). Does your firm experience problems in recruiting and retaining staff? YES/NO 
If YES, please give brief details.
23). Does your firm offer “support” (such as the payment of course fees/study leave) 
to employees who wish to obtain relevant external qualifications? YES/NO
If YES, is the employee “obliged” to remain with your firm for a specific time 
period after the course has finished? YES/NO
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24). Are employees offered the possibility of “training” in Japan? YES/NO 
If YES, what proportion of your workforce take up this opportunity?
25). Does your firm recognise and/or negotiate with trade union representatives? 
YES/NO
If YES, what proportion of your workforce are trade union members?
Position in the Company: Date:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION IN COMPLETING 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
PLEASE RETURN THE COMPLETED FORMS IN THE STAMPED 
ADDRESSED ENVELOPE PROVIDED.
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Appendix C
Statistical Techniques Involved in the Automotive Case Study 
(Chapters (4) and (5))
In Chapter (4), much of the Dodwell (1997) data is presentational and is not 
suitable or is insufficient to even consider using linear regression techniques to 
explore various hypotheses relating to the globalisation of the Japanese 
automobile industry. Nevertheless the Directory style information contained in 
the Dodwell Report (1997), has allowed a new data set to be collated and the 
graphs and statistics presented in Chapter (4) are both original and innovative 
attempts to show new evidence on the scale and pattern of globalisation within 
the industry. Throughout the Chapter, the data is used to supplement and 
substantiate various arguments.
The main statistical technique employed in Chapters (4) and (5) is the calculation 
of correlation coefficients between relevant variables. The aim of the correlations 
is to detect any statistically significant associations between variables in the 
Case Study. We do not generalise the results to make inferences about the entire 
population. Rather, on the basis of statistical regularities that hold for the data 
set, we only generalise to theoretical propositions. We are aware that small- 
sample significance tests cannot fully eliminate the problems of small-sample 
bias. As such, levels of 10% significance should be treated with caution and 
should not serve as the basis for any strong conclusions. The main interest in the 
study is:
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a) the existence o f an association
b) its direction
c) its statistical significance, but not in assigning a precise numerical value for 
economic interpretation
The correlation coefficients are based upon Pearson’s r and are calculated using 
Excel. Pearson’s r is essentially a measure of a linear association between two 
variables, which are assumed to follow a joint normal distribution (Newbold, 
1995). In this case, the Student’s t distribution is used, with the null hypothesis 
being that there is no association between the two variables. The test statistic is 
calculated as:
t = r /V(l-r2)/n-2)
and the null hypothesis is rejected if to 2 > | ta |, where (X is the level of statistical 
significance.
In Chapter (5), the correlations were based upon the bivariate regression of two 
dummy (qualitative) variables. The test of significance in this case is a chi-square 
test of independence using a cross-tabulation (or contingency table). The chi- 
square distribution is non-parametric and requires no assumption about the exact
shape of the distribution. The null hypothesis is of no association between the
2 2 two variables. The null hypothesis is rejected when % (Obtained/Corrected) > %
(critical), and in this case, the association between the two dummy variables is
unlikely to have been generated by chance alone.
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In all cases the data set generated - in the cross-tabulation - at least one cell 
where the expected frequency was less than 5. The test statistic was, therefore, 
calculated using Yate’s correction:
X2 (Corrected) = I  [|fQ - fe| - 0.5]2 / fe
A two-times-table has 1 degree of freedom, regardless of the number of cases in 
the sample.
An example of a correlation coefficient reported in Chapter (5) can seen as 
follows:
(r = 0.43, chi-sq = 5.21, p< 0.025)
The first statistic is the correlation coefficient, r. In this case it tells us that there 
is a positive correlation between X and Y. The second statistic is the chi-square 
test statistic. The third statistic indicates that the association between X and Y is 
statistically significant at the 2.5% level (where there is no significance between 
two variables, this is denoted by n.s).
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